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Abstract 
Trade secrets represent great value in companies and grants competitive advantages. However, they 
are mainly used internally as a complement to IPRs in order to protect the knowledge of the 
company. This thesis investigates the possibility to generate value from trade secret by external use, 
i.e. transacting the trade secret through either selling or licensing. In order to visualise the findings 
the thesis is built around two different types of cases, one case where the knowledge is embedded 
inside a physical product and one where the knowledge is openly available in a manual, to give more 
comprehensive conclusions. Three different types of protection and control mechanisms are 
analysed, namely Swedish and EU trade secret legislation, contractual protection, and practical 
protective measures. It is found that each type of protection and control mechanisms does not grant 
a sufficient level of protection and control by itself. However, by combining the findings from the 
three parts the conclusion is arrived to that the protection and control should most times be 
sufficient for externally transacting trade secrets. 
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1 Introduction  
It is well established that patents, copyrights, design rights, and trademarks can be transacted, either 
by sale or license. Companies have developed business models surrounding licensing of their 
patented technology as one of their main income source. Artists and record labels license out their 
copyrights on a daily basis, using for example Spotify as a mean. Companies utilising sub-contractors 
for production of their goods, such as Nike, are depending on licensing out their design rights to do 
business. Trademarks are licensed when a subcontractor is brewing and selling beverages under 
another brewer’s trademark, such as when Coca Cola is brewed and sold by a local brewery in 
Sweden. These IPRs are traditional ways of protecting knowledge in order it to be transacted. 
However, not all knowledge is possible to protect by IPRs. For example inventions might lack the 
inventive step.  There might also be business reasons for not utilising IPRs. These problems are to 
some extent offset by protecting of knowledge as trade secrets. Trade secrets are, due to their 
nature, not as commonly transacted as IPRs. The reason for this is due to the high risks of losing 
control and thereby the value of the trade secret. To investigate the level of protection and to 
understand the risks and how they can be avoided, a thorough analysis of Swedish and EU trade 
secret legislation will be performed.  
        Trade secrets represent great values in companies and society. It is therefore unfortunate 
that trade secrets are not given more protection in countries within the EU. For instance Sweden is 
the only state in the EU with an explicit act on protection of trade secrets. As an attempt to address 
this, the European Commission has proposed a Directive for harmonizing the trade secret 
protection throughout the European Union.  
        This thesis is a cooperation with SKF, who presented the authors with the subject and a 
wish for investigate and analyse how to transact trade secrets while maintaining their characteristics 
as trade secrets. The thesis will therefore be focused on the situation of SKF, but general 
conclusions will also be drawn. 
1.1 Problem Statement 
When performing the literature review for this thesis the problems presented in the following have 
been identified.  
1.1.1 Volatile Nature of Knowledge and Trade Secrets 
The first problem is that of the characteristics of knowledge, intangibles, compared to physical 
goods, tangibles. This poses problems in, for example, situations of bankruptcy where, for tangibles, 
13 
it is fairly easy to decide ownership compared to deciding ownership of intangibles not protected by 
IPRs. Furthermore it is identified that transacting tangibles present less obstacles than transacting 
intangibles, due to the volatility of intangibles.  
1.1.2 Lack of Exclusivity 
While “knowledge is the currency of the new economy”, as the EU-commission puts it, this 
knowledge can be protected by several means.1 The most well known ways of doing this is by using 
IPRs. These IPRs grant the owner exclusive rights to what is claimed by the IPR. However, this is 
not the case when one chooses, for one reason or another, to protect her proprietary knowledge as a 
trade secret. As there is no exclusivity right for trade secrets, this implies that once the information is 
out in the open anyone can freely use it. This volatile nature makes it difficult to transact trade 
secrets, in for instance licensing agreements, as it will be difficult to govern these agreements and 
ensure that the trade secrets do not lose their status as trade secrets and thereby their value.  
1.1.3 Differences in Protection 
The lack of harmonized legislation adds to the hardship of transacting trade secrets. If a company 
does not know what kind of protection its trade secrets has in each country, the company is certainly 
less prone to transact its trade secrets. With the Directive the legislation for trade secrets might be 
harmonised within the EU. If the Directive is adopted the problem will not be whether the 
protection is sufficient in a certain country, but rather how to transact the trade secret in order to 
generate the most value with the Directive in force. 
1.1.4 Static Legislation  
As is presented in the theory section below, IP may be used either statically or dynamically, where 
using IP in transactions such as licensing is a typical example of dynamic use. However, the trade 
secret legislation in Sweden, as well as the Directive, is not designed with dynamic use in mind. The 
legislation is instead designed for static use, i.e. keeping the trade secret hidden and granting certain 
measures if the trade secret is misappropriated.  
1.2 Aim of The Thesis 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the concept of knowledge, as an asset and property, can 
be treated as dynamic property in a commercial transaction by setting up foundations for a platform 
                                                
1 European Commission (July 2012a), Communication from the Commission to the Europeans Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, A Reinforced European Research 
Area Partnership for Excellence and Growth,COM(2012) 392, 17.7.2012, p. 2.  
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consisting of protective measures. Three different types of protective measures will be analysed, 
namely Swedish and EU trade secret legislation, contractual provisions, and practical measures. 
Emphasis will be on trade secret legislation since this is the foundation of the thesis. Each of the 
three types of protection will henceforth be referred to as ‘blocks’. The thesis will build upon two 
scenarios, which are inspired from two real cases from SKF where the authors will be responsible 
for one case each. In the first case the trade secret, and the knowledge it comprises, is embedded 
within a physical product and therefore not openly available for the customer. In the second case the 
trade secret, and the knowledge it comprises, is openly available for the customer. In relation to each 
case the most imminent risks associated with transacting trade secrets will be analysed. Using two 
cases in conjunction with their respective imminent risks, the authors’ believe will enable more 
concrete insights. If not using two examples there is a high risk that the thesis will have a more 
speculative character and less focused. 
1.3 Research Questions 
In order to break down the broad scope the thesis will focus on three research questions, with sub-
questions, that will be applied to both cases individually. The following research questions are 
investigated: 
1. Can the knowledge be identified as a trade secret according to the legal definition of the 
FHL and the Directive? 
1. What protection is granted by the FHL and the Directive in order to protect the 
knowledge from the imminent risks? 
2. Does the protection granted by the FHL and the Directive suffice for the knowledge 
to be treated as dynamic property in a commercial transaction? 
2. What contractual provisions can be utilised in order to protect the knowledge from the 
imminent risks?  
1. Does the protection granted by contractual obligations suffice for the knowledge to 
be treated as dynamic property in a commercial transaction? 
3. What practical measures can be used in order to protect the knowledge from the imminent 
risks?  
1. Does this protection granted by the practical measures suffice for the knowledge to 
be treated as dynamic property in a commercial transaction? 
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2 Literature Review 
Trade secrets and their use have been addressed in several works. In “Immaterialrätt & sakrätt” 
Wainikka addresses the question whether or not trade secrets can be licensed, however, she does this 
very shortly by just stating that it is possible and without mentioning how it should be done.2 
Wainikka has further addressed, to some extent, the use of trade secrets to protect innovations in 
the work “Att skydda innovationer”, however, trade secrets are only a minor part in the work and 
focus is not on transacting trade secrets but rather she gives a short account for how to protect trade 
secrets internally.3 Helgesson has performed a thorough comparative analysis of trade secret 
protection in France, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, in order to show the connection between 
technical development, socio-economical factors and the law, where the goal is to see how trade 
secrets may work in a new technical reality.4 Tonell thoroughly analyses the use of NDAs and their 
relation to trade secrets in his work “Sekretessavtal - och det rättsliga skyddet för 
företagshemligheter.”5 This work addresses to some extent the external transfer of trade secrets, 
mainly in connection to NDAs, however, focus is on internal use of trade secrets in order to protect 
knowledge. Fahlbeck presents a thorough analysis of the FHL in his work “Lagen om skydd för 
företagshemligheter – en kommentar och rättsöversikter” with the focus on explaining the law, 
preparatory works, and relevant case law.6 Focus is to explain how the law is to be understood rather 
than how to facilitate external use of trade secrets. Previous master theses regarding trade secrets 
have been addressed to some extent. Winkler’s thesis “Secrecy as a Part of the Intellectual Value 
Creation Within a Firm” focuses on how secrecy can be used to generate value within the company, 
and not through external uses.7 Stenberg and Fransson addresses in their thesis 
“Företagshemligheter - en värdeskapande strategi” also how trade secrets can be used to generate 
value as well as questioning that the FHL is arranged under competition law in Sweden.8 It is safe to 
say that how trade secrets should be handled internally in a company has been thoroughly 
researched. However, using trade secrets externally have been mentioned as possible in the 
                                                
2 Levin, Marianne, Wolk, Sanna, Persson, Annina H., Immaterialrätt & Sakrätt, Upplaga 1, Jure, Stockholm 2002. 
3 Wainikka, Christina, Att skydda innovationer: Affärer, risker och möjligheter, Upplaga 1:1 Studentlitteratur, Lund. 
4 Helgesson, Christina. Affärshemligheter i samtid och framtid, Upplaga 1:1, Jure, Stockholm 2000. 
5 Tonell, Magnus, Sekretessavtal - och det rättsliga skyddet för företagshemligheter, Upplaga 1, Jure, Stockholm 2012. 
6 Fahlbeck, Reinhold, Lagen om skydd för företagshemligheter - En kommentar och rättsöversikter, 3rd Edition, 
Norstedts Juridik, 2013. 
7 Winkler, Emil, Secrecy as a part of the intellectual value creation within a firm – How to use secrecy as a strategic tool 
in a business, University of Gothenburg – School of Business, Economics and Law, 2010. 
8 Stenberg, Susanne, Fransson, Martin, Företagshemligheter – En Värdeskapande Strategi, Juridiska Institutionen – 
Handelshögskolan vid Göteborgs Universitet, 2002. 
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encountered sources but have not been thoroughly researched in terms of how to do it.  
3 Method and Material 
The imminent risks of each case are a product of structured brainstorming, as well as discussions 
with relevant personnel at SKF and the supervisor.  
3.1 First and Second Research Questions 
For the first two research questions of the thesis, including both FHL and the Directive as well as 
the contractual provisions, the methodology that will be used is legal method. This method can be 
summarised in three steps:9  
1. Find all relevant legal information - Laws, case law, legislative proposals, doctrine etc. that is 
relevant for the research question. 
2. Apply the found legal information to the actual research question by interpreting them. This 
interpretation can be done in various ways, e.g. by literary interpretation, by teleological 
interpretation, according to the systematicity of the legislation in general, etc.  
3. Argue for the case that the legal sources and the interpretation of them is the correct one. 
The conclusion arrived to by using the legal method is then analysed in relation to the theories under 
the theory section. This is done by first reading up on the theories, then applying them to the 
conclusion where applicable and finally arguing for that the conclusion falls within the scope of the 
theories.  
3.1.1 The Directive 
As the Directive is not yet adopted by the EU, and therefore there is no existing case law, it is 
difficult to analyse what the prerequisites implies on a more detailed level. Due to this different 
interpretation methods utilised by the European Court of Justice will be reviewed as basis for 
analysing the Directive.  
When the European Court of Justice handles a case they may use various different methods, 
such as literary interpretation, autonomous interpretation, comparative interpretation, teleological 
interpretation etc., as foundation for interpretation of the applicable rule.10 The interpretation 
method the ECJ is most famous for is the teleological interpretation, which is mostly used when a 
                                                
9 Sandgren, Claes, Rättsvetenskap för uppsatsförfattare – Ämne, material, metod och argumentation, 2nd Edition, 
Norstedts Juridik 2007, pp. 36-39. 
10 Hettne, Otken Eriksson (2011), p. 158. 
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provision’s wording or context is unclear.11 A literary interpretation is mostly used in situations when 
the court want to use the wording of a provision as a limiting factor when, i.e. not wanting to give a 
provision a wider implication.12 Hettne and Otken Eriksson states that since the EU law should have 
the same effect in all member countries one can assume that terms occurring in both national and 
EU-law should not be interpreted the same way.13 A comparative method is according to Hettne and 
Otken Eriksson used for several reasons, such as to investigate if several countries have a similar 
solution to a problem, if there are differences in nations’ regulations to use as argument for a 
decision, if a country has a design of a legal rule that could serve as a model for EU regulation and 
to ensure that the EU-law is not too far from the legal traditions of the member states.14 Considering 
the influences taken from the FHL when drafting the Directive, together with the possibility to use 
national law when interpreting EU provisions, a comparison to how the Swedish act on trade secrets 
has been interpreted will be made in this thesis while having the implications of an autonomous and 
teleological interpretation in mind.  
3.2 Third Research Question 
Given that there is no source addressing the combination of trade secrets and practical protective 
measures, and that the nature of the question requires creativity, the method that will be used 
consists of structured brainstorm sessions, discussions that will be held with personnel at SKF 
working with IP and with a background in mechanical engineering, as well as interviewing an 
industry actor. In addition to this Internet searches for specialist knowledge, generally on technical 
forums, will be performed. 
The conclusion arrived to by using the method above is then analysed in relation to the 
theories under the theory section. This is done by first reading up on the theories, and then applying 
them to the conclusion where applicable and finally arguing for that the conclusion falls within the 
scope of the theories.  
3.3 Chosen Material  
The chosen material can be divided between the three first research questions. Material in relation to 
the first research question can in turn be divided into two parts, one considering the Swedish 
legislation and one concerning the European legislation about trade secrets. For the Swedish 
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12 ibid., p. 168. 
13 ibid., p. 161. 
14 ibid., p. 162 - 163. 
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legislation about trade secret the starting point is the propositionen 1987/88:155 that is the 
preparatory work of the FHL and has been consulted as far as it is applicable. Reinhold Fahlbeck’s 
book “A comment on Act on the Protection of Trade Secrets” (authors’ translation) is the most 
comprehensive work addressing the FHL and is the main doctrine for this thesis. Other doctrine will 
be used as well in order to confirm or to give a more nuanced view, however, in many cases the 
other sources derive their information from Fahlbeck’s work or are not as comprehensive as 
Fahlbeck, why Fahlbeck is many times the only available source. These sources are the works of 
specialised lawyers within relevant fields of law. To understand the implications of the FHL in the 
judicial arena relevant case law will be studied when applicable.  
 For the European legislation on trade secrets the starting point is the Directive in itself. To 
understand the underlying considerations for the Directive the “Commission Staff Working 
Document Impact Assessment” will be consulted. This working document builds on the 
commissioned study conducted by Baker & McKenzie, which is a thorough investigation of the 
trade secret protection throughout Europe, USA, and Japan.15 In order to understand the 
implications and how to interpret the Directive the work by Hettne and Otken Eriksson will be 
used.  
 The second research question regards many different areas of law. The starting point is 
contract law where the works of Ramberg and Ramberg is the main source. To understand the 
implications of contractual penalties the works of Gorton and Adlercreutz will be the main source. 
However, much of the before used doctrine are also relevant for the second research question, why 
they will be consulted here as well.  
 The nature of the third research question implies that no doctrine is available and few other 
sources as well. To understand and confirm the found solutions focus will be on Internet sources 
with specialist knowledge from technical forums to support and challenge the brainstormed theories 
used. The validity of the sources can, and should be, questioned. However, given the unorthodox 
nature of the solutions this is a necessity.   
3.4 Flowchart 
This thesis is written by two authors that need to be individually valued and judged, which has 
structural implications. In order to simplify for the reader the flowchart below has been made, see 
Figure 1. 
                                                
15 de Martinis, Lorenzo, Gaudino, Francesca, Respess, Thomas S. III, Baker McKenzie Study on Trade Secrets and 
Confidential Business Information in the Internal Market, Milan 04.2013. 
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The thesis is divided into three blocks, one for each of the three research questions. The first 
block answers the first research question whereas the second block answers the second research 
question and the third block the third research question. Using this structure makes the thesis more 
defined as well as it facilitates answering the research questions. It furthermore separates the 
findings making it more accessible for the reader.  
The three blocks are in turn divided into two sections, one for each case where each block is 
analysed and conclusions arrived to. This structure is utilised in order to separate the two individual 
contributions by the authors. This allows for an individual evaluation of the authors and their 
achievements. 
The part named “Overall Assessment” combines the findings from the three blocks from 
each case. Initially a summary of the findings is presented. Given the comprehensive nature of the 
thesis there is a need for a summary in order to facilitate for the reader. The authors are aware that 
this is a repetition. However, given the comprehension there is a risk that the reader either misses 
out on, or forgets, essential information. It might be possible to have a section referring to other 
parts in the thesis instead of the summary. This is however identified as inconvenient and does not 
fulfil the purpose of a summary.   
Following the “Summary” under “Overall Assessment” the thesis presents the conclusions 
for each case. The three protective measures are here brought together and analysed whether or not 
they enable dynamic use of trade secrets.  
The section called ‘Business Perspective’ follows the ‘Summary’. The authors have found it 
necessary to put the findings made into a business context. The reason for this is that the nature of 
the thesis focuses on the possibility for companies to utilise trade secrets in a dynamical way. Under 
this section the findings that are strictly relating to business considerations presented.  
Figure 1 - Flowchart 
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4 Delimitations 
First and foremost, the authors are well aware that it is not feasible to set up operational platform 
given the limited time for this thesis, why only a foundation for such a platform is the aim for the 
thesis. This thesis addresses only certain articles, in this case article 1 and 2 of the FHL and 2 and 3 
in the Directive. The articles 3-14 of the FHL and 4-20 of the Directive will not be accounted for 
since they are not relevant for how to protect the trade secret, but rather works as preventive 
pressure not to infringe. Article 7 and 9 of FHL will be briefly touched upon for comparative 
purposes.  
This thesis addresses none of the four IPRs, i.e. patents, trademarks, design rights, or 
copyright. In the case of patents and trademarks they fall outside the scope of the thesis since their 
nature implies disclosing the knowledge. However, patents will be used for comparisons to highlight 
strengths and weaknesses of the foundation of the platform. Moreover, copyright protects the 
representation as such from copying, and not the knowledge within, why it is not a part of the thesis 
either. The protection offered by design rights might be an interesting way to protect embedded 
knowledge, however, this protection falls outside the scope of the thesis since it does not protect the 
embedded knowledge but rather the design of the product.  
It falls outside of the aim of this thesis to investigate the regulation for damages within the 
FHL and the Directive, even if these regulations might be interesting to investigate. Furthermore 
this thesis will not investigate the possible competition law issues. The authors identify that 
competition law might affect the construction of the foundations of the platform, however, it is 
within the scope of the thesis since the aim is to identify protection and control measures rather 
than other legal limitations. When creating the foundation of the platform some aspects of labour 
law are identified as interesting. The authors have chosen not to include these aspects since the 
majority of them falls outside the scope of the thesis. Moreover, the foundation of the platform is 
constructed from the traders’ viewpoint, meaning that the employee and employer relationship 
generally is outside the scope. Under block 2 only Swedish law is investigated. The reasons for this is 
that it is not feasible due to the time period of the thesis to investigate all these issues in relation to 
EU-law or in relation to national law of several EU-members. 
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5 Theory 
The following theories will be applied in this thesis: the theory of control of knowledge, the theory 
of the three arenas, and static and dynamic use of knowledge theory. These theories have been 
selected in order to put the findings into context as well as providing tools to test and falsify the 
findings. By applying these theories to the findings the validity of the thesis increases as well as it 
gives a better understanding of the complex structure and reality the findings are set in.  
5.1 Petrusson’s and Heiden’s Theory of Control of Knowledge?  
The characteristics of knowledge being infinite in the sense of scalability, creates a problem. 
Something that is infinitely available has no value. Therefore the reason to control knowledge is to 
make it scarce. When made scarce it becomes more valuable. However this is not easy which has 
been identified by Foray, who states that companies finds it far more difficult to control knowledge 
than machines.16  
 The theory that knowledge has to be controlled in order to generate value is a central theory 
that this thesis is based upon. The better the control the company has over its intellectual assets the 
easier it is to package and transact them.  
5.2 Petrusson’s and Heiden’s Theory of Transforming Knowledge into Capital 
Petrusson and Heiden make the analogy that “[j]ust as water can exist in three states (solid, liquid, 
gas) so can financial objects (asset, property, capital)”.17 They furthermore state that; each state of 
water or financial objects are bound by different characteristics and consequences that in the case of 
financial assets are based on the belief and trust by the economic actors. This analogy is part of a 
model used to explain how to better understand wealth creation within a capitalistic economy, which 
is dependent on the formation of 
capital.18 The model furthermore 
shows the interplay between assets, 
property and capital, as shown in 
Figure 2.19 The process of creating 
capital is a three-step process, 
which starts with identifying the 
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19 ibid., p. 277 
Figure 2 – Assets as Valuable Objects 
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asset. The second step is to make the asset a property, while the third step is to capitalize on the 
property.  
The example used by Petrusson and Heiden to explain this model is that of a house. A house 
is fairly easy identified as an asset, the first step. In order for the house “to be considered as property 
it must be trusted as an object of a commercial transaction”, the second step.20 Central for this 
second step of claiming the house as property is the belief in ownership rights. These rights can be 
validated by either the judicial system or society in general. In many countries it is fairly easy to 
establish that one’s house is one’s property, e.g. in Sweden there is a system of title deeds. However, 
even lack of ownership rights allows commercialization of property to occur, but it would be 
difficult to reach the third level; capitalisation. The requirement for capitalisation, Heiden and 
Petrusson continues, is that the assets have to be seen and trusted as potentially secure objects in 
commercial transactions.21 For example, the house can be used as collateral for loans and bonds. If 
one cannot show that the house is her property it is hard, or impossible, to get a loan from the bank. 
This model can be applied to intellectual phenomena, i.e. knowledge, as well, however it is a 
more difficult exercise than with physical assets. In the context of knowledge, the first step is to 
identify what knowledge is considered an intellectual asset for the firm that needs to be protected. 
This intellectual asset could for example be know-how, market knowledge, technical specifications 
or administrative data. The next step is to claim the intellectual asset as property of the firm. As with 
the example of the house, this is generally done through the usage of legal tools, in this case by 
intellectual property legislation. A company can for example apply for a patent and if granted this 
patent, the patent and the technical solution covered within is the company’s property. By claiming 
that the intellectual asset falls within the criteria of an IPR the firm will establish the asset as 
property, which is the case where there is no administrative body, such as a patent office. This 
applies for example in the case of copyright. For trade secrets however, which are not considered as 
an IPR but are still legally protected against misappropriation, this is done by claiming the asset as a 
trade secret, by e.g. using non legal tools as marking it as confidential and keeping it secret. The third 
and final step is the difficult one. According to Petrusson and Heiden “...the asset must be trusted as 
potentially secure objects in commercial transactions before they can be considered as capital by 
financial markets, for example financing such as bonds and loans”.22 Theoretically it is fairly easy to 
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transact trade secrets and thereby capitalise on it, however due to the volatile nature of trade secrets 
and the fact that one mistake could erase the entire value, makes for a less trustworthy property for 
the financial markets than for instance a patent. However, this thesis will not focus on turning 
intellectual assets into capital. This thesis focuses on the first two steps, identification of an asset and 
then claiming it as property by different legal and non-legal measures. These two steps are identified 
as necessary to capitalise on the knowledge, which in turn can be seen as a middle ground between 
the property step and capital step, and that also is the aim of this thesis.       
5.3 Petrusson’s Theory of Controlling Knowledge in The Three Arenas 
The foundation of creating the control is the 
communicative interaction between what Petrusson 
describes as the ‘three arenas’. The three arenas 
consist of an administrative arena, a judicial arena, 
and a business arena as shown in Figure 3.23 In 
relation to patents the administrative arena is the 
administrative procedures related to claiming 
patents, such as patent offices. The judicial arena 
comprises the judicial courts that are upholding the 
laws upon which the state is built. In relation to 
patents the judicial arena is mainly about validation 
of patents, e.g. if a competitor tries to invalidate a 
patent, and pursuing infringers. The business arena 
is described by Petrusson “as a structural platform, which in turn is a conglomerate of structural 
platforms, e.g. of markets, innovation systems, firms, and commercial relations”.24  
 The interaction between these arenas is of great importance. For example: a start-up or a 
SME might have been granted a patent in the administrative arena. This patent grants them a strong 
property claim on the patented invention. However, start-ups and SMEs do not have strong 
positions in the business arena due to their lack of market power. Therefore a big company might be 
able to use this patent because of their market power in the business arena is stronger than that of 
the start-up or the SME. Start-ups and SMEs have a much harder time allocating resources for a 
possible infringement prosecution in the judicial arena. This very simplified example shows that if a 
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Figure 3 – The Three Arenas 
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company has a weak position in one arena it might be possible to offset by a strong position in 
another arena.  
In some cases there is no applicable administrative arena, such as the patent offices, which is 
the case with copyright or trade secrets, at least under Swedish law. In the case of trade secrets 
Petrusson argues that “[b]ecause there are behaviours that can be considered as a violation of the 
trade secret regulation in the judicial arena, it is also possible to claim a trade secret as property in 
the business arena”.25 Lacking an administrative arena, it is in the case of trade secrets highly 
important to create and maintain a control position in the two other arenas.  
5.4 Petrusson’s Theory of Dynamic or Static IP 
There are different ways to utilise knowledge within a company and with different outcomes. 
Petrusson has a theory about usage of IPRs, and discusses the concepts of static and dynamic IPRs. 
A static IPR is used to prevent others from using the IPR without authorisation, the concept 
originates from the right to use one’s property without disturbance.26 This is also the traditional way 
to look upon IPRs, as a way to block competitors. Dynamic IPRs on the other hand are a “set of 
tools used to assign property, license property, inherit property, utilize property as collateral and to 
claim property in a bankruptcy”.27 Dynamic IPRs are in other words used together with the rest of 
the society in different types of transactions instead of claiming static IPR to merely block others.  
The same view, of static and dynamic use, can be applied even if the knowledge is not 
controlled via IPRs. A good example of this is IP in the form of trade secrets which can be used 
statically, i.e. when the knowledge is kept secret inside a firm and is protected against 
misappropriation by law, or dynamically when transacting it to parties outside of the firm.  
  
                                                
25 ibid., p. 115. 
26 Petrusson (2004), pp. 118-120. 
27 ibid., p. 119. 
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6 Background  
In order to set the scene and to better understand the research questions and the economic 
environment they are set in, a background is presented in the following. The section will also 
address the importance of trade secrets in society today as well as how they can be controlled. 
Finally the section will identify the characteristics of knowledge since these characteristics play an 
important role throughout the thesis.  
6.1 Knowledge Economy 
Foray states that knowledge has 
always been at the heart of 
economic development.28 
However there has been a 
paradigm shift from the industrial 
economy to what is known as the 
Knowledge-based economy 
(henceforth referred to as KBE). 
Recent statistics from OECD 
shows that investments in 
knowledge-based capital 
(henceforth referred to as KBC) 
has exceeded the investments made in tangible capital, see Figure 4.29 Similar statistics show that in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom the investments in KBC matches or exceeds the investments in 
tangible capital.30 Another indication of the shift towards the KBE is the change in market-to-book-
value that has taken place for the Standard & Poor’s 500 companies. Market-to-book-value is the 
ratio of the capital market value of companies to the net asset value as stated in the companies’ 
balance sheets and Standard & Poor’s 500 is a stock market index based on the market value of the 
500 largest companies in the United States. This has continuously risen since the 1980s and with a 
value of around 7 US year 2000 implying that for every 7 USD of market value only 1 dollar appears 
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30 ibid., p.5. 
Figure 4 – Business investment in KBC and tangible capital 
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in the balance sheet and the remaining 6 USD are intellectual assets.31 According to Petrusson and 
Heiden “the industrial economy is typified by a relatively few, well-known commercial means from 
which to create and extract value through the production, distribution, and sales of physical 
goods”.32 The KBE33 on the other hand, as described by Petrusson, is an economy in which the 
production of physical goods does not generate sufficient wealth, but rather in the KBE “[h]uman 
resources have to be leveraged not only into physical products, but also into virtual products and 
license offers”.34 Firms in a KBE are more dependent on exploiting economies of scale through the 
use of intellectual property.35 The transition from an industrial economy to the KBE can be shown 
in a four-step model, which is captured in Figure 5, where the value addition of knowledge and the 
control of it is growing with each step.36  
The two grey boxes represent the industrial economy. In the first box competitive advantage 
is generated through the vicinity to natural resources. The value addition of knowledge is very low 
and it is therefore little need to control it. The second box illustrates that knowledge is more relevant 
than before since competitive 
advantage was generated by applying 
knowledge to work and production. 
Here it was necessary to have control 
over the knowledge companies 
possessed on how to produce the 
products. The third box highlights the 
era that many companies today are 
active in. Here knowledge has a very 
high value-addition and is therefore 
important to control. A typical 
situation is a company with 
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Figure 5 – Four Boxes 
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proprietary technology, e.g. a patent, which is used when producing a physical product and thereby 
adds value to the product. The fourth and final box captures when knowledge in itself is the 
commodity that generates value when used in a service or virtual product. With this identified it 
should be mentioned that many companies today are active in both the third and the fourth box. 
For example when a company uses their proprietary knowledge to manufacture products, they are 
performing an activity related to the third box. However when they license patents and other IP or 
IPRs to third parties they are active within the fourth box, or as called in this thesis, the KBE.  
6.2 Importance of Trade Secrets 
Trade secrets imply a competitive advantage for the proprietor. This advantage might be of a first-
mover character or of any other type. Studies, as presented below, show that trade secrets are 
important for companies. A study based on US data suggests that "enterprises in highly knowledge-
intensive industries like manufacturing, information services, professional, scientific and technical 
services, and transportation accrue between 70% and 80% of their information portfolio value from 
secrets".37 Furthermore a recent research paper from Fontana et al. (2013) shows that only 10 % of 
important industrial innovations are patented, suggesting that the remaining rely on secrecy or other 
type of competitive advantage.38 In a survey commissioned by the European commission 75 out of 
223 (34 %) respondents reported that their trade secrets had been stolen at least once.39 A survey 
conducted by PWC in 2012 shows that the total cost in a worst case scenario on average, related to 
security incidents such as theft of trade secret, is estimated to £110,000 - £250,000 for large 
organisations.40 According to a German article the financial damage caused, due to misappropriation 
of trade secrets in Germany, is approximately 20 - 50 billion euros.41  
 Trade secrets are furthermore vital in collaborations. In a collaboration setting, the 
collaborating partners often have to share their trade secret in order to develop new knowledge. A 
survey shows that the lack of protection of confidentiality or intellectual property was the factor 
identified as the most important barrier to enter into collaborations.42 
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6.3 Trade Secrets as Means to Protect Knowledge 
The exclusivity granted by an IPR does not apply for trade secrets. However, there are still 
numerous reasons for using trade secrets as protection for knowledge. One reason is that it might be 
too expensive to seek IPR protection, another that the there is no limitation in time of a trade secret. 
Another reason, which probably is the most common, could be that trade secrets are the only 
protection available.  
 The protection of knowledge as trade secrets is different around the world. In EU the 
protection differs between the Member States to a high extent. Sweden is for example the only EU-
member that has an explicit trade secret act. This fragmentation of the level of protection within the 
EU lowers the incentives to undertake cross-border economic activities, such as trade with trade 
secrets and enter research collaborations, both within the country and for cross border activities, 
thereby lowering the trade secret based competitiveness of European businesses and research 
bodies.43 As a response to this the European Commission has proposed a directive for the 
harmonisation of trade secret legislation throughout the EU, henceforth called ‘the Directive’. 
Adopting the Directive would provide significant positive benefits both in terms of predictability of 
the law between different countries as well as in many cases raising the level of protection overall.  
Before drafting the Directive, EU commissioned a study that investigated how trade secrets 
are protected globally. Three countries of the ones investigated stand out; USA, Japan, and Sweden. 
These countries are the only ones, of the investigated countries, that have explicit trade secret acts 
with a legal definition of what a trade secret is. Therefore the Directive has been influenced by the 
solutions in these countries. Hence it is no surprise that the Directive to great extent is very similar 
to the FHL when it comes to both structure and content. The Swedish government has confirmed 
this.44  
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6.4 Characteristics of knowledge 
Knowledge has different unique characteristics compared to physical goods, which will be described 
in the following.   
6.4.1 Non-rival 
One of the main features of knowledge is that it is non-rival, sometimes called non-scarce, in the 
sense that it can be in two or more places at the same time. Physical, human or financial assets on 
the other hand are rival, or scarce, as they cannot be in more than one place at the same time. 
According to Lev this scarcity is shown in the cost of using such assets, a cost that reflects the 
missed opportunity, i.e. the next best alternative for using the asset.45 Lev continues to say that the 
opportunity cost for knowledge is many times zero, or at least very low, as there is no opportunity 
being missed or nothing given up.46 One contributing factor to the non-rivalry of knowledge is that 
once it has been developed, which might be costly, the marginal cost for using it is either zero or 
very low.47 For instance it might be expensive to develop an app for a smartphone, but distributing it 
on the other hand is very cheap. The non-rivalry of knowledge is the main value driver as it allows 
for the knowledge to be sold an infinite amount of times.  
6.4.2 Scalable and Cumulative 
Unlike physical goods knowledge is cumulative. Machines deteriorate and must be replaced while 
knowledge and ideas build on the last knowledge or idea. As Foray puts it, knowledge can be seen as 
an intellectual input that enables creation of new knowledge and therefore broadens the spectrum of 
future actions.48 Furthermore knowledge is theoretically infinitely scalable. Manufacturing physical 
goods is limited in proportion to the availability of resources while knowledge on the other hand is 
not subject to this limitation. The value creation potential of knowledge – the scalability – is 
generally limited only by the size of the actual market.49  
6.4.3 Non-reversible  
Knowledge is unlike physical goods non-reversible. If a physical good is given or transacted from 
one person or business to another, the exact same good can be retrieved. This does not apply to 
knowledge. When knowledge is given from one person to another it cannot be retrieved since it 
resides in the minds of humans.  
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6.4.4 Tacit or Explicit 
Knowledge can either be tacit or explicit. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is neither articulated 
nor codified. This knowledge resides in people, institutions, or routines. This characteristic also 
poses a problem since it makes it hard to transport, memorize, recombine, and learn the 
knowledge.50 Tacit knowledge can for example be the skill an individual worker has refined over the 
years. Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be codified and articulated. An example of this is 
schemes of how to build a physical good.  
6.4.5 Non-Excludable 
Foray identifies that one of the characteristics of knowledge is that it is “non-excludable”.51 What 
this implies is that knowledge is very difficult to make exclusive or private, i.e. it is difficult to 
exclude others. One way to do this is to keep the knowledge a secret, but as soon as the secret is 
revealed, the proprietor loses the exclusiveness and control. This characteristic differs from the one 
of physical goods that can be shown but the proprietor still has the control and exclusiveness of the 
good. This is to some extent offset by IPRs as they can give the owner an exclusive right to use the 
knowledge for the duration of the IPR. The hardship to make knowledge exclusive gives rise to spill 
over effects that benefits third parties, since they get access to expensive knowledge for free. 
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7 Two Cases  
This thesis will, in order to create the foundations of a platform for dynamically utilising knowledge 
through the three blocks, use two cases. They will be described in the following along with the 
imminent risks that are identified in relation to dynamic use of trade secret in each case. 
7.1 Embedded Knowledge 
The first case surrounds a physical product that can detect if the bearings are operating and 
performing as they should. SKF has today a well developed after sales 
market where they sell similar products. Clients who buy bearings also 
have an opportunity to buy products that help them detect whether or not 
the bearings are operating optimally, so that they can be replaced or 
repaired before a costly stop in operations occurs due to broken bearings. 
However, this thesis will investigate a product that is not yet developed 
but might be in the future. The reason for this is that today's products are 
already known by many actors and it would not provide deep and 
innovative conclusions. The product is a machine condition indicator, 
hereafter referred to as “the sensor”, which can wirelessly 
transmit various data extracted from the bearings such as 
temperature, frequency, velocity, and acceleration, see 
Figure 6.52 The sensor can either be mounted on a 
machine containing the bearing or be embedded inside the 
bearing if the bearing is big enough. 
 Looking at a simplified section of the sensor it is 
seen that it consists of several different components that 
have to be placed in a certain way to function properly, 
see Figure 7. What components and how to create the 
sensor are the results gained through R&D at SKF. The 
knowledge of how to create the sensor and which 
components to use are not directly visible for anyone 
since it is embedded within the sensor, therefore the term 
                                                
52 SKF, “SKF Machine Condition Indicator – CMSS 200-25-PROMO Machine indication bundle”, retrieved 
02/06/2014 from: http://www.skf.com/binary/12-
137467/CM5120%20EN%20MCA%20and%20MCI%20Promotion_tcm_12-137467.pdf 
Figure 6 – The Sensor 
Figure 7 – Simplified Section of the Sensor 
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‘embedded knowledge’.  The blueprint is of course very simplified but serves as a tool for the reader 
to understand what knowledge is referred to. This knowledge, how to construct the sensor, is in this 
case assumed to be SKF exclusive.  
7.1.1 Risks 
In this section the thesis will highlight the imminent risks associated when dynamically utilising 
embedded knowledge. 
The underlying threat in the case with embedded knowledge is that the customer gets access 
to the knowledge within the sensor and thereby learns it and destroys its status of being secret. 
Compared to the openly available knowledge case, that case implies that the customer needs to 
interact with the information itself in order to fulfil the task solved by the information. In the case 
with the sensor the aim is to stop the customer from interacting with the sensor giving the cases 
starting points.  
7.1.1.1 Dismantl ing the Sensor 
When transferring the sensor the trader will possess the sensor. The sensor, as shown in Figure 6, 
has a simple ‘shell’ made of plastic material that hinders the trader from readily acquiring the 
knowledge within. The most imminent threat in this case, is that the trader opens the case and 
accesses the information. By simply dismantling the sensor the can acquire the information on how 
to manufacture and what components to use in order to create the same sensor herself. The trader 
can also use this information in order to destroy the trade secret by making it accessible for any 
interested party.  
7.1.1.2 NDT 
The trader can also acquire the information within the sensor without dismantling it. Companies use 
today several different methods when conducting Non-Destructive testing (henceforth referred to as 
NDT). NDT is a wide group of analysis techniques used in science and industry to evaluate the 
properties of a material, component or system without causing damage. The trader may X-ray, or 
similar, the sensor in order to acquire some of the information within the product.  
7.1.1.3 Transfer  
One of the risks is that the trader who acquires the sensor transfers the sensor to a third party. This 
is potentially a dangerous situation since the sensor might end up in the hands of SKFs main 
competitors, or in any other third party’s hands.  
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7.1.1.4 Bankruptcy 
In a situation where the buying trader goes bankrupt there is a risk that the trade secret ends up in a 
third party’s hands. In a bankruptcy situation the official trustee’s main responsibility is to make sure 
that the creditors are reimbursed. In order to do this, the official trustee is often forced to sell all the 
assets the bankruptcy estate owns. This means that there is a risk that the sensor is sold to a third 
party in order to reimburse the creditors. Moreover, it is identified that in a worst-case scenario, a 
risk where the official trustee understands that she has access to a trade secret that far exceeds the 
value of the sensor itself, sells the information directly to a high bidding buyer.  
7.1.1.5 Steal ing 
An identified risk is that the buying trader unwillingly transfers the sensor or the information it 
contains to a third party. Possible situations could be that an employee of the trader steals the sensor 
or that the trader is subject to espionage.  
7.2 Openly Available Knowledge 
A customer, who was about to build a large number of wind power stations, purchased custom 
made bearings from SKF. In the case of wind power it is essential that the bearings are studiously 
installed, the slightest error can have vast effects on the life expectancy of the bearing. In scenarios 
like this SKF offers the customer installation of the bearings using SKF’s technicians for a fee. 
However, in this case the client refused this and wanted a custom made manual so that they could 
install the bearings using their own technicians. SKF agreed to this and created a digital manual in 
form of a PDF specifically for this client. The manual had to be extremely detailed in order to 
guarantee that the client would have the possibility to install the bearings as well as SKFs own 
technicians would have done. Once completed, the manual was given to the client who installed the 
bearings correctly.  
 The knowledge in this case is the knowledge inside the manual of how to install the bearings 
in wind power stations, knowledge that stems from R&D by SKF. The manual was custom made in 
the sense that it is not available to any customer who wants to buy it, why the knowledge is assumed 
SKF exclusive. The difference between the two cases is the way the knowledge is manifested, in the 
other case there is a physical product that can be held and looked upon without getting access to the 
knowledge inside, in this case there is a manual which, once accessed, gives access to all the 
knowledge of how to install bearings by reading the document. The case was that SKF transferred a 
digital manual to the customer, but in order to give a more general applicability of the findings, this 
thesis will analyse both the case of a digital manual as well as an analogue manual printed on paper.   
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7.2.1 Risks  
In the following the most imminent identified risks will be discussed and further on in the thesis 
how and if it would be possible to avoid these risks using any means available, i.e. both legal and 
non-legal tools. 
In the case of the manual it was given to the customer, however, to give the bigger picture, 
the risks and solutions will be reviewed from the perspective that it would be given or sold, as well 
as from the perspective that it is licensed out and should later be returned to SKF. When no 
distinction is made between business models, i.e. when the reasoning is applicable to either selling or 
licensing, general wording such as ‘transfer’ will be used. The same applies to the medium of the 
manual, when not further specified both digital and analogue manual is intended. 
When transferring a manual to a customer in a case like this, the biggest risk that you, as a 
proprietor of the knowledge within the manual, take is the risk that the knowledge within the 
manual becomes publicly available. If that happens it implies that the competitive advantage from 
the manual might be lost completely, and the business unit installing bearings might face immense 
competition.  
7.2.1.1 Too Much Information 
There is one overall risk with the manual that, if solved, would solve most other issues in relation to 
the manual: the fact that the manual contains “too much” information. When making the manual 
for the customer to be able to install the bearings there is a balancing act to be made, on one hand 
the manual has to present enough information so that the bearing can actually be installed, while on 
the other hand SKF would like to limit the information within the manual so it does not pose a risk 
if lost or revealed. If the information in the manual is not complete for installing the bearing the 
value of it would be significantly lower, but also the risk when transferring the manual. 
7.2.1.2 Keeping the Manual 
The customer already has access to the information, however, in order to keep it, there is a need to 
make some sort of copy that can be kept or by simply keeping the manual instead of returning it in a 
licensing situation. The ways identified that some sort of copy can be made are presented in the 
following. 
7.2.1.2.1 Photographing 
Regardless if the manual is shown on the screen of an electronic device such as a computer, tablet, 
or is analogue and printed on paper, there is the risk that a person that has access to the manual 
might take photographs on one or more pages of the manual.  
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7.2.1.2.2 Screenshot 
For a digital manual also the risk that someone might make a screenshot on one or more pages 
when having the file with the manual open on the computer or tablet or similar.  
7.2.1.2.3 Printing 
For a digital manual having the manual there is a risk that the manual may be printed onto paper and 
then later distributed to numerous people. Even if the computer, where the digital manual is stored, 
is offline and does not have any connection to a printer, it is difficult to prevent customers from 
merely bringing a printer to the computer and print the manual.  
7.2.1.2.4 Recording 
There is a risk that the persons that have access to the manual might read the information within it 
out loud and make a recording that is kept, either as a recording or as a transcription.   
7.2.1.2.5 Copying 
There is always a risk that someone who has access to the manual takes a notepad or a computer 
and simply copies the manual by writing off the wording inside. In relation to an analogue manual 
there is also the risk that a photocopier is utilised to copy the manual. 
7.2.1.3 Transfer  
Below is presented the possible ways the manual could be transferred from the customer to a third 
party. Either the manual has been copied in some way, possible ways for copying a manual have 
been mentioned above in relation to Keeping the manual, or the original manual is transferred. 
7.2.1.3.1 Sending 
Sending a digital manual can be done in numerous ways, where the most obvious one would be as 
an attachment to for instance an email or a Facebook message. There is also the issue that the file 
could possible be uploaded to a server which one or more third parties have access to and be sent 
that way. Also the manual could simply be transferred to an USB-memory or similar and then be 
transferred to a third party via that USB-memory.  
For an analogue manual it would be possible to simply send it by regular mail, faxing it, 
using a courier or handing it over from one person to another.   
7.2.1.3.2 Stealing 
Having a virtual manual theft would be by hacking the device where the manual is or unwarrantedly 
grabbing the device where the manual is stored and walking away with it. An analogue manual would 
also be stolen by that someone unwarrantedly grabs the manual and then walks away with it. It 
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should however be noticed that the term ‘stealing’ is most likely not the correct one when discussing 
intellectual phenomena like a digital manual, since it is most likely not possible to see information as 
an object itself under Swedish law in which case it would not be possible to be convicted for stealing 
it.53 The term stealing will be used nonetheless as it for a reader is obvious what sort of actions is 
referred to, and because for an analogue manual it is correct, even if it is not correct usage of the 
term from a legal perspective in case of a digital manual. 
7.2.1.4 Learning the Information 
If the manual is only licensed to the customer, there will be a time when the manual with the 
information within it should be returned to SKF. If, by the time it should be returned, one or more 
employees have learned the information within the manual this poses a risk for SKF, as SKF has no 
longer control over the information within the manual. This information can then be transferred 
from the employees to other parties and thereby pose a big threat to SKF.  
7.2.1.5 Bankruptcy 
If the customer enters into bankruptcy the question is what will happen to the manual, will SKF be 
able to remain in control over the manual or will it end up in a third party’s hands. When bankrupt it 
is the official trustee’s responsibility to reimburse creditors, which is generally done by selling assets 
the bankruptcy estate owns. This implies that there is a risk that the manual ends up in the hands of 
a third party, which might not be intended. 
  
                                                
53 Wainikka, Christina, Information som självständigt objekt, SvJT 2003 s 577. 
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8 Block 1 - Trade Secret Protection 
The first block investigates the protection offered by the FHL and the Directive to see whether the 
knowledge in the two cases falls under this protection and what level of protection is granted. Finally 
an analysis will be performed addressing whether the FHL and the Directive provides sufficient 
control for dynamically using trade secrets for the two different cases. 
8.1 Protection Offered by FHL 
The FHL (1990:409) has in its first article a legal definition of what should be considered as trade 
secrets. The first article, as translated by WIPO, states the following:  
“For the purposes of this Act, a "trade secret" means such information concerning the business or industrial relations 
of a person conducting business or industrial activities which that person wants to keep secret and the divulgation of 
which would be likely to cause a damage to him from the point of view of competition.  
The term "information" comprises both information documented in some form, including drawings, models 
and other similar technical prototypes, and the knowledge of individual persons about specific circumstances even where 
it has not been documented in some form.” 54 
There are three prerequisites that need to be fulfilled in order for knowledge to be 
considered a trade secret according to the legal definition, 1) it has to be considered information 
concerning the business or industrial relations of a trader, 2) the trader should want to keep the 
information secret, and 3) that the divulgation (henceforth this term is replaced by the term 
‘disclosure’) of the information would cause damage to the trader from a competition point of 
view.55  
8.1.1 Information Concerning the Business or Industrial Relations of a Trader 
Fahlbeck breaks down the first prerequisite into three criteria that individually need to be fulfilled, 1) 
it has to be considered as information, 2) this information need to concern business or industrial 
relations of a trader, and 3) the holder of the trade secret need to be considered a trader.56  
8.1.1.1 Information  
According to the propositionen preceding FHL the term “Information” should be used as in regular 
parlance and work as a neutral collective denomination for information, knowledge and know-how 
                                                
54 “Sweden - The Act on Protection of Trade Secrets (1990:409)”, retrieved 10/02/2014 from: 
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=241716. 
55 Regeringens proposition om skydd för företagshemligheter 1987/88:155 p. 34. 
56 Fahlbeck (2013), p. 296. 
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of any kind.57 The propositionen continues with stating that information should be given a wide 
meaning and can be either complex, straightforward or otherwise qualified, and can be either 
documented or reside in the minds of humans.58 This has been verified both by Tonell and praxis.59 
In NJA 1998 s. 633 it was explicitly stated that there should not be any quality requirements for 
information to be considered trade secrets. Tacit information, however, that resides solely in the 
minds of the employees and that cannot be transferred to a third party, i.e. personal skill etc., is not 
covered and cannot be considered as trade secrets.60 Wainikka therefore concludes that the 
important distinction is not whether the information is documented, i.e. has a carrier, or 
communicated, but rather if it is possible to be documented or communicate the information. If it 
cannot be documented it cannot be a trade secret.61 The information can be about solitary 
commercial business activities, or about business activities of more general kind such as 
manufacturing methods, construction drawings, price determination calculations, customer lists, etc. 
and be documented in many different ways such as a prototype, or be stored on computer 
memories.62 In other words, a trade secret can be intangibly as well as tangibly manifested.63 
8.1.1.2 Business  or  Industr ia l  Relat ions 
To be considered a trade secret, the information must concern business or industrial relations of a 
trader. Both by Helgesson, Wainikka (former Helgesson), and praxis this has been interpreted as that 
the information must be linked to a company and the economic activities within the company.64 
According to the propositionen the term includes, but is not limited to, single commercial data, 
agreements made with clients, as well more common information such as market research, 
information that can be attributed to on-going operations, production, construction, research and 
development.65 Fahlbeck states that information generally occurring is not covered.66 Another way to 
                                                
57 Fahlbeck (2013), p. 296.  
58 Ibid.  
59 Tonell (2012), p. 22; NJA 1998 s. 633.  
60 1987/88:155, p. 34-35; Wainikka, Christina, Företagshemligheter: en introduktion, Upplaga 1, Studentlitteratur, Lund 
2010 pp. 17-18.  
61 Wainikka (2010) p. 18. 
62 1987/88:155 pp. 65 & 35. 
63 ibid., p. 12. 
64 NJA 1998 s. 633; Helgesson (2000), p. 275; Wainikka (2010), p. 36. 
65 1987/88:155 p. 35. 
66 Fahlbeck (2013) p. 310.  
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express this, according to Fahlbeck, is that the information must be of such character that revealing 
it would imply damage for the trader by negatively changing the trader’s competitive ability.67  
8.1.1.3 Trader 
A trader, according to both the propositionen and Wainikka, is any physical or legal person that in a 
professional manner conducts business, regardless of whether or not the business aims at making 
profit.68 This implies that not only private companies are considered traders in a legal sense, but also 
public authorities etc. to the extent they are conducting economic activities.69   
8.1.2 Secrecy 
Fahlbeck breaks down the second prerequisite into three separate aspects that need to be fulfilled 
for the information to be considered secret, 1) the time factor 2) the circle of people, and 3) the 
activity criteria.70 
8.1.2.1 The Time fac tor  
All IPRs have a limit in time, a patent is for instance only valid for 20 years, trade secrets on the 
other hand are not subject to this limitation as long as the other prerequisites are fulfilled. This was 
the issue in the case NJA 1999 s. 469 which concerned a bank and its internal instructions on how to 
grant credit to its customers. At the time of the trial the instructions were ten years old and the 
plaintiff therefore argued that they were not relevant anymore. The bank claimed that the 
instructions were still secret and the court was of the same opinion and stated that it does not matter 
how old the instructions are or if they have been replaced by new ones to consider them as trade 
secrets.  
8.1.2.2 Circ l e  o f  People  
For information to be protected as trade secrets there is a requirement for the trader to keep the 
information secret. However, as the propositionen states, the secrecy requirement is not absolute, it 
can be known by several persons as long as it is not publicly available to anyone who might be 
interested of the information.71 This has been verified both by praxis, Wainikka and Helgesson.72 
The secrecy requirement is hence a relative one, where the size of the circle of people that knows the 
                                                
67 ibid. p. 311.  
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70 Fahlbeck (2013) p. 315.  
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information is not the determinant of whether it is deemed secret or not.73 The propositionen states 
that at least as long as the information is not outside the circle of people who need the information 
to fulfil their work it remains secret.74 However, even information that is distributed outside the 
company, e.g. to a collaboration partner or in a license scenario, can maintain the secrecy status if 
the information is distributed only to a closed and identifiable circle.75 The case Ö 4004-09, as 
referenced by Fahlbeck, points at this where the situation was that the trader A claimed that certain 
information, source codes, that belonged to trader B had lost its character as a trade secret since the 
Trader A and a person who was participating as an expert in the arbitration process knew about this 
information. For any other third parties the information was however unknown. The court ruled 
that even though these two entities knew about the information it was not reason enough to deem 
that the information had ceased to be secret.76 
In relation to selling a product containing trade secrets Fahlbeck quotes SOU 1983:52, which 
states the following: “Moreover it seem clear how the characteristics of a secret can cease if it 
proliferated enough. This can happen by introducing the secret to the market, publishing it, 
exhibition or in any other similar way, under the condition that the secret is accessible without thorough 
or extensive examination of persons skilled in the art” (authors’ translation and emphasis).77 This is also 
picked up by Levin, who states that: “[i]t needs to be questioned whether or not blueprints for a 
product that is available on the market, and that can be analysed by anyone, by for example reverse-
engineering, should be considered as a trade secret at all according to the legal definition. If the 
information can be acquired in any other way, for reasonable costs, many indications point to that 
the trade secret protection has lost its status as such.”(authors’ translation).78 These two quotes 
implies that if a trade secret embedded within a product and is very easy to access by e.g. opening 
the product, it is questionable whether it really was a secret in the first place. 
8.1.2.3 The Activ i ty  Cri ter ion 
There is also a need for the trader to want to keep the information secret, which implies that the 
trader shall have the intention to keep the information only within a limited circle of people.79 
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76 Fahlbeck (2013), pp. 318-319. 
77 SOU 1983:52 Företagshemligheter. Betänkade av utredningen om skydd för företagshemligheter, p. 228. 
78 Bernitz, Ulf, Ramberg, Jan, Edenman, Ann-Charlotte, Festskrift till Jan Ramberg, 1st Edition, Norstedts juridik AB, 
1997, p. 376. 
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Helgesson calls this the activity criteria and it is not very severe, it is only required that the trader has 
a will to keep the information secret and that he has taken some sort of measure to ensure this.80 
The activity criteria has hence both a subjective dimension, i.e. the ambition to keep the information 
secret, and objective dimension, i.e. any activities to implement said ambition.81 Fulfilling the criteria 
can be done by telling employees how to handle the information, security routines or marking 
documents as classified, however, it should not be considered as form prescribed by law.82 In the 
case T8471/99 both the subjective and objective criteria are addressed and the court states that “the 
requirement for secrecy activities should not be particularly high” (authors’ translation). The case 
was about blueprints for ships where the trader that had made the blueprints had expressed that he 
should retain title to them. Objectively the trader had not expressly demanded secrecy but it was 
customary in the line business that blueprints were kept secret. With this as background the court 
expressed that the defendant “should have understood that the blueprints were not allowed to be 
distributed or used in any other context than that where one got hold of them” (authors’ 
translation). This case indicates that the activity criterion has low requirements and that customs in 
the line of business affects the activity requirement.  
A contrasting case is the case called “Factoringmålet” (AD 2013:24) where the labour court 
stated that “information can per se be secret even if given to persons outside the company. The 
information can however not be proliferated for an all too big and unidentified circle” (authors’ 
translation). In the case the information was not deemed as a trade secret since the trader had not 
fulfilled the requirement of clarifying that it was secret. Tonell raises the issue that the burden of 
proof is upon the party that disclosed the information that it is in fact secret, why being thorough in 
protecting the firm’s trade secrets is advisable even though there are low requirements.83 
8.1.3 Damage  
Fahlbeck breaks down the third prerequisite into three aspects 1) that the disclosure is likely to cause 
damage from a competition point of view, 2) for which trader the damage should be likely to be 
caused, and 3) what is understood with damage from a competition point of view.84  
                                                
80 Helgesson (2000) pp. 296-297. 
81 Fahlbäck (2013) p. 323. 
82 Helgesson (2000) pp. 296-297; 1987/88:155 p.36; Tonell (2012) p. 29. 
83 Tonell (2012) p. 29. 
84 Fahlbeck (2013), p. 327. 
42 
8.1.3.1 Disc losure Likely to Cause Damage 
By the third requisite it is implied that the information must be valuable for the trader. Tonell 
describes this as that the information has such commercial value and relevance that disclosure of the 
trade secret would affect the competitive strength of the trader.85 There is however no requirement 
that financial damage has actually occurred in the specific case, which is demonstrated by the word 
“likely” in the article, but rather if revealing the trade secret in that situation typically causes 
damage.86 Furthermore, when valuing whether revealing trade secrets could have caused damage in 
the specific case it is irrelevant whether or not the information was costly to obtain, but rather if the 
actual revealing has caused financial or other damage for the trader.87 In article 9 of the FHL it is 
said that “for a violation of the trade secret of a Trader, consideration shall also be given to his 
interest that the secret is not exploited or revealed without authorization and to other circumstances 
of other than purely economic importance”. (authors’ translation). This shows that the damages do 
not only have to be of economical character. 
8.1.3.2 For Which Trader 
According to Fahlbeck it is generally easy to answer the question for which trader the damage is 
likely to be caused, in most cases the information is only available for the trader that is the creator 
and in such case it is for this trader the damage is likely to be caused.88 However, a trader might get 
access to another trader’s trade secrets by, for instance, a license deal or in a collaboration setting. 
However, it does not mention if this is possible where a trader purchases the trade secret. The 
propositionen says that in such a case the trade secret can be seen as mutual between the two 
traders, and if the trade secret is revealed both traders are usually afflicted.89 In some cases, even if 
the trade secret is mutual, only the trader from whom the trade secret stems is afflicted, in which 
case it is still protected by trade secret law, in terms of damages and penalties, even though another 
trader has revealed it and is no longer a trade secret according to FHL.90  
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8.1.3.3 Damage From Compet i t ion Point o f  View 
According to the propositionen this criteria implies that only relevant information may be protected 
as trade secrets.91 In other words, only when disclosure would negatively change the trader’s 
competitiveness it is relevant. This aspect has been addressed in the case NJA 1995 s. 347 where the 
question was whether or not the internal instructions of a bank were to be seen as trade secrets. The 
Supreme Court noted that the purpose of having the instructions were to give the employees 
regulations for how to act in the case of unauthorized withdrawals. Thereafter the court stated that 
these regulations affect the bank’s possibilities to compete on the market and should therefore be 
seen as trade secrets. The Supreme Court furthermore mentioned that even if some external actors 
know the regulations, i.e. other banks, and the content of the bank’s regulations are similar to the 
external actors’ regulations; it is in the interest of the bank that they are not disclosed.  
8.2 Article 2 - Unwarranted Use 
According to Fahlbeck article 2 FHL needs to be studied together with article 1 in order to 
understand the scope of FHL. Article 2 states, according to the WIPOs translation, the following:  
“The Act applies only to unwarranted infringements of trade secrets. 
As an unwarranted infringement is not to be considered the fact that someone acquires, exploits or discloses 
what is a trade secret of a person conducting business or industrial activities in order to make available to the public or 
before a public authority disclose something that may be an offence for which imprisonment may be adjudicated, or 
which may be considered to be another serious incongruity in the business or industrial activity of a person conducting 
such activities. 
As an unwarranted infringement is not considered the fact that someone exploits or discloses a trade secret 
about which he or someone before him acquired knowledge in good faith.”92  
The first paragraph states the general principle that the act only covers unwarranted infringements 
of trade secrets while the second and third paragraph states examples of warranted infringements. 
An unwarranted offence can therefore, according to Fahlbeck, only be of the character where 
someone; acquires, exploits, or discloses the trade secret.93  
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8.2.1 Acquires 
According to the propositionen the term acquire relates to all sorts of acquisitions of the 
information.94 The term also implies that a certain activity is necessary and that the trader, if 
unwillingly or by chance has acquired the information, is not liable.95 Fahlbeck further analyses that 
the term means that you cannot acquire something you already possess, something new must be 
added to the ‘infringer’s’ sphere.96 In the next section he furthermore describes that it is not a 
requirement that the attacker takes part of the information, the attacker can for example be passive 
and only ‘steal’ the information in order to transfer it to a third party.97 
 If a trader legally purchases a product containing a trade secret and uses reverse engineering 
in order to acquire the information within, this is not identified as an unlawful acquirement.98 
Moreover, acquiring information this way does not mean that the information has been made public 
and thereby losing it status as a trade secret. The situation, according to Fahlbeck, can then be that 
both the proprietor of the trade secret and the trader that reversed-engineered it owns the trade 
secret mutually.99 However the acquiring party can use this information anyway she wants to in her 
commercial activity. It is therefore possible, after acquiring a product legally, to reverse-engineer it in 
order to acquire the knowledge and according to FHL legally make the information publically 
available FHL.100 
8.2.2 Exploits 
The propositionen states the following: “[e]xploiting means that somebody, in her own business, 
uses the information that is a trade secret. It is a question of commercial utilisation but there is no 
requirement that it leads to profit” (authors’ translation).101 The prerequisite also has an activity 
criterion, meaning that the prerequisite is not fulfilled if the attacker just passively sits on the 
information. Fahlbeck states, after analysing the case Ö 9002-03, “språkcentrum-målet”, decided by 
the Court of Appeal that if a competitor only possess the trade secret this requirement is not 
fulfilled.102 Furthermore, the propositionen’s statement that it has to be used commercially implies 
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that if an employee steals the trade secret or uses it in private activity, then the employee is not 
accountable since this does not constitute a commercial activity. However, the meaning of 
commercial activity is not clear. Fahlbeck analyses this prerequisite by asking three questions: 1) 
Does the exploitation have to occur externally in the sense that in an investigation it can be 
established that the actual information has been used? The example used by Fahlbeck is if a 
potential customer has been contacted by the alleged infringer who then openly has been using 
information that is exclusive for the alleged infringed party. 2) Does the exploitation need to occur 
in a way so the information is actually used or is it enough that the information affects the actions so 
that the infringer refrains from directly using the information and acts in a different way instead? 
Fahlbeck’s example is that of a customer register that has been abducted. Does the infringer have to 
contact persons within the customer register or is it enough that the infringer uses it to target 
different customers, i.e. as an elimination moment? 3) Is it enough that the information is used 
internally?103 Fahlbeck’s answer, after analysing that the propositionen does not address these 
questions, is that the first two questions are negative and the third positive.104 This means, according 
to Fahlbeck, that exploitation does not have to occur externally, that information generally used 
externally can also be exploited solely for internal purposes by affecting the infringer’s actions, i.e. 
referring to the case above, the infringer does not need to actually use the customer list since 
drawing inspiration from it is enough, and that exploitation can also be solely internally in the 
infringer’s own commercial activities by for example research and development work.  
8.2.3 Disclosure  
It is, according to SOU 2008:63, not a requirement that the disclosure is made to a certain person.105 
It is furthermore irrelevant how the trade secret is disclosed. It can according to the SOU 2008:63 be 
disclosed either orally or in writing.106 It can also be disclosed by someone handing over an object 
from which the trade secret can be deduced.107 
 Fahlbeck analyses what is the critical moment for disclosure. He states that in a situation 
where a resigning employee has access to a trade secret, and where the employee transfers this to her 
medium, e.g. a USB memory card, when she leaves the company, there is no disclosure since she 
                                                
103 ibid. pp. 361-362. 
104 ibid. 
105 SOU 2008:63 Förstärkt skydd för företagshemligheter, p. 319. 
106 ibid., p. 323. 
107 ibid. 
46 
transfers the information to her medium.108 If she uses the trade secret in her own private business 
and conducts competing business with the previous employer this situation might be considered as 
an unwarranted exploitation of a trade secret according to FHL, but not as a disclosure.109 In order 
for the information to be identified as disclosed according to FHL the information needs to be 1) 
unauthorised transferred to a new trader, e.g. the new employer of the abductor, and then either 2a) 
becomes known for the new trader, or 2b) the new employee, i.e. the abductor, has a position that 
implies that the new trader knows of the stolen information already by knowing that the abductor 
has the information.110 An e contrario conclusion gives that the trade secret can be disclosed to 
private persons and still not be considered disclosed according to the FHL, as long as it does not 
become known for any legal persons. 
 Fahlbeck states that a trade secret may be at several traders at the same time before he asks 
the question whether or not the information loses it characteristics as a trade secret if any of the 
traders discloses the information to a third party. Differently put, does an unwarranted disclosure at 
the same time imply that the information no longer exists in a limited and controlled circle and 
thereby becomes public and is no longer a trade secret? According to Fahlbeck this question has 
been addressed in arbitration, however he does not refer to any specific case. Fahlbeck states the 
following: “Whenever the transfer of information is warranted it is undoubtedly allowed. However, 
when the transfer is unwarranted the answer depends on the circumstances. If it is clear that the 
information has been disclosed to a certain trader and she realises, or should at least realise, that it is 
secret information she has been given, then the information ought to maintain its character as a 
trade secret for all traders who has access to the information.” (authors’ translation).111 The reason 
for still being identified as a trade secret is that the circle is still limited and controlled. 
8.2.4 Unwarranted 
The FHL protects only trade secrets against unwarranted offences and this has led to that it appears 
that the first paragraph of the article 2 has a character of a general clause. This is however no not the 
case.112 Wainikka states that responsibility requires an offence to fall within the scope of either of the 
responsibility articles 3-8.113  
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The second and the third paragraph of article 2 states examples of situations where an 
offence is not deemed as unwarranted. However there are other situations that are not identified as 
unwarranted offences. The first is according to the propositionen that the trader has explicitly or 
implicitly given her consent.114 The second situation according to the propositionen, is where one 
has an obligation to disclose information according to law, e.g. as a witness.115 The third and fourth 
situations that are not considered as unwarranted addresses employee and union exceptions. These 
are outside the scope of this thesis and are therefore not mentioned any further. The fifth situation 
regards the situation where a trader or an employee can defend their rights against a trader. The 
situation whether or not the employee can defend her rights or not will not be further mentioned 
since it falls outside the scope of this thesis. Fahlbeck analyses whether or not a trader can legally, on 
her own, acquire information of another trader in order to secure evidence in a legal dispute. He 
answers this question that it might be possible if a trader suspects that a competing trader has 
unwarrantably infringed the suspecting trader’s trade secret.116 The suspecting trader can get this 
information by demanding an employee of the infringing trader to give him the information.  
 The second paragraph is an example stating that someone, e.g. an employee, can disclose 
“something that may be an offence for which imprisonment may be adjudicated, or which may be 
considered to be another serious incongruity in the business or industrial activity of a person 
conducting such activities” (WIPO translation). This example falls outside of the scope of this thesis 
and will therefore not be mentioned any further. On the other hand, the third paragraph falls within 
the scope of the thesis. The third paragraph means that if a trader was in good faith when she 
acquired the trade secret, i.e. she did not know that she acquired a trade secret, and then either 
exploits, discloses, or acquires the trade secret, it will not be deemed as an unwarranted offence.117 
Fahlbeck analyses the situation where a trade secret has passed several different traders and comes 
to the conclusion that in order for the last trader to be responsible for an offence, not only does she 
need to have been in bad faith when she acquired trade secret but also all the intermediaries needs to 
have been in bad faith.118 The outcome of this regulation is according to Fahlbeck that a trader 
might lose the “right” to the trade secret if it is acquired by a trader who is in good faith since the 
secret character of the information is extinguished.119  
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8.3 EU Trade Secret Protection 
The 28th November 2013 the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive on a 
uniform trade secret protection within the EU that will be reviewed in the following. The reason for 
reviewing the Directive is that even though Sweden has a good protection for trade secrets in the 
sense that Sweden actually has an act on protection of trade secrets (FHL), Sweden is a very small 
country. To make this thesis more general an outlook on the proposed EU directive will therefore 
be done, as this will ensure that the findings in this thesis may be more or less applicable in the 
whole EU.  
Article 2, which gives the trade secret definition, states that: 
“‘trade secret’ means information which meets all of the following requirements  
(a)   is secret in the sense that it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components, 
generally known among or readily accessible to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of 
information in question;    
(b)   has commercial value because it is secret;      
(c)   has been subject to reasonable steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control of the 
information, to keep it secret.”120 
The identified prerequisites are information, secrecy, commercial value, and activity, which will be 
analysed in the following.   
8.3.1 Information 
A teleological interpretation gives that the term “information” must be given a wide meaning, as the 
purpose of the Directive is to enhance possibilities for research collaborations and trade with trade 
secrets. This is also supported by the Directive itself which says that regarding trade secrets a 
“definition should therefore be constructed as to cover business information, technological 
information and know-how”.121 If a narrow meaning would be adopted the Directive would not 
grant an effective protection of trade secrets within the EU. The Swedish trade secret act also 
indicates that information should be given a wide meaning. Like the FHL the Directive states that 
personal skills – tacit knowledge – should not be covered, however, the Directive should not cover 
trivial information whereas it can be covered by the FHL.122  
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8.3.2 Secrecy 
A literal interpretation of the secrecy prerequisite appears to have a relative meaning just as it has in 
Swedish law, implying that the information may be known by more people than just the ones 
working with it etc. The important distinction is if the information is generally known within the 
circle that normally deals with this information or is at least readily accessible to this circle of people. 
An e contrario interpretation gives that if the information is known by everyone outside the circle 
and is readily available to them but not to people within the circle, then it will still be considered 
secret.  
8.3.3 Commercial Value 
The only reasonable interpretation of commercial value must be that the secret information 
somehow grants the holder a competitive advantage. This might be either direct, as if the 
information can be used to improve a product, or indirect, if the information is not valuable to the 
holder but would be very valuable for a competitor. This prerequisite is similar to the one in the 
FHL stating that “the disclosure of which would be likely to cause a damage to him from the point of view of 
competition”.123 For a disclosure to be possible, the information must be secret, and for damage to 
occur, the information must also have a commercial value. Therefore, even though the writing is 
different, the Directive seems to imply the same thing as FHL.  
8.3.4 Activity  
A literal interpretation of this prerequisite implies that different circumstances require different steps 
to keep the information secret. Therefore in a situation where the trade secret is utilised internally 
the demand for activity to keep it secret is most likely less, than in a situation where the trade secret 
is utilised externally. Furthermore a literal interpretation leads to that if the information is of high 
value for the person lawfully in control of it, the reasonable activity level is likely to be higher than if 
the information is of less value. Compared to the FHL this prerequisite expressly states that 
different circumstances demand different activity levels whereas the FHL only states that an activity 
is needed.  Out of the four prerequisites this is identified as the one that differs the most between 
the Directive and the FHL. In Swedish case law a lack of activity has, in at least one case, been 
‘healed’ by customs in the line of business or there has been a low level of required activity overall, 
something that most likely will not be the case for the Directive.  
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8.4 Scope of Protection – Article 3 
Article 3 of the Directive states that that “trade secret holders are entitled to apply for the measures, procedures 
and remedies provided for in this Directive in order to prevent, or obtain redress for, the unlawful acquisition, use or 
disclosure of a trade secret”.124 Hence, to be granted any rights according to the Directive against actions 
by third parties, there are three prerequisites that need to be fulfilled first. These prerequisites are 1) 
it has to be a trade secret according to the definition in the Directive, 2) the action has to be 
considered either as an acquisition, use or disclosure according to the Directive, and 3) the action 
has to be unlawful. What is considered a trade secret according to the Directive has been addressed 
above, the other prerequisites will be analysed below. In order to read the entirety of article 3, see 
appendix 1. 
8.4.1 Acquisition 
The Directive itself gives no definition as what should be considered as an acquisition, however, it 
does present a list of different ways that a trade secret can be acquired unlawfully in paragraph 2, 
article 3. This list is has several different ways that a trade secret can be unlawfully acquired. In line 
with this, along with a teleological interpretation, gives that the term acquisition must be interpreted 
widely and hence can be done in many different ways.  
For the acquisition to be considered as unlawful there is also a requirement that it is done 
without the consent of the trade secret holder and that it is done intentionally or with gross 
negligence. Where the line should be drawn between ‘normal’ negligence and gross negligence is 
however unclear and depends most certainly on the circumstances in the specific case.  
One way to acquire the trade secret that, most likely, is not unlawful is to buy a product that 
has been put on the internal market and then use reverse engineering to see what is inside it and 
thereby get access to any trade secrets inside. If the buyer is under no obligation not to use reverse 
engineering then it is not unlawful to use this method to get access to trade secrets.  
8.4.2 Use 
Article 3, paragraph 5, of the Directive states that “[t]he conscious and deliberate production, offering or 
placing on the market of infringing goods, or import, export or storage of infringing goods for those purposes” should 
be considered as unlawful uses.125 This paragraph then works as a specification of the more general 
rules given under paragraph 3, article 3. Under article 2 of the Directive is the definition of what 
should be considered an infringing good given, which is “goods whose design, quality, manufacturing process 
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or marketing significantly benefits from trade secrets unlawfully acquired, used or disclosed”.126 As is seen it is quite 
straight forward what can be considered unlawful use of trade secrets, however, this is most likely 
not an exhaustive list of possible unlawful uses, as it is very product focused. A teleological 
interpretation would give that using know-how on how to perform a process would also be 
considered a use according to the Directive. There is also an issue as to what should be implied by 
‘goods’. Does it cover only physical things or is also intellectual things covered? A teleological 
interpretation would give that both physical and intellectual things are considered ‘goods’ in the eye 
of the Directive.     
8.4.3 Disclosure 
As a trade secret is information, and by the very nature of the concept of trade secrets the 
information is also secret. A teleological interpretation of what should be considered a disclosure of 
a trade secret is therefore that it becomes known. The question, however, is when this is considered 
to be done, i.e. how many must the trade secret be known to in order to have been disclosed? In 
order for the Directive to grant a good protection, the number of persons that it becomes known to 
must be few, the protection would be illusory if there was a need for the information to be widely 
known before it would be considered as a disclosure by the Directive. Under FHL there is a 
requirement that the information becomes known for a trader to be seen as a disclosure, a private 
person would not be enough, it is however unclear if there is a similar requirement for the Directive. 
8.4.4 Unlawful Use or Disclosure 
For a use or disclosure to be considered unlawful it has to be done either intentionally or by gross 
negligence, and without the consent of the trade secret holder, according to paragraph 3, article 3. 
For it to be considered as an unlawful use or disclosure the person performing the action must be 
found to meet one of the following conditions: 1) that the trade secret was unlawfully acquired, 2) is 
in breach of a confidentiality agreement or similar, or 3) is in breach of a contractual obligation to 
limit the use of the trade secret.  
According to paragraph 4 of article 3 there is another situation when a use or disclosure 
should be considered unlawful, namely if the person “at the time of use or disclosure, knew or should, under 
the circumstances, have known that the trade secret was obtained from another person who was using or disclosing the 
trade secret unlawfully within the meaning of the paragraph 3”.127 
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9 Embedded Knowledge – Analysis of the FHL and the Directive 
Following Petrusson’s statement that describing information, as a trade secret is a claiming process 
that if accepted in the business arena, the actor has trade secrets that can be defined as an asset. The 
following sections will therefore analyse if the sensor, and the information it contains can be 
identified as a trade secret according to the first article of the FHL. It will be presented by analysing 
each of the three aspects of the three prerequisites. Thereafter the author will analyse whether or not 
the sensor can be identified as a trade secret according to the Directive. Finally the protection given 
by the both legislations will be analysed in relation to the imminent risks. 
9.1 FHL Analysis of Article 1 
The following will investigate whether or not the sensor fulfils the prerequisites found in article 1 of 
the FHL. The three prerequisites are divided into the three factors that they contain.  
9.1.1 Information Concerning the Business or Industrial Relations of a Trader 
9.1.1.1 Information 
As is identified in the propositionen and in doctrine, the important distinction is that tacit 
information is not protected by the FHL. The FHL protects only information that can be 
documented. Since the blueprints, component data, technical data, manufacturing data, and etc., of 
the sensor can be documented, either on a piece of paper or virtually, it is established that this 
criterion is fulfilled. In this case the paper or the virtual file becomes the carrier of the information. 
The question is whether or not the sensor itself, when manufactured, can be seen as a 
documentation of information? Following the propositionen stating that the information regarding 
the construction of the sensors can be documented in a prototype implies that the sensor per se 
becomes the carrier of the information. This is because if the sensor is dismantled and observed a 
third party will gain information on how to construct the sensor and possibly its relation to the 
bearings. The case 1114/97 supports this view. In the case the district court of Stockholm came to 
the conclusion that circuitry could be seen as trade secrets. The case was appealed but the Court of 
Appeal never tried the question whether or not the circuitry was to be identified as trade secrets.128 It 
should therefore be noticed that the case is of less judicial value since it was not tried by the 
Supreme Court and the relevant question was only tried by the district court. However, the case 
hints that the court might identify the sensor as a trade secret. The case, together with the 
propositionen stating that information can be tangibly represented, supports the conclusion that the 
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sensors can be carriers of information. Therefore it is identified that there are two situations in this 
case that refer to carrying information, 1) where the blueprints and the similar data is documented, 
i.e. embodied, physically or virtually and 2) where the sensor itself is the carrier of information. In 
this thesis it is the second case that is referred to when information, or the knowledge within the 
sensor, is discussed and analysed.   
9.1.1.2 Business  or  Industr ia l  Relat ions 
To be a trade secrets according to the legal definition the information needs to concern business or 
industrial relations of the trader. Doctrine and case law show that this means that the information 
needs to be linked to an economical activity of the company. SKF is a company that does not only 
produce bearings but also produce – as mentioned above – products that helps the clients maintain 
their purchased bearings and machines, i.e. products on the ‘aftermarket’. Manufacturing and selling 
the sensor is therefore identified as a part of SKFs business activity. Furthermore the information is 
linked to the industrial relations of SKF, since it shows how to manufacture sensors that can detect 
irregularities in bearings. It is therefore established that there is both a business relation and an 
industrial relation. It is recognised that the information is not generally occurring since it stems from 
SKFs own R&D. There is of course a risk that another company has developed the same 
technology. If revealed, it would damage SKF economically and affect their ability to compete 
negatively, because it would hamper SKF’s leverage position in negotiations if the customers could 
either install or do the products and services themselves or buy them from competitors. Such 
scenario would drive the prices down and in the long run decreasing the turnover for SKF. 
9.1.1.3 Trader 
The third aspect, regarding if SKF is identified as a trader or not, is easily analysed. There is no 
doubt that SKF, being a legal entity that develops, produces, and sells products and services is 
identified as a trader. With all three aspects fulfilled the first prerequisite is identified as fulfilled.  
9.1.2 Secrecy 
9.1.2.1 The Time Factor  
Considering the time factor, even if the sensor was developed several years ago, it is still considered 
as a trade secret. This applies even if SKF would develop a new version of the sensor later on. This 
conclusion is supported by the general view on trade secrets having no limitations in time and the 
case NJA 1999 s. 469, as referred to under section 8.1.2.1. 
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9.1.2.2 Circ l e  o f  People  
The analysis of the applicable law shows that it is of great importance to control the circle of people 
that has access to the information, since the secrecy requirement is not absolute but relative. During 
manufacture it is relatively easy to identify the circle, since it is most likely the manufacturing 
department that knows the secret. The question is what happens in a situation where the sensor is 
transacted to a customer? The analysis shows that the sensor can be distributed outside the company 
and still maintain its secrecy status, if it is distributed to a closed and identifiable circle. Following 
SOU 1983:52 and Levin’s statement, that one way to lose the secret character is by introducing the 
sensor to the market under the condition that it is easily accessible for a person skilled in the art, 
shows that it might be a problem when a buyer purchases the sensor. In the case where the trade 
secret is sold to whomever wants to buy it, it can be claimed that the secret is not widely spread 
implying that it is still a trade secret, since it is heavily protected by locks or other physical tools that 
a person skilled in the art cannot easily access.  It is however hard to know where the line is to be 
drawn for something that is easily accessible for a person skilled in the art since there is no case law 
or doctrine that point to the answer. One can speculate that if the sensor is only protected by a 
plastic cask and sits on top of the machine that contains the bearing, it would most likely be 
considered as easily accessible for a person skilled in the art. The sensor will in that case lose its 
characteristic as a trade secret. Another factor that might affect the outcome is whether or not the 
information per se is not easily accessible for a person skilled in the art. If the sensor is of 
technology that not even a person who is skilled in the art understand how it works, or is able to 
easily understand how works, one could argue that it is not easily accessible. This is not addressed in 
law but as shown it might be possible to use this line of argumentation. The conclusion that can be 
drawn is that selling the sensor to whoever wants to buy it is an unpredictable business model.  
The question is what happens if the sensor is not sold but rather the right to use it is licensed 
and the sensor itself is leased out? When using the expression that the sensor is “licensed out”, the 
author describes the situation where both the right to use the sensor and that the sensor itself is 
leased out, In order to avoid reiteration. A licensing right means that the licensor maintains the 
ownership rights for the sensor and that the licensee only has license rights, i.e. she is allowed to use 
the sensor in return for example royalty payment. The same reasoning applies where the sensor itself 
is leased out, i.e. no ownership rights are transferred. A licensing agreement is entered after 
negotiations between the parties and especially in situations like these where the agreement represent 
great values. This behaviour points to that it should not be considered as “put on the market”, since 
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it is not accessible for whoever wants it. The conclusion is therefore that it is easier to maintain 
control of the circle if SKF negotiates with each interesting party, as is the case when conducting a 
licensing business model rather when utilising a sales model. Therefore a business model that 
focuses on licensing the sensor is identified as safer in terms of keeping the information secret. 
An interesting question is if custom made products means that the product is put on the 
market or not. This has not been addressed in the doctrine and is therefore of a speculative nature. 
SKF sells their products through two different distribution channels: one where they act as an 
original equipment manufacturer (henceforth referred to as OEM) and sells towards these 
customer’s directly and one where they sell to distributors, which are either owned by SKF or are 
independent. An OEM is “a company whose products are used as components in another 
company’s products”.129 The companies SKF sell to can be anything from car manufacturers to wind 
power manufacturers. When selling to these customers there is always an element of customisation 
since the products always differ depending on who is the customer, i.e. BMW uses different 
dimensions and specifications on their products than Volvo does. The fact that these sales 
agreements enter into force after extensive negotiations and often runs for a long time, point to that 
they should not be seen as “put on the market”. However, when the products are components of 
something that is eventually sold to a consumer, one can argue that the product is put on the 
market.  For example in the case where the product is sold to a car manufacturer, i.e. SKF sells a 
bearing containing the sensor to Volvo, Volvo incorporates the component in their cars, which are 
eventually sold to the consumers. The consumers having bought the car are able to do whatever they 
want with it. It is undoubtedly so that when the car containing the trade secret is sold to the 
consumers, it is to be seen as put on the market. These types of sales point to that the products are 
not put on the market since they are so specific, and thereby might be protected by the FHL. On the 
other hand when SKF sells to the distributors the situation is different. When the distributors want 
products the place an order and sell them to whoever wants them. In this case it is certain to say that 
the products have been put on the market and that the product is most likely not considered as a 
trade secret according to the FHL, with the restriction that the information is easily accessible by a 
person skilled in the art. However, one could argue that when the products are sold to distributors 
they cannot gain the trade secret protection given by FHL since the spread of the trade secret is 
public and uncontrolled, making the circle is most likely not defined, limited and closed. 
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Following the case “Ö4004-09” it is shown that even if some actors knows how the sensor is 
built and what it contains, i.e. they have the exact same knowledge, it can still have a character of a 
secret. It loses this character first when the circle is unidentified and uncontrolled. This is an 
important feature since it shows that even if some actors know about the secret it does not lose its 
status. However, the applicable law does not point to how many actors can know about the secret 
before it loses its status. 
9.1.2.3 The Act iv i ty  Cri ter ion 
It is established, in the analysis that the protection given by the FHL does not stand on its own. 
Some external activity measures are required in order for the FHL to be applicable, in this case 
making sure that not everyone has access to the information. If the sensor was “open”, meaning that 
anyone who passes it would see how it is constructed and what components it consist of, the circle 
of persons is not longer easily identified. Put in other words, there needs to be an interaction 
between the contractual provisions and the practical measures in order to get the protection from 
the FHL.  
 The case T 8471/99 established that it might not be necessary to have an interaction 
between the contractual provisions or activities such as stamps, locks, or passwords in order to be 
granted the protection from the FHL. This applies only if the court establishes that it is customary in 
the line of business to keep the information secret or that the customer should have understood that 
SKF wanted the information to be kept secret. The requirements for this prerequisite are, very low, 
why it would be recklessly not to protect it. Furthermore, a thorough use of different activities will 
make it easier to show that there has been a breach since burden of proof is upon the disclosing 
party.  
9.1.3 Damage 
9.1.3.1 Disc losure Likely to Cause Damage 
As is established in the analysis section, it is irrelevant whether or not SKF have spent a lot of 
resources in order to develop and construct the sensors. However, the information is still valuable 
for SKF since it gives them leverage in negotiations with their buyers. With the sensor kept as a 
secret SKF is able to negotiate better terms. It is identified that other companies, more focused on 
sensors and similar products, might offer other sensors and solutions. In the case where the secret is 
disclosed SKFs competitive ability is hampered since these actors might offer solutions for better 
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terms. Therefore it is identified that there is a risk that disclosure of the trade secret would affect the 
competitive strength of SKF since customers might choose other solutions.  
9.1.3.2 For Which Trader  
In the case where SKF transfers the sensor it is shown in the analysis section that the sensor will still 
enjoy the protection of the FHL, in terms of damages and penalties, even if it is disclosed at a 
customer’s site. It is furthermore identified that SKF is the trader who will suffer damage since it 
would hamper the competitive strength of SKF, which is analysed in the section above. A scenario 
where the customer suffers damage because other companies will know what technique the 
customer is using is identified as unlikely or in best case, not damaging at all. However, as mentioned 
by the propositionen, when the trade secret is licensed out it can become mutual, i.e. both the 
licensor and the licensee have the trade secret.  
9.1.3.3 Damage From Compet i t ion Point o f  View 
This prerequisite has been interpreted that only when disclosure would negatively change the 
trader’s competitiveness the information is identified as relevant. This question has already been 
addressed in section 9.1.3.1 where it was established that it would negatively affect SKFs 
competitiveness. Following the Supreme Court's statements in NJA 1995 s. 347 it is also identified 
that even if some actors already know or have similar solutions to the sensor, SKFs sensor will still 
enjoy protection from the FHL since SKF has an interest that the sensor is not to be disclosed. 
9.1.4 Conclusion 
An overall assessment of the analysis shows that it is most likely possible to claim the sensor as a 
trade secret according to the FHL if actions that restrict access to the information are taken. 
However, if one wishes to use the sensor dynamically, by selling the sensor, protection from the 
FHL might not be possible. SOU 1983:52 and Levin’s statement stating that if a product is “on the 
market” it can lose its characteristic as a trade secret if it is able to reverse engineer the product for 
reasonable costs, shows that it might be impossible to get the sensor protected by the FHL. One can 
only speculate where the threshold is for whether or not something is unreasonable costly or easily 
accessible for a person skilled in the art. It might be possible to address lots of different non-legal 
tools to the sensor, e.g. locks, stamps, etc. so that it becomes deemed as unreasonably costly to 
reverse engineer it. One way to get around this, and to increase the chances of keeping it secret 
according to the legal definition, is to license out the sensor rather than selling it. A licensing model 
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enables control of the circle of people knowing about the trade secret, i.e. the relative secrecy criteria 
of the FHL is fulfilled.  
 Applying Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theory that in order to capitalise on IA one needs to have 
a property claim, gives that it is possible to capitalise on the sensor. There is therefore no doubt that 
the sensor and the knowledge within can be claimed as property. The question whether or not this is 
a strong or weak property claim is elaborated around in section 9.3.5. 
Petrusson’s theory on the three arenas and his statement that describing a trade secret is a 
claiming process in the business arena shows that it is possible to claim the sensor as a trade secret, 
even if the FHL would not recognize it as such when it is dynamically utilised. This is possible since 
there is no administrative arena that regulates whether or not something is a trade secret or not, i.e. 
it is the trader herself who determines if it is a trade secret or not, until proven otherwise in the 
judicial arena. However, if not identified as a trade secret according to the definition in the FHL, the 
trade secret claim cannot utilise the remedies found in the FHL. One can imagine the situation 
where SKF deems that it is a trade secret, even after being sold, and even if it is easy to reverse 
engineer the sensor. The only way to test if this is true or not is to bring the matter before a court 
that then has to decide if it is a trade secret according to FHL. Theoretically this can be done, but it 
depends on the power SKF has in the business arena. In a situation where the buyer has a low 
degree – or none – of power in the business arena, e.g. is a start-up or a SME, SKF could more 
easily force upon that this is a trade secret according to FHL and that the remedies according to that 
law will be enforced. In a scenario where the buyer has equal – or more – power it is identified as a 
risk since that actor most likely has the resources and will to take legal actions. However, what is 
important to mention is that the business arena described is restricted to Sweden, since the FHL is 
Swedish national law. Therefore it is possible that the sensor might not be acknowledged as a trade 
secret in for example Germany or France, since this is a different area business arena and the same 
law is not applied there. 
9.2 EU Analysis of Article 2 
The following will analyse whether or not the sensor will be deemed as a trade secret according to 
the Directive. Given that it is only a proposal, and therefore lacks guiding case law and doctrine, the 
analysis is rather short and has by nature a speculative character.  
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9.2.1 Information 
With a teleological interpretation as a starting point, meaning that the term should be given a wide 
scope, the sensor fulfils this criterion. The sensor is furthermore considered as explicit knowledge 
since it is possible to transfer it or write it down in a manual for example. Regarding the question 
that the Directive does not cover trivial information, whereas it may be covered by the FHL, it is 
identified that the sensor most likely is not of trivial character that is addressed in the Directive. An 
overall assessment shows therefore that the sensor fulfils the “information” criterion.   
9.2.2 Secrecy 
Given that the secrecy prerequisite has a relative meaning just as it has in Sweden, shows that the 
sensor might be known for several persons without losing its characteristics as a trade secret. As was 
identified under the FHL analysis, it is possible to maintain the secret character of the sensor. It is 
furthermore identified that article 2, section 1 (a) states that “is secret in the sense that it is not, as a 
body or in the precise configuration and assembly of its components” (author’s emphasis), meaning that there 
is no doubt that the sensor as a body, or its assembly of components, can be of trade secret 
character. This wording does not exist in the FHL and it is identified as a good contribution for 
knowledge that is manifested physically, since it removes any doubts whether or not the sensor or its 
assembly can be of trade secret character. Regarding the question what happens when the trade 
secret is sold, i.e. put on the market, one can only speculate. The most likely speculation is that if 
sold and easily accessible the trade secret loses its secret character. Just as in the Swedish regulation, 
a business model focusing on licensing out the sensor to certain, but not all customers, instead of 
selling it, is more preferable since it is easier to maintain control of the circle.  
9.2.3 Commercial Value 
The sensor grants SKF a certain advantage against its competitors. The advantage is identified as 
both a direct and indirect advantage since it improves the product and it is of great value for SKF’s 
competitors. Therefore, if the competitors would get access to the information SKF will suffer 
damage. It is therefore identified that the commercial value prerequisite is fulfilled.  
9.2.4 Activity 
The sensor is either mounted on machines or embedded within the bearings that belong to the 
customer and therefore the sensor will be in the customer’s premises. This means that the 
circumstances are such that in order for it to be deemed that reasonable steps have been taken, the 
sensor needs to be protected relatively carefully. Since there is no case law or further clarification of 
the prerequisite, it is hard to analyse what is deemed as reasonable steps. It is most likely not enough 
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to just mark the sensor as “classified information” given that it is in the customer’s premises and of 
great value to SKF. Therefore more steps will have to be utilised.  
9.2.5 Conclusion 
Since the Directive is still not in force and therefore lacks further clarification, a conclusion merely 
becomes a prediction. However, as identified in section 3.2, because of the influences from Swedish 
law some predictions are deemed as more likely than other. The Directive has, in comparison to 
Swedish law, some advantages when it comes to analysing whether or not embedded knowledge is 
covered. For example the Directive clearly states that physical knowledge, in its assembly, 
components, or as a body can be of trade secret character. The Directive has furthermore an 
advantage by stating that different steps needs to be taken in order for the directive to cover the 
knowledge, making it easier for traders to apply adequate protective measures. An overall assessment 
shows that the Directive will most likely identify the sensor as a trade secret.  
Following Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theory on assets, property, and capital, the introduction 
of the Directive will make it easier to propertise the trade secret since the Directive will develop the 
system of ownership rights of the trade secrets by making it more homogenous throughout the 
European Union. This is one step towards making it possible to capitalise on trade secrets by 
dynamically using them.  
Regarding the three arenas, the lack of an administrative arena, means that anyone can claim 
their knowledge as a trade secret without applying for it anywhere. This claim can then be tested in 
the judicial arena where the court settles whether or not the knowledge falls within the scope of the 
Directive. It is identified that the business arena is of even more crucial importance, since a strong 
position in this arena means that it will be easier to claim the knowledge as a trade secret and 
property. A smaller enterprise can claim it in the business arena, however, with its weak market 
power will make this harder. It could therefore be said that small enterprises are only left to claim it 
in the judicial arena, which is a costly operation. Therefore a company such as SKF benefits greatly 
from the Directive.  
9.3 Analysis of Scope of Protection 
The following – as stated in the introduction – risks are identified as the most imminent: dismantling 
the sensor, acquiring information through NDT, transferring it, steal it, and bankruptcy situations. 
This section will analyse whether or not these risks are covered by the FHL. In the FHL it is the 
four prerequisites ‘acquires’, ‘exploits’, ‘discloses’, and ‘unwarranted’ that define whether or not it is 
61 
unwarranted infringement. When it comes to the Directive it is the prerequisites ‘acquisition’, ‘use’, 
‘disclosure’, and ‘unlawful’. This analysis is done to identify whether or not these two acts offer 
sufficient protection in order to transact the sensor, i.e. the embedded knowledge. 
9.3.1 Dismantling the Sensor 
According to Fahlbeck’s analysis the term acquiring implies that something new has to be added to 
the trader’s sphere. The question is therefore if the trader, by licensing the sensor, is getting 
something ‘new’ when she dismantles a product she already had in her possession? The typical case 
is that the trader licenses the sensor without knowing how it looks inside and what components it is 
made off. With this viewpoint, that it is the knowledge inside that is the interesting aspect, it can be 
said that she has not added anything new to her sphere. However, one can argue that she already 
had the knowledge in her sphere, especially if the sensor is not protected by any measures, i.e. 
already by having it in her possession it should be considered that she has the knowledge as well 
since it is more or less readily accessible. Law or doctrine does not address this question but the 
author identifies that if the sensor is heavily protected, the customer does not acquire the knowledge 
within. By dismantling the sensor the trader will get this information and thereby adding something 
to her sphere. The conclusion is therefore that the prerequisite “acquires” is most likely fulfilled in 
such a scenario. However, the question is then whether or not this is an unwarranted acquirement?  
 The analysis of the term unwarranted also shows that in order to not be unwarranted is if 
the licensee has the consent of the licensor (SKF) or any of the other ways that are identified in the 
above analysis section. In this case it is the consent of SKF that is the only applicable way that can 
authorize an acquirement. The analysis of the unwarranted prerequisite shows that consent can be 
given explicitly or implicitly. If the trader understood – according to the circumstances – that she 
had the consent to do something, she could do it. An e contrario interpretation of this gives that a 
trader could implicitly understand that she did not have the consent to do something with the 
sensor, i.e. there is an implicitly understood restriction to dismantle the sensor. Implicit agreements 
depend on many circumstances but one can imagine the case where the buying trader purchases the 
sensor and that it is heavily protected. i.e. it has locks or other protective measures making it hard to 
dismantle. Can this be a circumstance that implies that the trader should have implicitly understood 
that she could not dismantle the sensor? Much point to that it should be understood by the trader 
that she did not have the consent to dismantle the sensor, since it is rather obvious that she should 
not dismantle the sensor given the protective measures. However, since it depends on the 
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circumstances in each case, it can never be said for sure that this is the case. But by highlighting this 
question it is identified that there is some uncertainty when it comes to unwarranted acquisitions. 
 In the case where the sensor is sold to the trader, one has to rely on the implicitly 
understood agreements. The reason for this is that no other agreements are entered other than the 
ownership right for the sensor is transferred for payment. This is a risk that is identified with a 
business model focusing on selling the sensor. One way to ensure that it is an unwarranted 
acquisition is to rather license out the sensor than selling it. If the licensing agreements address the 
ownership and usage limitations, it is much easier to establish whether or not dismantling of the 
sensor is unwarranted or not. The reason for this is when the licensee only has licensing rights to the 
sensor, the presumption is that she cannot do anything with the sensor without the consent of the 
licensor or something that has explicitly been agreed upon. Therefore the licensing agreement has to 
address the question what the licensee can do or not do with the sensor. However, this shows that it 
is not the FHL that gives the immediate protection, but rather the business model and the 
agreements that are attached to it. Although the FHL might be applicable even if this has not been 
regulated through an agreement, i.e. the licensee should have implicitly understood that she could 
not dismantle the sensor because of the licensing agreements and the measures protecting it, it is 
identified that it is easier to establish whether or not something is unwarranted or not when agreed 
upon through contracts. 
Dismantling the sensor, or trying to get access to the information within in it in any other 
way, is regulated by the Directive in article 3 paragraph 2. As mentioned in section 8.4 and the 
appendix, unauthorized access of an object from which the trade secret can be deduced, and that is 
lawfully under the control of the trade secret holder, is unlawful when carried out intentionally or 
with gross negligence and without the consent of the trade secret holder. The same reasoning as in 
the paragraph above can be made here. Much point to that when the sensor is sold, the trader has 
the consent to access the information within the sensor since ownership rights have been 
transferred. The trader can reverse engineer the product and as a first step dismantling it in order to 
acquire the information legally. The question can be asked whether or not it should implicitly be 
understood that they did not have the consent to dismantle the sensor but this is – as identified in 
the paragraph above – as very unpredictable. A difference from the FHL is the wording “and that is 
lawfully under the control of the trade secret holder”. The question here becomes what is the 
meaning of ‘under control’. In the case where the sensor is sold it could be established that SKF 
does not have any control, neither legal control since the ownership rights have been transferred 
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without any restrictions on how to use the sensor or control in the sense that they have physical 
control over the sensor. However, in a licensing case it is identified that they still have the ownership 
rights through an agreement, i.e. legally in control, and therefore much points to that this 
prerequisite is fulfilled even if they still do not have physical control, i.e. they have it in their 
possession.  
9.3.2 NDT 
The question is whether or not the FHL covers the situation where a customer tries to acquire the 
information within the sensor utilising NDT. Conducting NDT relates to the risk that the customer 
“acquires” the information. In order to avoid reiteration the same reasoning as made in the section 
above, 9.3.1, applies here. The conclusion is therefore that accessing information using NDT is 
identified as acquiring information.  The question how much, or how accurate the information is, 
makes most likely no difference.  
 As in the section above the question comes down to whether or not the act of using NDT is 
unwarranted or not. Conducting a sales model implies – as mentioned before – that the customer 
can do whatever she wants. This is due to that there are no explicit restrictions to do so. Again it can 
be argued that there are implicit agreements restricting such use. When conducing a license model 
the starting point is that all acts, which are not explicitly or implicitly consented are illegal. 
Therefore, trying to use NDT in order to acquire information within the sensor will be identified as 
an unwarranted acquisition, which is covered by the FHL. It is however another question that it is 
most likely hard to establish that the customer has conducted NDT, meaning that such acts in 
practical cannot be covered by the FHL 
 Analysing this imminent risk from the protection given by the Directive gives more or less 
the same answer as in the section made above, 9.3.1. Therefore a more extensive evaluation will not 
be conducted. It is enough to establish that when the sensor is sold a NDT will most likely not be 
identified as an unlawful acquisition and as an unlawful acquisition when licensed out.   
9.3.3 Transfer 
In a situation where a trader has purchased or licensed the sensor legally, is she able to transfer the 
sensor without the FHL recognising it as an unwarranted infringement? Such action relates to 
whether or not the buyer has disclosed the information. As described in the analysis above it is 
established that a trade secret can be disclosed when it is transferred as an object from which the 
trade secret can be deduced. Therefore a transfer of the sensor can fulfil this prerequisite. Even if 
Fahlbeck’s example analyses an employee stealing the trade secret and then giving it to a trader 
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willing to acquire it, some guidelines can be read from it. There are two steps: in the first step, the 
sensor has to be unwarrantedly transferred to a trader, and in the second step the trade secret has to 
be known for the acquiring trader. Yet again it boils down to whether or not this is unwarranted or 
not and if the trader actually accesses the secret information. As identified in the other risks, when 
the trader buys the sensor much point to that transferring the sensor to a third party cannot be 
identified as an unwarranted infringement. In a situation where the transferring trader has acquired 
the sensor from SKF by a licensing deal, this behaviour would most likely be identified as an 
unwarranted disclosure according to the FHL, since the transferring trader has not ownership rights 
but rather only licensing rights and therefore has no right to transfer it to a third party without the 
consent from SKF, i.e. she breaches the licensing agreement when transferring the sensor. 
Therefore, in the licensing deal the first step is most likely fulfilled.  
Question is however if the second step is fulfilled. Undoubtedly the third trader acquires the 
sensor but does she acquire the trade secret that is protected within the sensor? This question is not 
addressed in case law or doctrine and therefore one can only speculate. An example with blueprints 
can be made. Even if the blueprints are transferred in an envelope they surely have to be identified 
as transferred even if the trade secret, at first glance, cannot be seen. The trader can simply open the 
envelope in order to access the information. In the case with the sensor it is the plastic cask that 
conceals the trade secret within it and it is undoubtedly harder to open than an envelope. Given the 
precision that can be achieved by modern machines today, it is easy to open up a sensor that is only 
protected by a plastic cask. If the sensor on the other hand is heavily protected by different 
measures, it can be argued that the acquiring trader per se does not know the trade secret and 
therefore remedies according to the FHL cannot be demanded. However, if the acquiring trader 
would somehow, against the odds, be able to access the information, it will be identified as an 
unwarranted disclosure since the second step of Fahlbeck’s analysis is fulfilled. This speculation 
follows the same reasoning that the SOU 1983:52 and Levin has when stating that something that is 
not easily accessible for a person skilled in the art can maintain its secret character even when it is 
put on the market. The conclusion is therefore that in a situation where the sensor licensed to a 
trader, the FHL might be utilised to remedy an act where the sensor is unwarrantedly transferred to 
another trader.  
A relevant question is whether or not the sensor loses its characteristic as a trade secret when 
it is disclosed after being transferred? As the analysis of the applicable law states above, several 
traders can know of the secret without it losing its characteristics. Fahlbeck mentions that when the 
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transfer is unwarranted the answer whether or not it loses it characteristics depends on the 
circumstances.130 If it is clear that the information has been disclosed to a certain trader, which can 
be identified, and this trader realised, or should at least realise, i.e. is in bad faith, that it is secret 
information she has been given, the information ought to maintain its character as a trader secret. 
An e contrario analysis shows that if the trader did not know she was given a trade secret, or it 
cannot be identified which trader was given the information, the sensor will lose its characteristics 
since the acquiring trader was in good faith and this is always considered as a warranted 
infringement. The reasons for this are that it is possible to acquire trade secrets in good faith, 
meaning that the trader is not responsible for any infringements. As mentioned by Fahlbeck, this 
applies to all traders if the trade secret has been transferred in several steps, i.e. all the traders need 
to be in bad faith. 
 The directive has a straightforward approach to whether or not transfer to a third party 
could be identified as an unwarranted disclosure or use. By identifying a person who meets any of 
the three conditions, the person has committed an unlawful use or disclosure of a trade secret. The 
first condition states that the person has acquired the trade secret unlawfully. In the case where the 
trade secret is either sold or licensed out to a trader it is – as mentioned above – identified that the 
trader has lawfully acquired the sensor. Therefore the first condition is not fulfilled. The second 
condition states that it is a breach or inducement to breach a confidentiality agreement or any other 
duty to maintain secrecy. In the case where the sensor is sold it most likely means that there is no 
breach since there is no confidentiality agreement. However, the wording “or any other duty to 
maintain secrecy” could imply that if the sensor is heavily protected, the trader should understand 
that she has a duty to maintain the secrecy. However, protecting the sensor with different non-legal 
tools, such as stamps or locks can be used as a strategy to leverage that this condition is fulfilled in 
the case where one sells the trade secret. In the case where SKF licenses out the sensor, the party 
who transfers the sensor to a third party, or steals, the situation is different. Licensing agreements 
usually contain confidentiality agreements and if such exists this condition is fulfilled. The third 
condition states that if the person is in breach of a contractual or any other duty to limit the use of 
the trade secret it should be deemed as unlawful use. When the sensor is sold the most likely 
situation is – as mentioned – that there is no explicit contracts that are entered. The wording that 
states: “or any other duty to limit the use of the trade secret” resembles to the wording used in the 
second condition. The wording has the character of a general clause that could be used if any of the 
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other two conditions are failed to fulfil. In the licensing situation this condition will most likely be 
fulfilled, but as mentioned, it is most likely already covered by the second condition.  
 The overall assessment shows that in the case where the sensor is sold it will most likely not 
be considered as an unwarranted infringement according to both FHL and the Directive. The 
situation where the sensor is licensed out is on the other hand most likely covered if confidentiality 
agreements are entered. 
9.3.4 Stealing 
A scenario where the sensor is stolen relates to different situations depending on what the actor who 
has stolen the sensor does. The most imminent risk is that an employee steals the sensor. Such 
action can be identified as an unwarranted acquisition of the trade secret. There is no need to 
identify whether or not the employee has learned the information since it is not a requirement that 
the employee takes part of the information, the employee can for example be passive and only 
“steal” the information in order to transfer it to a third party as is identified in the analysis. If the 
employee transfers the knowledge to a third party, it is most likely identified as an unwarranted 
disclosure of the trade secret, see the above section for a more extensive investigation. One can also 
imagine the scenario where a trader conducts business espionage in order to gain the information. 
Such action is also identified as an unwarranted acquisition and is especially addressed in article 3 of 
the FHL. 
 The directive is yet again more straightforward compared to the FHL. Article 3 section 2 (b) 
addresses this situation by stating that it should be considered as unlawful acquisition when someone 
has, without consent, acquired the information through theft. Therefore a situation where an 
employee or a competing trader steals their information is without a doubt covered by the Directive. 
9.3.5 Bankruptcy 
As mentioned under section 10.1.4, the official trustee is responsible for reimbursing the creditors 
when a company enters into bankruptcy. The trustee must many times sell everything that is in the 
bankruptcy estate in order to be able to reimburse the creditors. It is therefore identified that the 
trustee, as bought by the trader who has entered into bankruptcy, will most likely sell the sensor, to a 
third party. However, the official trustee also has the possibility to enter into the agreements that 
were entered by the trader and therefore keep fulfilling them. The question is if the FHL or the 
Directive covers this situation? The situation where the trustee sells the sensor in order to reimburse 
the creditors will be analysed first. Secondly the situation where the trustee enters the agreement will 
be analysed.  
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 The situation where the trustee sells the sensor to a third party relates to an unwarranted 
disclosure. As mentioned there are two steps to consider, 1) the sensor needs to be unwarrantedly 
transferred to a trader, and 2), it has to be known for the acquiring trader. Whether or not it is 
unwarranted according to the FHL depends if the trader has consent or not. In the situation where 
the sensor is sold, the trustee can transfer it to a third party since any action is warranted if no 
implicit agreements have been entered.  This applies even if it is the trustee and not the initial trader 
who transfers the sensor since the trustee is to transform all the property that belongs to the 
bankrupt trader, into ‘liquid assets’.131 In the situation where the sensor has been licensed out the 
situation is different since the bankrupt trader does not own the sensor. Much points to that this 
situation is solved with the same reasoning that was mentioned above under the risk “transferring 
the sensor”, i.e. the first and the second step is most likely fulfilled since the trustee did not own the 
sensor and the acquiring third party knows about the secret if it is not so heavily protected that a 
person skilled in the art can easily acquire it. Therefore this can be identified as an unwarranted 
disclosure. However, yet again, this depends on that there is a licensing agreement and not that the 
FHL covers it per se.  
 It is considered a general legal principle that the bankruptcy estate has the possibility to enter 
into the agreements of the bankrupt company, or not if that is what the bankruptcy estate wishes 
to.132 Therefore an outcome could be that the trustee enters into the licensing agreement that was 
made with the now bankrupt trader. This does not have to mean that it is a bad thing for the 
licensor but it is established that the FHL offers no protection for this scenario. This situation needs 
to be solved by using other tools.  
 Regarding the Directive, article 3 paragraph 3, the outcome is most likely the same in the 
situation when the sensor has been sold to the now bankrupt trader. Regarding the scenario where 
the sensor is licensed out, article 3 paragraph 3 is the most relevant one. The second condition is the 
most relevant one but if this might not be fulfilled the third condition, which has the character of a 
general clause, is most likely fulfilled.  
9.3.6 Conclusion 
Applying the theory of dynamic use of intellectual property, the question is whether or not FHL 
allows for such use of the knowledge within the sensor. As it is established that FHL most likely 
acknowledges the knowledge as a trade secret, according to the legal definition, it is theoretically 
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possible to use it dynamically. However, practically the protection given by FHL, as stated by Levin 
as well, is often times “toothless” (author’s translation).133 This analysis shows that the control given 
by FHL is low if not protected by other legal tools, such as agreements. An example is that anyone 
can reverse engineer the product if they have bought the sensor legally. Therefore it is identified as 
almost impossible to sell the product and maintain the secret character. There is an option to rely on 
that the trade secret is so hard to access that a person skilled in the art cannot easily do this. When 
so, the trade secret maintains its secret character. This is however, as mentioned, very unpredictable 
and not advised. However, safeguarding the sensor with different measures is still interesting, but 
not as a sole measure. The business model that is identified as best suitable is the licensing model. 
This business model allows it too much easier show that any infringement is unwarranted. The 
reason for this is that one can then contractually agree upon what should be an unwarranted 
infringement or not. It can however not be mentioned too many times that the contractual 
agreements are separated from FHL and acts as a way to easier utilise the FHL.  
As mentioned under the theory section, having control over an identified asset is key in 
order to make it valuable. If the knowledge is seen as public it is hard to persuade a trader to buy it. 
Above it was established that the sensor can be acknowledged as a trade secret according to the 
definition of the FHL and the Directive and that this allows for claiming the knowledge within the 
sensor as property. However, one can argue whether or not this is a strong property claim. Generally 
a claim derived from Swedish law ought to be strong, in the sense that it grants the proprietor or 
owner a good control position. However, this depends mainly on the system of ownership rights 
surrounding that claim. The analysis shows that it is rather easy to claim something as a trade secret, 
which have to be a factor that suggests that the claim is not strong. Furthermore, lack of an 
administrative arena also suggests that the strength of the property claim is not strong. A third factor 
is that the trade secret claim grants no exclusivity for the knowledge. A fourth factor is the volatile 
nature of trade secrets, as shown in the analysis. A comparison can be made towards the patent and 
the system surrounding patents. The patent system gives the proprietor or owner a strong claim to 
the knowledge patented. The reasons for this is that there is well established ownership rights in the 
form of a well developed administrative arena that grants exclusivity which is upheld by more or less 
all business actors. The conclusion is therefore made that the property claim from a trade secret is 
identified as a weak property claim.  
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The analysis shows that the protection from the two legal acts is not impregnable. This 
implies that even if SKF can claim that the sensor is a trade secret, it would not matter since it is 
hard to capitalise on it. In order to dynamically use trade secrets the level of control needs to be at a 
certain level. It is hard to establish where this level is but the author argues that with only the FHL 
and the Directive as protection the level of control is not sufficient. Capitalisation can still occur, but 
in order to create a foundation for a platform, the FHL and the Directive is not enough. However, 
applying the theory of the three arenas to the conclusion that the FHL and the Directive offers poor 
protection for transacting knowledge, can give other results. The argumentation for this is that an 
actor with power in the business arena has a greater chance to uphold the protection compared to 
an actor with no or less power within the business arena. For example, if SKF transacts knowledge 
to an actor who has little or no power within the business arena compared to SKF and SKF only 
relies on the protection offered by the FHL and the Directive, this protection will be identified as 
stronger than the protection when both parties have equal strength within the arena. The reason for 
this is that the actor with no or less power is more likely to depend on trade with an actor with 
influence in the business arena. That actor is therefore less prone to infringe the trade secret since it 
will damage the business relationship with the actor who has power in the business arena. Therefore 
the protection offered by the FHL and the Directive is relative when applying the theory of the 
three arenas. Depending on the circumstances the protection can be identified as more or less 
protective, i.e. the FHL and the Directive offers different amounts of control depending on the 
power within the business arena. 
10 Openly Available Knowledge – Analysis of FHL and the Directive 
In the following an analysis will be performed whether the manual, both digital and analogue, and 
the information contained therein can be claimed as property, i.e. trade secrets, in the business arena 
according to the FHL and the Directive. Petrusson argues that describing information as trade 
secrets is a claiming process and if the claims are accepted in the business arena, the holder has a 
trade secret that can be seen as her intellectual property.134 Describing information as trade secrets 
implies that the legal prerequisites for knowledge to be seen as trade secrets must be fulfilled for 
both FHL and the Directive. Finally it will be analysed what protection is granted by the both legal 
acts.  
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10.1 FHL Analysis of Article 1 
In the following will be analysed if the knowledge in the manual is considered as a trade secret 
according to the FHL. The structure for the analysis is the one used above when presenting the legal 
background, i.e. the different prerequisites and their respective sub criteria. 
10.1.1 Information Concerning the Business or Industrial Relations of a Trader 
10.1.1.1 Information 
The propositionen mentioned above gives that the information criteria should have a wide meaning 
and that it can be of many different sorts as long as the information is possible to document. 
Furthermore praxis gives that there should be no quality requirements on the information, implying 
that even if the information presented in the manual is of a simple nature it should still be deemed as 
information in a legal sense. Of the examples presented above are for instance seen construction 
drawings, which without doubt will be present in the manual when showing how to mount the 
bearing. The manual also contains information of other character as well, but as the example list is 
not exhaustive, that there should be no quality requirements on the information and due to the wide 
meaning of information, the conclusion must be that the other information is considered 
information in a legal sense as well. The criterion that the information should be possible to 
document and not only reside in the minds of humans is fulfilled in the case of the manual as it is 
written down, i.e. documented. The fact that the manual might be of a digital character will not 
affect the conclusion since it is explicitly stated in the propositionen that the information may be 
stored on a computer memory.135 In summary the information contained in the manual is considered 
information from a FHL perspective, regardless if the manual is digital or analogue.  
10.1.1.2 Business  or  Industr ia l  Relat ions 
The information must concern the business or industrial relations of a trader. As has been stated 
above, this criterion should be interpreted as that the information must be linked to a company and 
the economic activities within the company, and not be generally known. As the manual covers 
information of how to mount the bearing it must be seen as linked to both the economic and 
industrial activities of the company, as the production of bearings is the core activity of the 
company. The company also has operations that work solely with mounting bearings, therefore, in 
relation to that business unit within the company, the link is quite strong. The existence of this 
business unit indicates that the information is not generally known, otherwise the customers could, 
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and likely would, do the mounting themselves or contract a third party to mount them. The business 
case would at least not be as favourable if the information used by the mounting service is generally 
known to anyone who might want to compete with a similar service. In summary the criterion that 
the information must concern the business or industrial relations of a trader is fulfilled.  
10.1.1.3 Trader 
The third criterion that the holder of the trade secret should be considered a trader is a generous 
criterion. A trader is any physical or legal person that in a professional manner conducts business, 
regardless of whether the business aims at making a profit.136 As the company in this case is a 
multinational legal person that has profits of billions of SEK, and is considered to be in the 
forefront of the technical advances within the area, the company is without doubt considered a 
trader from an FHL perspective.  
10.1.2 Secrecy 
10.1.2.1 The Time Factor  
The time factor implies that even if the manual was developed several years ago, it will still be 
considered as a trade secret if the other prerequisites are fulfilled. This applies even if SKF would 
make a new version of the manual in the future, following the case NJA 1999 s. 469, as have been 
accounted for under section 8.1.2.1 
10.1.2.2 Circ l e  o f  People  
For the information to be considered and protected as trade secrets there is a requirement for the 
trader to keep the information secret, however, this prerequisite is not absolute in the meaning that 
no one may know the information. There are no limitations on how many may know the 
information, there is however a requirement for the circle of people that knows the information to 
be closed and identified. It is also noted above that as long as the information is only distributed to 
the people that need the trade secret to conduct their work, then it should be considered as kept 
secret. For the time before the manual is transferred to the customer the information is most likely 
considered secret as long as the information is known only by the persons who need the information 
to do their work and the ones writing the manual, which would then be considered as a closed and 
identified circle. Once transferred to the customer it can continuously be considered secret if the 
identified and closed requirement is fulfilled. If the circle of people that is allowed to read the 
manual are the people that are going to use it when mounting the bearings, then that circle would 
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most likely be considered as “identified and closed” and the information considered secret as long as 
the information is kept within that circle of people. If the information is available outside the circle 
of people that need it to mount the bearings the circle of people might not be considered “identified 
and closed”, which is something that would have to be settled by a court of law in the judicial arena.  
As the manual is custom made, and not for available to anyone who might be interested in it, it will 
be possible to establish an identified and closed circle since SKF can choose the customers. If the 
manual is widely sold or licensed, as identified in the SOU 1983:52, it is impossible to have an 
identified and closed circle and the secrecy prerequisite is not fulfilled. It is however unclear where 
the line should be drawn more specifically for the circle to remain identified and closed why caution 
should be exercised when transferring trade secrets to a third party, as well as when keeping them 
secret in-house.  
10.1.2.3 The Activ i ty  Cri ter ion 
There is also an activity criterion for the information to be considered secret, which implies that the 
trader shall have the intention to keep the information within a limited circle of people and has 
taken some sort of measure to realise this ambition. An e contrario interpretation gives that if the 
information is secret just by luck, without the trader having any intention of keeping it secret and 
not have taken any measures to ensure the secrecy, then the activity criteria is not fulfilled. It is 
however very difficult for another party to prove that the activity criteria has not been fulfilled, why 
the risk is most likely low if the information is secret by luck. The case T 8471/99 states that if the 
objective criteria is not fulfilled, i.e. no measures have been taken as to ensure the that the 
information is kept within a certain circle of people, it might be ‘healed’ if it is customary within a 
specific line of business to keep such information secret, implying that the trader that receives the 
information should have understood that he is not allowed to disclose the information. In the case 
of the manual it will most likely be considered as trade secrets before distributing it to the customer, 
as long as the trader has in some way expressed to the employees that they must not tell the 
information contained within the manual to any third party, for instance by having a secrecy clause 
in their employment agreement. After transacting the manual with the customer there is still no 
difficulty to ensure that the activity criteria is fulfilled by having the customer sign an NDA, or 
similar. If no such measure have been taken it presents difficulties for the trader to prove that, if so 
is the case, it is customary in that line of business to keep the information secret. However, as the 
activity criterion is low it is rather simple to fulfil it why some measures should always be taken to 
ensure that it is fulfilled. 
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10.1.3 Damage  
9.1.3.1 Disc losure Likely to Cause Damage 
The third prerequisite for information to be considered as trade secrets is whether it is likely to cause 
the trader damage from a competition point of view, if the information is disclosed. This damage 
does not have to be only economical and there is neither any requirement that any damage has 
actually occurred, but rather if it is a situation which typically would cause damage for the trader. As 
there is no requirement that any damage has actually occurred it is rather simple to affirm that the 
situation of the manual is likely to cause damage. There are separate business units within SKF that 
work with mounting bearings, which use the information that is documented in the manual. Sharing 
this with a third party is therefore likely to cause damage to that particular business unit if the 
manual is disclosed, either by the receiving party or an employee of SKF.  
10.1.3.2 For Which Trader  
There is also a need to establish for which trader the damage has occurred, or is likely to occur. It is 
rather clear that it is SKF that would suffer the damage, as it is their trade secrets that the manual is 
comprised of. The receiving party may also be damaged if that knowledge presented her with a good 
competitive advantage or similar. Such damage is however more insecure and depending on the 
specific case why the only damage that would be for sure, if the trade secrets were disclosed, would 
be for SKF 
10.1.3.3 Damage From Compet i t ion Point o f  View 
Finally the disclosure has to actually damage the possibility to compete. As has been mentioned SKF 
has business units that work solely with mounting bearings, and when doing so they utilise the 
knowledge within the manual. If this information would come into the hands of other customers 
than the one who received it, or worse, if it got into the hands of a competing firm, it would without 
doubt damage the ability for SKF to compete within this area. The major advantage SKF has over 
the competitors is that SKF knows exactly how the SKF manufactured bearings should be mounted, 
if this information is instead freely available the competitive advantage is diminished.  
10.1.4 Conclusion 
As a general conclusion the manual, both digital and analogue, fulfils all the prerequisites according 
to the FHL for being claimed as a trade secret in the business arena, which is where it has to be 
claimed since there is no administrative arena. In other words, there is no doubt that the manual 
may be claimed as property using FHL.  
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Due to SKF’s size and market power the manual will benefit from stronger protection than 
that of a small company, since SKF can leverage their power in the business arena, something that a 
small company cannot do the same way.  
It should also be recognised that if the manual is widely sold or licensed to anyone who 
might be interested in it, it will to all certainty not be considered as a trade secret, but rather publicly 
available knowledge. Therefore it is advisable to hand pick a few customers instead of widely 
distributing the manual.  
Something highly important in the case of the manual is what happens when the manual 
contains information that is both generally known and information that is claimed as trade secrets. 
In such a case, will the manual as a whole be protected as a trade secret or not? It comes down to if 
the manual as such can be claimed as a trade secret or if only the information within the manual can 
be trade secrets. A parallel can be drawn to customer lists that comprise public information, namely 
people’s names and addresses, but are still considered trade secrets. The names as such are public 
but the fact that those specific people are customers to a company is a trade secret. This implies that 
if you have public information but add another dimension of information to it, and use it in a 
specific context, then it can still be considered trade secrets. The secret dimension that they are 
customers, of the information is then very small compared to the public dimension, their name and 
addresses, of the information. The conclusion must therefore be that even if the majority of the 
information is publicly available the entirety can be claimed as a trade secret. If the same reasoning is 
applied to the manual it will most likely be possible to claim as a trade secret even though some of 
the information contained within is publicly available. A teleological interpretation of the FHL gives 
the same outcome, since the protection otherwise would be illusory. If it would not be like this, a 
trader would lose the protection over a document containing highly important information if a 
single aspect were to become publicly known. The conclusion is therefore that even if some 
information in the manual is publicly available the manual as such will be possible to claim as a trade 
secret and property of SKF.  
10.2 EU Analysis of Article 2 
In the following will be analysed whether the information in the manual, both digital and analogue, 
will be considered as trade secrets according to the Directive. The four prerequisites that are needed 
to be fulfilled in order for the manual to be seen as a trade secret are information, secrecy, 
commercial value, and activity, which will be analysed in the following.  
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10.2.1 Information 
Above has been stated that the term information must be given a wide meaning to give an effective 
protection for trade secrets. The directive itself also says that the “definition should therefore be 
constructed as to cover business information, technological information and know-how”.137 
However, neither tacit nor trivial information should be covered. The manual contains technological 
information as well as know-how on how to install the bearings. As the manual is written down the 
information is not tacit, since such information is impossible to document. The information is not 
trivial either as it is obviously of great importance when installing bearings in wind power stations. 
Given the wide interpretation of the term information, the information in the manual must as a 
conclusion be considered as information in the meaning of the Directive. 
10.2.2 Secrecy 
As the secrecy requirement is of a relative nature, this implies that the information in the manual 
might be known outside of SKF, under certain circumstances at least. The important distinction is if 
the information is generally known within the circle that normally deals with this information or is 
readily accessible to them. Before the manual is transferred to the customer it will almost certainly 
be considered secret, and after the transaction as well, since transferring the manual to one company 
will not imply that it is generally known in the relevant circle. It is however unclear where the line 
should be drawn for when the information would be considered as generally known, is the majority 
of cases it would definitely require more persons to be aware of the information that in just one 
company. The criteria that the information should be readily accessible to people within the relevant 
circle cannot be interpreted so that just because one company is allowed to buy or license the 
information from SKF it is considered readily accessible as it is possible to get access to the 
information this way. If that were the case it would imply that transfer of trade secrets would not be 
possible, since they would no longer be trade secrets. It should also be noted that if the manual is 
widely distributed it will be very difficult for the manual not to become generally known in the 
relevant circle and no longer be considered as a trade secret, why this is not advisable. 
10.2.3 Commercial Value 
That the information within the manual has a commercial value is a conclusion that is easy to arrive 
to. To be able to install bearings in wind power stations the information in the manual is required 
since installing the bearings is very difficult and impossible to do without the information within the 
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manual. The party that has access to this information has a competitive advantage as that party may 
then install the bearings. A competitive advantage like this is highly valuable, which is also shown 
when SKF has a business unit that works with installing bearings in situations like this. If SKF can 
base parts of an entire business unit on the information within the manual, and similar information 
relating to other bearings, the information is undoubtedly valuable.  
10.2.4 Activity 
What should be considered reasonable steps to keep the information secret is dependent on the 
circumstances in the specific case. If the information is transacted outside the company, the activity 
level, i.e. the reasonable steps to keep it secret, must be higher as the trade secrets are more 
vulnerable once transferred, especially if widely transferred. The same applied if the information is 
highly valuable, the required activity level is most likely higher than if the information is not very 
valuable. What in the individual case should be enough is unclear, but the fact that the requirements 
are relative, sends a clear signal to the trade secret holder to add more protection to ensure that the 
activity criterion is met. In the case of the manual there is probably a need to use both contractual 
protections, such as secrecy clauses, as well as marking the manual with “secrecy” and probably 
other protective measures as well to be on the safe side.  
10.2.5 Conclusion 
First and foremost there is a need to recognise that the Directive has not yet entered into force, why 
the analysis of it has a big proportion of prediction. With this in mind, the manual, both digital and 
analogue, will as a conclusion be considered a trade secret according to the Directive for the time 
before it is transferred to a third party, as long as it is kept secret. Just as under FHL the fact that the 
manual might comprise both secret and public information should not affect the trade secret status 
of the manual as a whole as the protection would then be illusory. One criterion may present issues 
is the activity criterion, the other ones are rather straight forward that they are fulfilled.  When the 
manual is being transferred on the other hand, there is a need to apply more protective measures to 
ensure the secrecy of the manual. Where the line should be drawn as to when the activity criterion 
should be considered met is unclear, and is most likely decided in the individual case. It does 
however show that when transferring trade secrets a trader should be cautious and rather use too 
much protection than too little. Utilising few strong protective measures or many less strong ones 
may for instance do this. 
Lacking an administrative arena a trade secret needs to be claimed in the business arena 
instead, and then later upheld in the judicial arena if needed. Just as in relation to FHL above there is 
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no doubt that the manual may be claimed as a trade secret and thereby property according to the 
Directive.  
It is clear that since a trade secret is claimed in the business arena, the size of the company 
claiming the trade secret, and their inherent market power, will affect the protection of the trade 
secret, as a big company like SKF may leverage its market power into better protection. It could 
however also lead to higher requirements for protective measures, as the activity criterion is 
dependent on the circumstances in the specific case.  
Given Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theory the proposed Directive will make it easier to 
capitalise on trade secrets than before due to the harmonisation of the rules concerning trade 
secrets. Claiming a trade secret as property in the business arena will be made easier since all EU 
countries will have the same prerequisites for doing so, and protecting it in the judicial arena will 
also be easier due to the harmonised legislation. As a general conclusion the directive as such will 
therefore facilitate capitalisation of the trade secret by dynamic commercial transactions.  
10.3 Analysis of Scope of Protection 
It is established that the manual, both digital and analogue, is considered as a trade secret according 
to both the FHL and the Directive. The next step is to establish what protection is granted by the 
FHL and the Directive. Under the FHL only unwarranted uses are prohibited and under the 
Directive only unlawful uses are prohibited, what this implies has been addressed above. The 
question is if any of the imminent risks mentioned above in relation to transferring a manual to a 
customer are covered by either the FHL, the Directive, or by both. For this to be the case the risks 
below need to be an acquisition, exploitation or disclosure according to FHL or the Directive, and 
on top of this unwarranted or unauthorised. If this is the case will be analysed in the following 
where each individual risk will be reviewed after first addressing some aspects that are applicable in 
all cases. The analysis will be carried out as if no contractual obligations are entered into between the 
parties to better show what protection is granted by FHL and the Directive and which actions might 
trigger sanctions, mainly in terms of damages, by FHL and the Directive.  
10.3.1 Good or Bad Faith 
According to article 2 paragraph 3 FHL it is possible for someone to acquire a trade secret in good 
faith, implying that no attack on the trade secret in terms of exploitation or disclosure can be seen as 
unwarranted. If a trade secret is acquired by someone in good faith she can therefore do whatever 
she like with it, since she was not aware that it was a trade secret. As is stated above, if the trade 
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secret has passed several parties there is a requirement that not only the last party in the line of 
events is in bad faith, but also all parties before. This is therefore a potent risk when transferring 
trade secrets, however, Tonell indicates that it might be enough for bad faith to have confidentiality 
provisions in the agreement between the two first parties.138 To be on the safe side parties should in 
an agreement explicitly state that the manual is a trade secret and use confidentiality provisions. 
Another way to ensure bad faith for a customer would be to mark the manual with ‘Confidential’ or 
‘Trade secret of SKF’.  
10.3.2 The Acquisition 
All risks except “Too Much Information” relate to that the manual has been transferred to the 
customer at some stage and then there are risks in relation to this. In all these cases the customer has 
acquired the manual, when transferring the manual analogously or digitally, according to both the 
FHL and the Directive. The customer did not have the manual in her possession before and now 
has, which implies an acquisition of the manual. The propositionen states that a trade secret may be 
stored on a computer memory why transferring the manual as a PDF will be seen as an acquisition 
by the customer as the manual is always stored on the hard drive of the computer or similar 
electronic device.139 The Directive has most likely the same standpoint, though not explicitly. 
However, if a solution for accessing a digital manual is used where the customer only accesses the 
manual via a web-based data room or similar, where the manual is not stored locally on a computer 
but on a remote server, can the manual be considered to be acquired by the customer?  
When the manual is downloaded to the Random Access Memory (RAM) of the computer 
when accessing the manual via a web page, for as long as the web page is open. RAM is a type of 
computer memory that can be accessed randomly, and every time you start a program it gets loaded 
into the RAM, which allows for faster access than running the program straight from the hard 
drive.140 When the web page is closed the memory will be cleared, the copy of the manual in the 
RAM is a temporary one.141  
However, as long as the computer has not been turned off and then on again, there is a 
possibility that temporary files of the manual might be saved on the computer. These files might in 
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turn be possible to access by someone with enough computer skills, however when the computer is 
turned off any such files are deleted for certain.  
A relevant question in relation to this is whether or not the customer needs to take part of 
the information. Fahlbeck states that the “the word acquire does not imply that acquirer takes part 
of the information” (author’s translation) meaning that acquirer can be a passive middle hand and 
that the information is considered acquired already when customer has the possibility to take part of 
the information.142 A trade secret is therefore considered possessed already when a customer has the 
possibility to access it, regardless of factual possibility to access it. For instance, if accessing the 
information in the RAM or the temporary files requires special competence, this will not affect the 
possession. I.e. in this case, when the information is in the RAM or is available as a temporary file 
the customer has acquired it.   
When the customer accesses the manual, she might only view a certain part of it. In that case 
the most likely conclusion is that at least parts of the manual, what is viewed on the screen, is saved 
in the RAM. This would then be seen as in the customer’s possession and have been acquired. 
Would this be enough for the manual as a whole to be possessed, and thereby acquired, by the 
customer? As the customer has access to the whole manual and can freely choose which part of it to 
view, then the most reasonable conclusion must be that even if only a part of the manual is saved in 
the RAM during a specific time period it must likely be seen as the whole manual is acquired by the 
customer. The conclusion should reasonably not differ between FHL and the Directive.  
Using a web-based data room solution that downloads either parts of or the entire manual to 
the RAM will therefore imply that every time the manual is accessed it will be acquired by the 
customer, and every time the web page is closed the customer will get rid of the manual as long as 
no temporary files are saved. It might however be the case that the manual is not saved to the RAM 
when accessing it, though highly unlikely.  
If the computer, or similar device, which is used for accessing the manual through the data 
room is not belonging to the customer but is leased from SKF, does that affect the conclusion? The 
reasoning for that an acquisition had occurred above was that temporary files were saved on the 
computer belonging to the customer. If the computer does not belong to the customer, does that 
imply that the customer has not acquired the manual when accessing it?  
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Fahlbeck states that every type of acquisition of the information implies an acquisition in a 
legal sense.143 This means that the acquisition does not need to be of a physical or virtual carrier, 
which is also discussed below in relation to ‘Learning the Information’. A person can acquire 
information by learning it as well as acquiring the carrier of the information. When the manual is 
accessed on the customer’s computer it will be considered as an acquisition since the customer then 
has control over the information, at least temporarily. If the computer belongs to SKF instead, it can 
be questioned whether the customer has control over the information or not. It depends on whether 
the customer the customer can exercise control over the information, which in turn depends on how 
the device has been set up and programmed. It is therefore difficult to arrive at a definite conclusion 
and that for it to be an acquisition for certain when using a data room and SKFs electronic device, 
there is a need for an employee of the customer either to learn the information, or by making some 
sort of copy of the manual. As long as this does not happen, it is unclear whether the customer has 
acquired the manual according to FHL. Reasonably the Directive would be of a similar standpoint.  
Utilising the solution with a data room and SKF’s electronic device implies that when the 
customer accesses the manual, it is for certain considered as a use according to FHL and the 
Directive. This use is authorised by SKF and therefore the customer has not infringed. If the 
customer manages to access the manual after the license has been terminated and uses it then it will 
be unwarranted, as SKF has not consented to it.  
Will the different types of identified acquisitions above, when acquired using a data room 
solution, the PDF solution or an analogous solution, be seen as unwarranted according to FHL or 
unlawful according to the Directive? As regards the FHL the acquisition of the manual as the 
customer has done in this case, regardless of distribution model, since SKF has consented to the 
acquisition, is not an unwarranted acquisition. The same applies for the Directive where article 3 
specifically says that it has to be without the trade secret holder’s consent to be considered an 
unlawful acquisition. The acquisition of the manual is therefore considered lawful according to both 
FHL and the Directive.  
What happens if the employee learns the information is accounted for below in relation to 
‘Learning the Information’. The legal implications of copying the manual are accounted for below in 
relation to ‘Keeping the Manual’. 
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10.3.3 Selling the Manual 
Above under section 11.2.1 in relation to the FHL is stated that acquiring a trade secret by reverse 
engineering after first lawfully purchasing the product within which the trade secret can be found is 
not unwarranted. It is also stated that in such a case if the customer uses or discloses the trade secret 
those should be considered as warranted actions. In the case of the manual there is little need for the 
reverse engineering to be performed to get access to the information within the manual. Read the 
document and the information is there. When selling the manual to a customer the customer must 
therefore be allowed to do whatever she wants with it. Reasonably the protection granted by the 
FHL must be the same regardless of how the information is packaged why the same rules should be 
applicable for reverse engineering both for analogous and digital products.  
Most likely the same principle is applicable under the Directive, however as it is not yet 
implemented it is difficult to know for certain. However, it is established that the Directive has 
drawn inspiration from the FHL, which further supports the thesis that the same principle is 
applicable under the Directive as under the FHL. If this is the case it implies that the customer can 
do whatever she wishes with the manual, use it in-house, disclose it to anyone she wishes or sell it to 
a competitor of SKF under both the FHL and the Directive.  
10.3.4 Licensing the Manual 
As the control over the manual is lost when selling it, as has been established above, the following 
analysis of FHL and the Directive will focus on the case when the manual is licensed from SKF to 
the customer. 
10.3.4.1 Too Much Information 
As SKF is the party that decides how much information should be in the manual, and it is their own 
knowledge, having too much information is neither unwarranted according to the FHL nor unlawful 
according to the Directive, why this risk is limited by neither the FHL nor the Directive. 
An interesting question is instead what happens if the information within the manual is 
limited as an attempt to address the risks associated with having too much information, for instance 
by letting necessary calculations be made outside of the customer’s control using an external device, 
a web page or an interactive manual, see section 15.2. This might affect the claim of the knowledge 
within the manual as trade secrets, however unlikely given the generous interpretation of what is 
considered information by both FHL and the Directive.  
If the manual and the external device are licensed to a customer it is obvious that the 
information that is still within the manual has been acquired. For the information that is stored 
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inside for instance an apparatus it is not as obvious. If the device is simply handed over to the 
customer it will not imply an acquisition of the information per se unless it is more or less readily 
available for the customer to see. Since it is most likely not more or less readily available the 
information within the device should not be seen as acquired by the customer.  
If the customer would somehow manage to access the information within the external 
device or web page it would be considered an acquisition of said information. The acquisition would 
in turn be considered unwarranted as SKF would not have consented to it and it should be obvious 
for the customer as well, why the acquisition cannot be made in good faith. From evidence 
perspective the external device is beneficial, since the customer should not have had access to the 
information within at all.  
When installing the bearings using the manual and the external device or similar, the manual 
part will be considered to be exploited in a legal sense. The part inside the external device is not as 
obvious. For external part the customer uses the information indirectly by typing a value and 
receiving an answer. It has been established that indirect use still constitutes exploitation, however, it 
did not aim at this situation, why the applicability can be questioned. Most likely it will be considered 
exploitation, in order for the protection to be effective. This implies that when the license is 
terminated and if the customer has for instance learned the manual and continues to use the device, 
it will constitute exploitation. Exploiting the manual during the license is warranted as SKF has 
consented to it. Once the license has expired exploitation is unwarranted, as the consent from SKF 
has then lapsed.   
10.3.4.2 Keeping the Manual 
The term acquire indicates that you get access to something that you previously did not have access 
to. So the question is if the trader secretly keeps the manual, in a licensing situation, when it should 
instead have been returned to SKF, is this considered an unwarranted acquisition according to the 
FHL? Fahlbeck states that you cannot acquire something that you already possess, implying that 
even if you refuse to return the manual, it will not be considered an acquisition according to the 
FHL since the manual was in your possession to start with. This is the case regardless of distribution 
model, either digital or analogue, apart from the case of a data-room where manual is only in 
possession of the trader as long as it is viewed. If the customer somehow manages to access the 
manual via the data room after the license agreement has expired when the customer no longer 
should have access, it is an acquisition as something new has been added to the infringer’s sphere 
and it is unwarranted, as SKF would not have consented to it.  
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Another case is if the customer makes a copy of the manual and keeps it, while returning the 
original to SKF. Then something new has been added to the infringer’s sphere, the copy, why this 
reasonably must be considered as an acquisition according to FHL. As the manual should have been 
returned, and no copies be made, the customer cannot have had SKF’s consent, either explicitly or 
implicitly, why the acquisition must be seen as an unwarranted one according to FHL. FHL does 
therefore provide any protection against the party keeping the manual when it should have been 
returned, but only when utilising a data room solution or if a copy of the manual has been made. 
In the case when keeping the manual is not considered an unwarranted acquisition it might 
be possible for customer to either transfer the manual to a third party of use it in some way. If the 
manual is transferred the same will apply as is accounted for below in relation to transferring the 
manual to third parties. If the manual is used within the company it will however be considered as 
exploitation according to the FHL as long as it is a commercial utilisation, but there is no 
requirement for profit. It has above been stated that there is no need that the trade secret is used 
externally for an exploitation to be at hand, it is enough that it is used internally. Is such exploitation 
unwarranted? This is negatively defined by the FHL, see section 11.2.4, stating for instance that if 
SKF would have given consent to the exploitation then this would not be an issue. If nothing is 
agreed between the parties then the question comes down to if SKF implicitly could have consented 
to the exploitation. As a licensing agreement, as such, is for a limited time, if the customer continues 
to use the manual after the termination of the agreement, it will probably be seen as unwarranted if 
it can be proven that the customer should have understood this, which the customer most likely 
should have understood. However, stating in an agreement that the manual should be returned or 
destroyed and no copies are to be made or used after the termination of the agreement would avoid 
this risk. Marking the manual as ‘Trade secret of SKF’ would most likely also put the customer in 
bad faith.  
Would keeping the manual be seen as an unlawful acquisition according to the Directive? 
Given the definition of what should be a trade secret according to the Directive, it most likely 
implies that when trade secrets are legally transferred from one trader to another, as with the 
manual, the trade secret will be possessed by both of them. That would in turn imply that, as under 
Swedish law, you cannot reasonably acquire something that you already possess, why keeping the 
manual most likely is not to be seen as an unlawful acquisition according to the Directive, regardless 
of if the manual is digital or analogue. One exception would be if a data room solution is utilised and 
the customer would manage to access the manual after the license agreement has been terminated, 
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since every time you access the manual it is seen as an acquisition. Another exception would be if 
the customer makes a copy of the manual and keeps it, while returning the original to SKF. Then the 
customer has something new and it therefore most likely seen as an acquisition. Both accessing the 
data room without authorisation and making copies are actions that explicitly are considered as 
unlawful by the Directive, why it will be considered as unlawful acquisitions in both cases.  
 In the case when keeping the manual is not considered an unlawful acquisition it might be 
possible for customer to either transfer the manual to a third party of use it in some way. If the 
manual is transferred the same will apply as is accounted for below in relation to transferring the 
manual to third parties. If the manual is used within the company this will most likely be considered 
a use according to the Directive. The explicit examples in the Directive of what should be 
considered as use of trade secrets are very product focused, and relates to production, import, 
export, etc. which might imply that know-how of the sort that the manual contains cannot be used 
in a legal sense. However, it is explicitly stated in the proposal for the Directive that different sorts 
of know-how should be covered by the definition. If this is the case, the only reasonable conclusion 
must be that it is also possible to legally ‘use’ such know-how in order for know-how to be protected 
by the Directive.  
Is such use unlawful? It is, in this case, unclear whether any of the three conditions for 
unlawful use under article 3 is met. The first one is not, since it is not unlawfully acquired. Since 
there are no contractual provisions there are no confidentiality clause either that could have been 
violated, however, if the manual is marked with ‘Confidential’ or ‘Trade secret of SKF’ or similar it 
might be enough for the use to be considered unlawful under the second condition. To keep using 
the manual after the termination of the license agreement is most likely considered a breach of a 
contractual obligation to limit the use of the trade secret, the third condition, if the customer did it 
intentionally or with gross negligence. It is however questionable if it is considered as gross 
negligence to continue to use the manual or if it would be considered as ‘normal’ negligence. 
Marking the manual as ‘Trade secret of SKF’ might affect the judgement so that the customer is 
considered to have done it intentionally. Using the manual after termination of the license agreement 
might therefore be an unlawful use according to the Directive, however it is difficult to give a clear 
answer and therefore have a specified agreement to avoid situations like this is advisable.  
10.3.4.3 Transfer  
For a transfer of a trade secret from the customer to a third party to be considered as an 
unwarranted action according to the FHL, the question is if it can be seen as a disclosure according 
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to the FHL. It is stated that it is irrelevant to whom the trade secret is disclosed, or how it is done, as 
long as it is to a trader and not a customer. There is however a need for the trade secret to 
unwarrantedly be transferred from the customer to a new trader and become known for this new 
trader. Another way would be if the information is unwarrantedly transferred to a new trader by an 
employee that left the customer for the new trader and brings the information, and the employee has 
such a position that the new trader knows of the information already by knowing that the new 
employee has the information. Hence, if the manual is transferred to a new trader, by any means, 
and this trader gets knowledge of the information this will imply a disclosure that will be considered 
as a disclosure according to FHL.  
The next question is if such a disclosure is warranted or not. Since there is no agreement 
between the two parties the question comes down to if the customer understands that the manual 
may not be transferred to third parties. As it is possible to give consent either explicitly or implicitly 
it should also be possible to have both explicit and implicit confidentiality. If the customer 
understands that the manual may not be transferred to a third party she is therefore in bad faith, and 
vice versa. It is however many times difficult to, in the judicial arena, prove that the customer was in 
bad faith in a case like this, why this is a question that should be addressed in an agreement by using, 
for instance, a confidentiality clause. If SKF during the whole procedure have acted in a way that 
implies the wish to keep the manual secret and the customer has also done this up to the time of the 
disclosure, that the customer will most likely be in bad faith, but it is also difficult to prove. 
However, in some way marking the manual with ‘Confidential’ or ‘Trade secret of SKF’ signs would 
definitely put the customer in bad faith. Since there is no written agreement between the parties it 
will be close to impossible to, in the judicial arena, prove the bad faith, in this case, that is needed to 
make the disclosure unwarranted. Therefore much point to that the disclosure of the manual in the 
judicial arena might be considered as warranted, unless it has been marked or there are explicit 
confidentiality provisions in an agreement.   
 When the manual is transferred to a third party, it is not clear what should be considered a 
disclosure in the eyes of the Directive. It is established that for it to be any protection, there should 
not be any requirements as to the amount of third parties the manual was transferred to. That the 
manual is transferred to a single third party should therefore be enough. It is unclear if the Directive 
has the same requirement as the FHL has regarding that the transfer must be to a trader or if it 
would be enough that it is disclosed to a private person. It is also unclear if the third party need to 
know the information or if it is enough that the third party has access to it. The most reasonable 
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conclusion is that at least when transferred to a trader, and when that trader knows the information, 
it will be considered a disclosure according to the Directive.  
The question in this case, as with the FHL, is whether or not there is an implicit 
confidentiality provision between the parties. However, referring to the discussion under the FHL 
part above, it is to some extent unimportant if such an implicit provision objectively exist or not, 
since it will be difficult to prove it in the judicial arena. If the manual is marked with ‘Confidential’ 
or ‘Trade secret of SKF’ of if a confidentiality agreement has been entered into the customer will 
however be in bad faith. Therefore, even if the disclosure in fact is unwarranted, it will in the judicial 
arena most likely be seen as warranted when there are no written provisions or markings implying 
the contrary.   
10.3.4.4 Learning the Information 
If the employees of the customer learn the information within the manual, the question is what 
happens with the manual from a legal perspective. The manual that SKF still has, and the customer 
as well, will still live up to the requirements for being seen as trade secrets, the only difference if the 
employee learns the information within the manual is that instead of having to read it from a screen 
it is in her head. The circle of people that has access to the manual will not be directly widened by 
the employee learning the information within the manual as she had access to the manual 
beforehand, in the long term the circle of people might be extended though. Will the information 
inside the head of the employee still be protected by the FHL or will it be considered the property 
of the employee with which she can do whatever she please? It is explicitly stated in the 
propositionen preceding the FHL that it is irrelevant if the information is written down or resides in 
the minds of humans for it to be considered as trade secrets. The trade secret definition in the FHL 
does not cover tacit information, i.e. personal skills, experience or knowledge where “The principle 
should be that information that anyone with adequate education may convert into practical results 
should be seen as information in the trader’s business. However, is the information tied to the 
individual so that it cannot, through an instruction or direction, be transferred to someone else then 
it should be seen as personal information and hence not be part of the trader’s business.” (author’s 
translation).144 
The information that the employee learned was in fact transferred to her from the manual, it 
was possible to write down the information and tell the employee how the installation of bearings 
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should be performed, hence it cannot be seen as tacit information that is the employee’s sole 
property and exempted from the FHL. Also, the acquisition of this knowledge by learning it cannot 
reasonably be seen as an unwarranted offense as the manual lawfully was transferred to the 
customer. The conclusion is therefore that the information, even though an employee learnt it, is 
still considered as a protected trade secret according to FHL. This implies that the provisions of the 
FHL still are applicable to the information inside the head of the employee. To learn the 
information in the manual is therefore not an offense according to the FHL, but as the provisions of 
FHL are still applicable, an exploitation or disclosure of the information might be considered 
unwarranted and trigger sanctions depending on the circumstances since the manual is licensed to 
the customer. That is however the case only for as long as the employee keeps working for the 
customer and is under a loyalty obligation towards her employer. When the employee quits her job 
she can normally do whatever she pleases with the information, as she is no longer under any loyalty 
obligations toward her employer, an issue that to a certain point can be addressed by a 
confidentiality agreement. 145 
 Just like the FHL the meaning of the term information has a wide meaning in the Directive 
and it is also explicitly stated that personal skills and other tacit information should be excluded 
from what is comprised by the term information. It has already been established, above in relation to 
the FHL, that the information within the manual is not tacit, and that the employee learning this 
information does not make it tacit either. Even though the Directive does not explicitly say one or 
the other the most reasonable conclusion must be that a trade secret does not need to be 
documented for it to be protected, that it like in Sweden can reside in the minds of humans and be a 
trade secret as long as it is not tacit information. The fact that the employee learns the information 
within the manual must therefore reasonably not affect the status of the trade secret, which is still 
owned by SKF. Also, the acquisition of the manual cannot be an unlawful acquisition either as the 
employee lawfully had access to the manual.  
As the manual still will be considered as a trade secret it implies that the provisions in the 
Directive will still be applicable to the information inside the head of the employee. To learn the 
information in the manual is therefore not an offense according to the Directive, but as the 
provisions of the Directive are still applicable, a use or disclosure of the information might be 
considered unlawful and trigger sanctions depending on the circumstances. It is unclear what 
happens if the employee quits her job, since there are no explicit provisions about that situation in 
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the Directive. To avoid this risk a confidentiality agreement should be utilised stating that the 
employee cannot disclose the manual even after she quit her job. 
10.3.4.5 Bankruptcy 
It is considered a general legal principle that the bankruptcy estate has the possibility to enter into 
the agreements of the bankrupt company, or not if that is what the bankruptcy estate wishes to.146 
Even if SKF would not want the bankruptcy estate to enter into the agreement it can still do so by 
forced entry.147 Folkesson mentions three situations when a bankruptcy estate might not enter into 
the agreement, namely if the bankruptcy estate does not have the qualifications of the debtor, if the 
agreement is of personal character or if the agreement is based on stronger personal trust between 
the parties, i.e. commission agreements for instance.148 The legal consequences are then if the 
bankruptcy estate enters into the agreement the provisions in the agreement are applicable in the 
relationship between the bankruptcy estate and SKF as before. If the bankruptcy estate does not 
enter into the agreement the situation depends on distribution model. If the manual, either digital or 
analogue, was transferred to the customer then the manual should be returned to SKF. If a web-
based data room solution is used the customer only has access to the manual when logged in, 
implying that SKF can erase the user account and there is no risk of misappropriation. As has been 
established above keeping the manual when it should be returned is not an unwarranted or unlawful 
acquisition. Hence, neither of these actions will be considered as unwarranted according to the FHL 
or unlawful according to the Directive, either the agreement is entered into or it is not. However, if 
the bankruptcy estate performs an unwarranted or unlawful disclosure, exploitation or use that 
would be considered as actions that would trigger sanctions according to the FHL or the Directive. 
However, as the sanctions that are possible are damages and a bankruptcy estate generally is 
insolvent, the possibility to be granted damages is not worth very much. Neither the FHL nor the 
Directive does therefore provide any protection in case of bankruptcy of the customer, except in the 
case of disclosure and exploitation.  
10.3.5 Conclusion 
As is established above in relation to the different risks the protection granted by the FHL or by the 
Directive is many times not especially extensive and leaves a company unprotected in many 
situations. The protection is basically limited to the preventive effect that the risk for damages has 
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and the criminal actions that might have preventive effect for a person. In relation to each individual 
case above it is however many times possible to widen the scope of protection of both the FHL and 
the Directive when complementing them with confidentiality provisions in an agreement or marking 
the manual with ‘Confidential’ or ‘Trade secret of SKF’ to ensure that the customer is in bad faith 
and not eludes responsibility that way.  
It is established that it is possible to claim the manual as property according to both the FHL 
and the Directive. It can however be argued whether the property claim granted by the FHL and the 
Directive will be strong in the sense that it grants the proprietor a good control position. The issue 
with trade secrets is that you cannot be sure that you fulfil the requirements for claiming knowledge 
as a trade secret until a court has tested it. The reason for this is the lack of an administrative arena. 
Another issue with trade secrets is the lack of exclusivity over the knowledge they comprise, which 
lowers the control over the knowledge. The most likely conclusion is therefore that a property claim 
based on FHL will not be a very strong one.  
The question then is whether the property claim in conjunction with the protection offered, 
will be sufficient to capitalise on the trade secret, i.e. the manual, in a commercial transaction. On a 
theoretical level it might be a sufficient level of protection, however, practically it does not suffice 
since the scope of protection for trade secrets is basically limited to prevention by the risk of having 
to pay damages in the judicial arena. Damages that many times are, if not impossible, then at least 
very difficult to establish the size of. There is also a big issue with damages and trade secrets, 
because no matter how much damage you are awarded, if the trade secret is no longer secret there is 
no possibility of getting it back. The protection for trade secrets in the judicial arena, given by the 
FHL or the Directive is in other words insufficient when capitalising on trade secrets by transferring 
them as the FHL and the Directive are designed for static use, i.e. keeping the trade secrets hidden 
inside the company. Dynamically transacting trade secret requires a high level of control, especially 
as trade secrets provide no exclusivity over the knowledge, why it has been identified that the 
control and protection granted by the FHL and the Directive is not sufficient. It is still possible to 
capitalise on the trade secret, but in order to maintain the value of the trade secret and to create a 
foundation for a platform for transacting trade secrets by maintaining value and control, neither 
FHL nor the Directive is sufficient.  
For a company of SKF’s size there is however the possibility to leverage their size and 
strength in the business arena to ensure better protection for the trade secret. This implies that a 
strong player in the business arena can claim that they have better protection than they actually do, 
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or that more of the information is protected as trade secrets than is actually the case. One reason for 
this it is that many customers are reluctant to upset a big company like SKF where the position in 
the business arena works as prevention, i.e. the customer will not reveal the trade secret out of fear, 
on the other hand many companies are far bigger than SKF where the prevention will not work. 
Another side of it is that once the trade secret has been revealed a big company will have better 
chances of getting fair damages from the infringing party due to resources to drive a court case, due 
to the strong position in the business arena. 
11 Block 2 - Contractual Provisions 
In the following section different contractual aspects will be reviewed, and later analysed in relation 
to both cases to improve the protection and control position. Furthermore some aspects on where 
the line should be drawn for what can be agreed upon between the parties will be investigated.  
11.1 Freedom of Contract 
A central principle in Swedish Contracts Act (1915:218) is the freedom of contract. The principle 
states that everyone has the freedom to enter into an agreement, the freedom to not enter into an 
agreement, and the freedom to agree upon the content in the agreement.149 There are however 
limitations to this principle, for example when the law deems it to be necessary to protect a weaker 
party such as a consumer or employee.150 Other limitations to this principle are laws that are 
mandatory and they are not possible to avoid by an agreement. In addition, the principle of freedom 
of contract does generally not extend to third parties, i.e. it is generally not possible for two parties 
to contractually bind a third party without her consent.151   
The scope of the principle stretches to article 36 in the Contracts Act, which expresses the 
principle of equivalence. The principle states that the whole agreement or conditions can be adjusted 
or disregarded if they are deemed to be unreasonable when the agreement is signed, if the conditions 
are changed after signing the agreement, or other circumstances.152 However article 36 does not state 
how to analyse whether the agreement or the clause is unreasonable or not, and according to 
Ramberg and Ramberg’s interpretation of the propositionen, an overall assessment of the situation 
should be made.153 One of the circumstances is the position of the parties.  There are many cases 
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according to Ramberg and Ramberg where the Supreme Court has annulled or reconciled the 
agreements between traders and consumers, since the consumer is the weaker party and thereby 
needs protection.154 Article 36 is however much harder to apply when both parties are traders, as is 
identified in NJA 1979 s. 483. The case considered an expected exclusion clause in a standard 
agreement that was very extensive and where the distributor was a listed company while the smaller 
enterprise was a family owned company. The supreme court stated according to Ramberg and 
Ramberg, that “the circumstance that one of the traders is a small enterprise compared to the other 
party, does not constitute, in itself, evidence for that party to have an inferior position” (authors’ 
translation).155 The Supreme Court did not reconcile the agreement. The reasoning seems to be that 
the judicial system should pose minimum obstruction to trade and that this is something best 
managed by the parties themselves.  
11.2 NDA 
NDAs are not regulated by any special law and therefore it is the Contracts Acts, where freedom of 
contracts is the starting point. There is no form prescribed by law and NDAs can therefore be 
entered both orally and written. A written agreement is however preferable from an evidence 
aspect.156 Tonell compares the NDA as a protection measure with FHL and concludes that the 
NDA is only applicable between the parties that have entered into it while it according to FHL 
article 8 is possible to act against a third party.157 Tonell thereafter states that this is more important 
within larger corporate organisations “[w]here it is not possible for all concerned parties to know of 
all the secrecy commitments within the organisation” (authors’ translation).158 It is therefore 
important that the scope of the secrecy is set out in the NDA.  
 It is possible for a trader to enter into NDAs with her employees. This is often done through 
the employee contract but this secrecy commitment can also be entered in a separate agreement. 
 Since there is no special law regulating NDAs, there is no special law regulating whether or 
not they can be adjusted or identified as void. This is done by article 36 of the Contracts Act, as 
mentioned above. Any NDA, or content of such agreement, e.g. the length of the secrecy 
commitment, that is found unreasonable can be nullified or adjusted. Tonell states that in the 
situation where the parties are traders the scope for something to be unreasonable is slim, implying 
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that more or less any NDAs can be entered into.159 However, in situations where the trader has 
drafted long secrecy commitments, or even infinite secrecy commitments, the trader should state the 
reasons for this in order to not get them adjusted or nullified.160 When the trader enters into secrecy 
commitments with her employees the situation is different. The employee is often considered as the 
weaker party and therefore in need of extra protection. However, Tonell concludes that the 
employer’s interest to protect her trade secret should be taken into consideration. This means that in 
the situation where the employee leaves the company a more favourable assessment from the 
employer’s perspective can be done according to Tonell.161 
 Tonell gives two examples for how a NDA can enhance the protection given by FHL, one 
where the trader has entered into a negotiation with another trader and the other one when an 
employee leaves the company.162 Article 6 of FHL gives that a trader is liable for exploiting or 
revealing a trade secret, which she has been given in confidence during negotiations. If the trader has 
signed an NDA the party who has given the information can fairly easily show that there has been a 
breach, i.e. the trader was in bad faith, and that article 6 is applicable. Without an agreement this 
would be hard since the burden of proof is, according to FHL, on the plaintiff.163 In the situation 
where an employee leaves the company, her loyalty obligation towards her former employer ends. 
Therefore the risk is that the employee reveals secret information after her employment. Article 7 of 
FHL is set to deal with these risks. However, according to section 2 of article 7, extraordinary 
reasons are needed in order for the former employee to be liable. Fahlbeck and Tonell state that a 
breach of a specific NDA is such an extraordinary reason.164 
11.3 Implications of FHL on Secrecy Provisions 
The question whether or not the FHL limits the possibility to agree on secrecy has been 
encountered throughout the literature. The question affects the contractual protection that can be 
offered. Tonell is of the opinion that “[i]t is clear that the parties cannot extend the scope of FHL by 
using wider definitions of which information should be covered by the NDA than the legal 
definition as set out in article 1 FHL” (authors’ translation).165 Tonell states that the same is 
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applicable in relation to article 2 of FHL since both article 1 and 2 are mandatory. Therefore any 
secrecy commitments that extend these articles can be void. Fahlbeck is of the same opinion and 
states that “[a]greements that state secrecy in situations that are not considered as unwarranted 
according to article 2 are void”166 (authors’ translation). Considering article 1, Fahlbeck has the same 
reasoning as Tonell that article 1 is mandatory and the definition can therefore not be extended.167 
However, as Tonell states, it is a different question whether or not the parties can, on contractual 
grounds, regulate and limit the use of a party’s information, even if that information would not be 
considered as a trade secret according to FHL.168 Tonell is of the opinion that as long as the 
contractual agreement is not unreasonable the traders are free to contractually regulate the use of 
party’s information. Fahlbeck on the other hand states that such agreements are void.169 Wainikka’s 
conclusion is however not as direct, since she states that the legal position is uncertain.170 Hence, it 
might be possible to regulate and limit the use of a party’s information even if it is not considered a 
trade secret according to article 1 FHL.  
11.4 Penalties 
Adlercreutz and Gorton states that penalties are in advance standardised damages, with the double-
edged function of both facilitating determination of an appropriate level of compensation as well as 
leverage against the other party of the agreement to ensure she fulfils her contractual obligations.171 
The parties generally decide that in a specific action or case a sum of money should be paid to the 
other party, e.g. if a licensee discloses a trade secret the level of compensation can be determined 
beforehand avoiding difficult and time consuming assessments of the size of the damage that is 
required for damages to be awarded.172 However, penalties may also work as a limitation of the 
responsibility, in cases when the penalties are set to a low level, which was the case in NJA 2010 
s.629.173 In such a case the penalty may be seen as a substitute for fulfilling the contractual 
obligations.174  
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Penalty clauses are under Swedish law generally binding unless they are found to have 
unreasonable effects, in which case they can be adjusted according to article 36 Contracts Act.175 A 
penalty that is unreasonably high might be lowered or overridden entirely, the penalty might also be 
increased if the size of the penalty is seen as an unreasonable limitation of the compensation, 
however, Adlercreutz and Gorton argues that it in practice is rare that the penalty is increased.176 
Penalties can be used for positive contractual obligations, such as late delivery, error in the product 
etc., where the penalty will work as a substitute for damages, but it can also be for negative 
contractual obligations as contractually determined compensation for breach of for instance secrecy 
or competition clauses.177  
12 Analyse of Block 2 - Embedded Knowledge 
As mentioned, the most imminent threats are dismantling the sensor, acquiring information without 
dismantling it, transferring it, stealing it, and bankruptcy situations. The following will analyse how 
these threats can be reduced using the agreement as a legal tool, which is the second block of the 
foundation for the platform.  
12.1 Dismantling the Sensor  
Dismantling the sensor, in order to acquire the secrets kept within, is – as mentioned – the most 
imminent risk. The contract can be used as an effective tool in order to prohibit the buyer or 
licensee to commit this act by stating that any attempts to dismantle the sensor is a breach of 
contract with penalties as sanction. Since the freedom of contract is the starting point this is most 
likely not identified as unreasonable especially since SKF has a great interest in keeping the sensor 
secret. Even if it is fairly easy to agree upon such a clause it is harder to ensure that the buyer follows 
the agreement. This is a general deficiency with agreements that is hard to overcome until it is too 
late, i.e. the buyer has already breached the contract and accessed the knowledge. Therefore the 
penalties should be set very high in order to have a preventive effect.  
 Situations where the buyer thinks she can legally dismantle the sensor can arise. One can 
imagine the situation where the sensor stops functioning and the buyer tries to open the sensor in 
order to identify what is wrong. These situations should be designed as a breach of the contract in 
order to reduce the risk for the buyer to acquire the information within. Penalties as a sanction 
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should be connected to this breach. The design of the clause should be as such that SKF’s own 
technicians shall do any repairs necessary in order for the sensor to function properly. This clause is 
identified as not only good from a control position but also from a business perspective, since it 
offers more value propositions for the buyer in form of a service.  
 In order to enhance the protection given by this clause it should be connected to a warranty 
as well. It is very common to state that if any attempts to dismantle a product are committed, the 
warranty given by the trader ceases to exist. This is identified as a clause that has the potential to 
refrain the buyer to dismantle the sensor if the warranty is favourable, and should therefore be 
included in the contract. 
 An agreement that the trader cannot dismantle the sensor might not be enough. The 
situation can arise where the employees of the buyer tries to dismantle the sensor without knowing it 
is a trade secret. The employee would then be in good faith and not liable for any breach. Therefore 
a clause stating that the customer guarantees that her employees are under secrecy provisions should 
added to the agreement. By doing this there can be no doubt that the employees that have any 
connection to the machine are in bad faith when attempting to dismantle the sensor.  
 The above stated contractual obligations affect the protection given by the FHL and the 
Directive. The obligations help ensuring that the circle of people is kept as limited and controlled as 
possible. The obligations also show that SKF fulfils the objective and subjective criteria set out in 
the FHL prerequisites by addressing to the customer that the knowledge should be kept secret.  
12.2 NDT 
Acquiring the information without dismantling the sensor can be described as the first step in order 
to dismantle the sensor. However, in order to avoid misunderstandings it should be stated in the 
agreement that using any methods to acquire the information within the sensor, without dismantling 
it per se, should be considered as a breach of contract with penalties as a sanction. This clause 
suffers from the same problem as the one identified above, it is hard, probably even harder to 
identify that there has been a breach of contract before it is too late. It is hard to establish that 
somebody has used for example X-ray or sound waves in order to understand how the sensor is 
constructed.  
 This contractual obligation affect the protection given in the first block by addressing 
towards the customer that the knowledge within the sensor is a trade secret of SKF, thereby 
fulfilling the objective and subjective criteria of the prerequisites in the FHL. The obligation also 
helps keeping the circle of people limited and controlled.  
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12.3 Transfer 
In order to reduce the risk of the buyer transferring the sensor to a third party the buyer should sign 
an NDA as soon as the negotiations are initiated. By doing this, the trader will be in bad faith, and 
can therefore not claim that she did not know that it was a secret. The act of transferring the sensor 
to a third party should also be identified as a breach of contract sanctioned by penalties. However, as 
with the other clauses, the problem is to know whether or not this clause has been breached. 
 This contractual obligation is important because it is very intertwined with the first block. 
The analysis under block 1 shows that trade secrets can be acquired in good faith. When so it means 
that the customer is not reliable for any infringements done. By utilising this contractual obligation it 
is ensured that the customer is in bad faith when she acquires the sensor and thereby reliable for any 
infringements. This contractual obligation shows how important it is to address different protective 
measures in order to utilise the protection given by the FHL and the Directive.  
12.4 Stealing 
In order to make sure that the sensor is not stolen provisions on how it should be safeguarded 
should be agreed upon. It is hard to analyse this clause in detail since it depends on the 
circumstances in each case. However, a general clause stating that the buyer should take reasonable 
actions to safeguard the sensor should be added in the contract.  
 Even though this obligation does not affect the first block directly it has an indirect affect by 
trying to keep the circle of people as limited and controlled as possible in the long run. The 
obligation also puts pressure on the customer to maintain the secret character  
12.5 Bankruptcy 
The risk of a trader entering into bankruptcy is not as easy to address with contractual agreements. 
In order to avoid this situation traders usually agree upon a “change of control” clause. This means 
that, in a situation where the trader enters into bankruptcy and the official trustee takes over 
operations, the contract is nullified. However, Folkesson states that the trustee can enter into almost 
any agreement deeming such a clause inoperative.178 Therefore another approach is required to 
address this question. The best approach is a proactive approach where commitments to keep SKF 
informed about the economic status of the acquiring trader. However, this is probably not easily 
agreed upon since a company is most likely not prone to hand out information about their economic 
situation. In a licensing situation it is probably easier to state that if the royalty is not paid on time, 
                                                
178 Folkesson (2007), p. 129. 
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the sensor should be returned to SKF. Much points to that when the buyer is ceasing to fulfil her 
commitments, the risk of her entering into bankruptcy is higher. With this clause the sensor will not 
get into the hands of the official trustee and in the long run in a third party’s hands. However, there 
are deficiencies with such a clause as well. One can imagine the scenario where the buyer prioritises 
the royalty payments for the sensor while actually her economic situation deteriorates fast without 
SKF knowing. 
Using contractual provisions in order to prevent the bankruptcy scenario affect not the claim 
made in block 1. It neither strengthens nor decreases the protection given by the FHL or the 
Directive. However, it does facilitate the transaction of the sensor since this situation is identified as 
an imminent risk.   
12.6 Conclusion 
Since the starting point is freedom of contract the above mentioned content of an agreement are 
most likely identified as reasonable when the parties are both traders. It is another question whether 
or not a buyer would accept these clauses, i.e. from a business perspective it might be hard to 
implement some of the clauses. Moreover, an agreement is identified as crucial in order to protect 
the trade secret but there are also problems with it. With the agreement SKF have to rely on its 
preventive effect since even if the buyer or licensee breaches the contract it is hard to know when 
she breaches it. Often this will come to SKF attention too late, i.e. when the breach has already been 
committed and the buyer or licensee has acquired the secret information. As soon as the buyer or 
licensee learns the information the exclusiveness is destroyed since it is impossible to erase – take 
back – what someone has learned. 
 As mentioned, it is hard to establish the damage from an infringement. Using a contractual 
agreement with penalty as a sanction is an easier approach since both parties know in advance the 
economic consequences of a breach. A breach of a clause connected with a penalty means that as 
soon it is established that there has been a breach, the breaching party has to pay the set penalty. 
One question that is interesting and affects the protection is how high the penalties should be set. 
Because there is freedom of contract this can be set as high as the parties can agree upon. It is 
identified that SKF has a great interest to keep the sensor secret, which justifies higher penalties. 
However, high penalties might be contra-productive to business since high penalties can scare 
traders, especially SMEs, to enter into the agreement. High penalties are also more likely to be 
adjusted or nullified if they are identified as unreasonable according to article 36 of the Contracts 
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Act. Given that SKF has a legitimate interest in keeping the information secret, the starting point 
should be to set the penalties high. 
 The analysis shows that the contract only has a preventive effect. The conclusion is therefore 
that there needs to be incentives for the buyer to follow the contract. The penalty is one method to 
incentive the buyer to not breach the contract. Another solution that could be utilised is to draft the 
contract so that the majority of the royalty is paid in the beginning of the agreement. The heavy 
investment the trader needs to commit herself to in the beginning of the agreement creates an 
incentive not to breach the contract, since it would be too expensive to breach both the agreement, 
i.e. paying high penalties, and to pay the high royalty. A depreciating royalty scale is often used in 
license agreement and should pose as a minor challenge to agree upon.  
 Petrusson states that it is possible to claim properties by simply using contracts since the 
assumption is that the contract will be upheld in the judicial arena.179 Therefore the proposed 
licensee agreement above is yet another property claim, which is separated from the FHL and 
Directive claim made in ‘Block 1’. However, even if there are well developed institutions that 
safeguard that the contract is fulfilled, the problem is – as mentioned in the paragraph above – that 
the contract is only a preventive measure that can be breached in order to gain the knowledge. It is 
the author’s belief that in order to create a foundation for a platform for transacting physically 
manifested knowledge through trade secret protection, the agreement and the protection given by 
FHL or the Directive is not enough to ensure dynamic use of the trade secret. 
Following Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theory, the right given by the contract can be used and 
accepted by the market actors and society. However, it needs to be mentioned that as much as FHL 
is applicable in Sweden, the NDA can be interpreted differently in other countries than Sweden, i.e. 
Sweden is only one of several business arenas. Therefore the contract might need to be changed 
depending on which country, i.e. which business market the sensor is sold in.   
The analysis finally shows that the contractual provisions are intertwined with the protection 
given in the first block, and many times necessary in order to enable the protection. Unsurprisingly 
the conclusion is therefore that in order to transact trade secrets there needs to be contractual 
provisions protecting them.  
                                                
179 Petrusson (2004), p. 115. 
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13 Analysis of Block 2 - Openly Available Knowledge 
As have been stated above the most imminent risks identified in relation to transferring a manual to 
a customer is that there is too much information within the manual, that the customer keep the 
manual when it should have been returned, that the customer may in turn transfer the manual, that 
the customer may learn the information within the manual and that the customer can enter into 
bankruptcy. In the following will be analysed how the legal tools presented above in relation to 
block 2 can be utilised to lessen said risks and how they can affect the protection granted by FHL 
and the Directive.  
13.1 General Provisions 
It has been established above that freedom of contract is the general principle unless anything else is 
explicitly stated elsewhere. In the following will therefore be analysed what different contractual 
means are available to facilitate the transfer of trade secrets in the form of a manual to a customer. It 
should however be emphasised that it is not possible to contractually bind a third party against her 
will. Therefore risks in relation to such situations, such as that employees might not be bound by the 
provisions in the agreement straight away, must be secured by other means such as that the 
customer guarantees that the employees follow the provisions in the agreement too. Such a 
provision would not affect the protection according to FHL and the Directive. The provisions in the 
agreement between SKF and the customer regarding other issues might however affect these legal 
acts, which will be reviewed in connection with the analysis below. Initially general provisions that 
are applicable for all risk will be addressed followed by risk-specific provisions.  
13.1.1 NDAs 
Non-disclosure agreements or similar secrecy or confidentiality provisions have the advantage of 
making explicit how a party may and may not handle the information she has received, for instance 
making copies should not be allowed. Also NDAs as such are reasonable in the eyes of article 36 
Contracts act, however, if too lengthy it might be considered as unreasonable. NDAs do also have 
the benefit of fulfilling the activity criterion under FHL and most likely the Directive. It does also 
put the party in bad faith, implying that it is easier to prove a disclosure is unwarranted according to 
the FHL or unlawful according to the Directive, where for the Directive one specific provision for 
responsibility is if the party has violated a confidentiality provision. For the NDA to provide a full 
cover it should be signed already during negotiations, and also cover arbitration and arbitration 
awards so as to ensure that at no point during the collaboration the trade secrets are revealed. If no 
100 
secrecy is agreed upon during arbitration the parties are free to disclose all the information, as was 
decided in the case NJA 2000 s. 538. In relation to this it should therefore be noted that when 
transferring trade secrets the parties should always agree to settle any disputes by arbitration to allow 
the proceedings to be secret. However, regardless of situation, if there is no NDA, or if it is expired, 
the information might still be considered as a trade secret and be protected by either FHL or the 
Directive.   
Being in SKF’s position one should always strive for as long confidentiality provisions as 
possible to ensure the trade secrets are not lost. If being between equal parties it is under Swedish 
law also unlikely that it would be considered unreasonable only because of the duration in time. 
However, from a business perspective a party might not be keen on signing a far-reaching 
confidentiality clause. There is also the issue that it might be difficult to know when a party has 
violated an NDA, which is the same issue as with relying on trade secret legislation like FHL or the 
Directive, the customer might have spread the manual to all of SKF’s competitors without SKF 
knowing of it. Therefore, even if an NDA provides several benefits, one should still choose 
customer with care, a customer that can be trusted.  
13.1.2 Penalties 
As has been established it is very difficult to determine the size of the damage that has been caused 
if a trade secret has, for instance, been unwarrantedly disclosed according to FHL. This is a big 
weakness of the protection granted by FHL and the Directive. The most convenient way to avoid 
this weakness and the difficult, and many times time consuming, enterprise of determining the level 
of damage is to have pre-set penalties in the agreement. However, it does not affect either the claim 
or protection granted by FHL or the Directive. 
For the most severe offenses the penalty should be set really high, and for less severe 
offenses the penalty should be set lower. Big penalties should legally not be an issue as long as the 
parties are both traders and ‘equally powerful’, they are supposed to know what they are getting into 
and therefore it is not seen as unreasonable. It should nonetheless be noted that from a business 
perspective it might be impossible to have such big penalties if the customer will not accept it, 
especially for SMEs which might be frightened by the high penalties. Setting too low level of 
penalties is however also a risk since it may be seen as a limitation of responsibility, but it has the 
upside of from a business perspective as it would be easier to tolerate as a customer. The penalties 
should therefore be set as ‘high as possible’ since the risk of having the penalties seen as 
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unreasonable and set down is most likely less than the risk that the penalty is set too low and seen as 
a limitation of responsibility.  
13.1.3 Access to Information 
The risks that the manual might be transferred, kept or learnt, are all relating to individuals. If there 
are no persons accessing the manual these risks will be more or less avoided. However it is also 
possible to limit the risk by minimising the circle of people that has access to the information in the 
manual. This can be done contractually by explicitly stating who should have access to the manual, 
either digital or analogue. This will also have the benefit of effectively limiting the circle of people 
that has access to the information while fulfilling the activity criterion according to FHL and most 
likely the Directive, ensuring that it will still be considered as a trade secret. If the manual is 
transferred outside this circle it is a disclosure that is unwarranted according to both FHL and the 
Directive. This provision therefore increases the effectiveness of the protection from said legislation. 
If this provision is violated it is however very difficult for SKF to become aware of the violation.   
13.1.4 Payment 
One way to incentivise a customer to not leak the manual or otherwise violate the agreement is to 
use a payment method for a license deal that will make the customer reluctant to take any risks. The 
method that should be used is to divide the payment into two different parts, one part that is an up-
front payment, and one part that is royalty based and is due every month or quarter or similar. From 
a business perspective it should not be difficult to convince a customer of a model like this, at least 
if the agreement is for a specific amount of years since that would imply that a model with only 
royalties would end up with the same cost in the end. The up-front payment should be set at a level 
that makes it, together with penalties, more expensive for a customer to disclose the trade secret 
than staying as licensee, regardless of when the disclosure occurs.  
 This model affects neither the claim nor the protection granted by FHL or the Directive. It 
does only provide incentives for not violating the provisions of the contract.  
13.2 Too Much Information 
The risk posed by having too much information within the manual is a risk that cannot be remedied 
by neither legal nor contractual measures. The only solution for this risk is to, in some way, limit the 
amount of information given in the manual.  
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13.3 Keeping the Manual 
It has been identified that one of the risks in a licensing situation is that the customer keeps the 
manual when it should be returned. To begin with there is a need for a provision in the agreement 
stating that SKF will retain title to the trade secret, i.e. the manual. It should also be agreed that the 
customer should return the manual upon termination of the agreement. This provision should be 
used in conjunction with penalties, is the manual not returned, or if a copy is kept or similar, then 
the customer is liable to pay a penalty. The level of penalties should be on the upper part of the scale 
since it would imply that SKF would lose the control over the manual. There ought also to be a 
provision in the agreement stating what the customer may and may not do with the trade secret 
under the agreement, to set the outer boundaries.  
 The provisions in the agreement stating what the customer may and may not do with the 
manual can serve as an effective way proving that an unwarranted offense according to FHL or 
unlawful offense according to the Directive have occurred. This is the case when for instance the 
provision states that after termination of the agreement the customer is not allowed to continue to 
use the manual. If the customer does this anyway, it can easily be proved that it is a violation of FHL 
or the Directive, if SKF ever finds out about the violation that is. Stating how the manual may be 
used in the agreement will also fulfil the activity criterion according to FHL and most likely the 
Directive.  
As has been established above, even if the manual includes some information that is publicly 
available and therefore is not considered as trade secrets, the manual as a whole must reasonably still 
be seen as a trade secret. For information within the manual that is not trade secrets it is unclear 
whether it is possible to limit the management of said information from a legal perspective. Due to 
this uncertainty there is a possibility to claim that it is possible to limit the management of such 
information and bet on that your claim is the right one if a court tries the question. Either way it is 
likely that if the question will be tried by a court it will not be in the immediate future, during which 
time it is possible to leverage the uncertainty in this question. However, the manual as such may 
without doubt be agreed upon since it as a whole will be seen as a trade secret. 
13.4 Transfer 
 To address the risk that the manual might get transferred to a third party it should be a provision in 
the agreement stating that the customer may not transfer the manual to anyone that is not part of 
the agreement, i.e. to any third party. To ensure the effectiveness of this provision it should be used 
in conjunction with penalties, which should be set on the top level of the scale of penalties as 
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transferring the manual to a third party is the most severe violation of the agreement, at least from a 
trade secret perspective since the circle of people might become too big for it to be considered 
secret.  
 To begin with this provision will fulfil the activity criterion according to FHL and most likely 
the Directive, since it aims at maintaining the secret character of the manual. If the manual is 
transferred and thereby violating the contractual provision it is obvious that it constitutes an 
unwarranted disclosure according to FHL and the Directive. Such a provision will therefore increase 
the effectiveness of said legislation. It may nonetheless be difficult to become aware of that the 
disclosure has ever occurred.  
The manual might get stolen, for a digital manual either by hacking an electronic device or 
stealing the entire device on which the manual is stored or for an analogue manual by simply 
grabbing and walking away with it. Therefore there should be a provision in the agreement between 
SKF and the customer that the customer should take all reasonable protective measures or similar to 
ensure it is not stolen. Having a general provision as the one mentioned would make it difficult to 
sanction, however, if stated in the contract that specific protective measures should be taken, then 
they should be sanctioned by penalties to ensure observance. Such provisions will not affect the 
protection or claim according to FHL and the Directive.  
13.5 Learning the Information 
One could imagine a provision in the agreement between SKF and the customer stating that the 
customer’s technicians are not allowed to learn the information within the manual. However, such a 
provision would not avoid the risk that the technicians learn the information within the manual, and 
it would be very difficult to prove that it had happened for any sanctions to be applicable. On top of 
this it is highly likely that it would be considered unreasonable according to article 36 Contracts acts 
as many times you cannot decide what to learn and not, if you install bearings using the process 
described in the manual over and over it is impossible not to remember anything of the procedure 
after a while. 
A better solution would be to, in the agreement between SKF and the customer, state that 
the employees of the customer that will use the manual should be under secrecy obligations that 
extend also after the employee has left her job. Such an obligation will fulfil the activity criterion of 
FHL and most likely the Directive. If the obligation ends when the employee leaves her job it will be 
a big risk, since the employee may do whatever she please with the trade secret without sanctions 
according to article 7 FHL, unless in very severe cases. Violating a specific secrecy provision is such 
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a severe case, as has been noted above. As mentioned above the length of such provisions might be 
problematic if being too long, which especially has to be taken into consideration when it comes to 
employees. However, if it is possible to present a good motivation for the length it lowers the risk 
for problems associated with this. Also it should most likely lower the risks for problems if the 
secrecy provision is very specific and only covers the manual. This provision should be sanctioned 
by penalties, in order for the customer to actually ensure that the employees are subject to such 
secrecy obligations, as the agreement requires. It should be noted that even if a secrecy provision 
have been violated it is many times difficult for SKF to prove, or even become aware of, the 
violation, making it difficult to protect oneself against an employee learning the manual. 
13.6 Bankruptcy 
If the customer of SKF would go bankrupt, the question is if it would be possible to contractually 
prevent the bankruptcy estate from taking control over the manual. If the manual was sold from 
SKF to the customer it is the property of the customer and SKF can do little about this. If the 
manual is licensed instead the question becomes if it would be possible to, on a contractual basis, 
prevent the bankruptcy estate from entering into the agreement by using for instance a change of 
control clause. As has been noted above under section 10.3.4.5, a bankruptcy estate may enter into 
an agreement even if SKF would not like to be part of that agreement. According to Folkesson, the 
same applies to change of control clauses, if the bankruptcy estate wants to enter into the agreement, 
the change of control clause cannot prevent it from doing so.180  
Better is instead to find solutions that will end the relationship before the bankruptcy, or at 
least preserve SKF’s interests. If the royalty payment is due every month, and this is not paid within 
a certain period of time, SKF should have the possibility to terminate the agreement. If this period is 
too short it might be seen as unreasonable and if the customer prioritise the payment to SKF over 
other invoices it might not provide any protection at all. If it is possible to terminate the agreement 
with a couple of months term of notice it would be possible to terminate the agreement if the 
customer would show signs of insolvency. This model would require that the agreement may be 
terminated by SKF without stating any specific reasons and that SKF have access to the customer’s 
continuous financial data to be able to notice signs of insolvency. A solution like that might be 
difficult to use from a business perspective, since the customer and the survival of the agreement 
would be subject to SKF’s notion and the customer might not want to share the financial 
                                                
180 Folkesson (2007), p.129. 
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information with SKF. The model with a big up-front payment has the positive implication, apart 
from incentivising a party not to leak the manual, that SKF would be certain to at least have gotten 
that payment out of the relationship, since bankruptcy for the customer may make it difficult for 
SKF to get paid.  
Neither of the contractual measures trying to address a potential bankruptcy situation will 
affect either the trade secret claim or the protection granted by FHL and the Directive.  
13.7 Conclusion 
As a general conclusion it can be said that not only relying on the FHL or the Directive, but also 
using contractual obligations will facilitate the transfer of trade secrets and ensure a stronger 
foundation of a platform. It will make it clearer what is actually protected and from what type of 
actions by utilising provisions on how the manual may be used, and by whom, and confidentiality 
provisions. This type of provisions will also ensure that the protection granted by FHL and the 
Directive is actually available and not only a facade. It will facilitate claiming knowledge as trade 
secrets according to these legal acts, for instance by fulfilling the activity criterion according to FHL 
and in most cases the Directive. The conclusion is therefore arrived to that in order to be able to 
transact trade secrets at all there is a need for contractual provisions to protect them.  
By complementing the provisions with different levels of penalties the effectiveness of said 
provisions will be made more secure. Utilising big up-front payments will allow SKF to have a more 
secure position, as it will deter customers from violating any of the provisions in the agreement. It is 
also recognised that it might be possible to agree what may and may not be done with information 
that falls outside the scope of the FHL, however as the doctrine provide contrarious opinions as to 
whether this is possible or not caution should be exercised in relation to these matters. As the 
contractual provisions are described from a Swedish perspective there are most likely differences in 
other legislations that need to be taken into consideration when transferring the manual, unless the 
contract is explicitly governed by Swedish law which might not be possible in every case from a 
business perspective.  
 Petrusson states that one way to claim intellectual properties is to in the business arena 
utilise contracts since the assumption is that the contract will be upheld in the judicial arena, i.e. a 
judicial court.181 This implies that SKF may utilise the legal contract as a property claim of the 
knowledge within the trade secret. However, both trade secret legislation and contracts are merely 
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preventive measures that provide incentives, mainly financial, for the party not to violate the 
provisions in the law or the agreement. If the trade secret is disclosed money cannot change that 
fact, and many times it is difficult to recoup the investment in the information by damages or 
penalties from the disclosing party. It should also be emphasised that it many times might be 
impossible to even become aware of that the customer has violated the contract, implying that even 
if a high penalty would provide some compensation it would not help if the violation of the contract 
never becomes known by the proprietor of the trade secret. It is therefore obvious that the 
protection granted by legal contracts as such is not sufficient in order to capitalise on trade secrets 
such as the manual when dynamically using the trade secret.  
14 Block 3 - Practical Measures for Protecting Embedded Knowledge 
This block investigates what practical protection measures can be used for protection the sensor in 
relation to the imminent risks.   
14.1 Dismantling the Sensor 
Dismantling the sensor is identified as the most imminent risk. Below are presented several 
measures on how to lower this risk. Some of the protective measures address not only the risk that 
the customer dismantles the trader but also some of the 
other identified imminent risks. 
14.1.1 Moulding 
As shown in Figure 7 the components and their relation to 
each other is what need to be protected. One way to protect 
the information is to mould the inside of the shell, with the 
components within, see Figure 8, of the sensor and 
thereafter sealing it. This solution has been used to mould 
ECUs with plastic materials making it hard to access the 
information within. “ECU (Engine Control Unit) is a type of 
electronic control unit that controls a series of actuators on 
an internal combustion engine to ensure optimal engine 
performance.”182 If someone tries to open the ECU they 
                                                
182 Stackoverflow, “How are Engine Control Units (ECU) of high speed racing bikes coded?”, retrieved 24/04/2014 
from, http://stackoverflow.com/questions/23635784/how-are-engine-control-units-ecu-of-high-speed-racing-bikes-
coded. 
Figure 8 - Moulding the Sensor 
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more or less have to destroy the unit itself in order to get the information. It is identified that by 
destroying the unit the infringer might get information about which components are used although 
they most likely are broken by that time. However, by simply destroying the unit it will be hard to 
understand the relations between the components. It is therefore identified that, depending on how 
‘precise’ the infringer can destroy the moulding, some of the information might still be unknown for 
the infringer. 
 There are however potential problems with moulding the sensor. Question is whether or not 
the components will operate as they are supposed to when they have a cask consisting of plastic 
material surrounding them? It is however not a question that will be further investigated since it lies 
outside the scope of this thesis. 
Bosch uses this solution in order to protect their trade secrets they have in their ECUs. They 
mould their ECUs and then sell them to Volvo, without Volvo knowing what is in them. However, 
this solution is not ‘bulletproof’. In the Bosch case, Eriksson AB successfully opened one of the 
ECUs and discovered that the material within was very cheap and simply arranged in proportion to 
the price charged by Bosch. A quick Internet search shows that a company called ACtronics, with 
headquarters in the Netherlands, specializes in dismantling ECUs in order to repair or modify 
them.183 It is therefore established that this solution is not bulletproof but only hinders the infringer, 
i.e. it makes it harder for her to access the trade secret.  
Utilising moulding as a protective measure affects both the protection given in block 1 and 
2. First of all moulding the sensor enables SKF to keep the secret by limiting the possible circle of 
people. It is furthermore possible to connect this practical measure to a contractual provision, which 
states that any attempts to destroy the moulding are a breach of contract. The moulding also acts as 
a measure showing that SKF fulfils the objective criterion as set out in the FHL. It furthermore 
obstructs the customer to infringe the sensor by acquiring, disclosing, or exploits it. 
14.1.2 Embedding 
As identified in section 7.1, the sensor can either be mounted or embedded within the bearing, if the 
bearing is big enough. Embedding the sensor is one way to protect it. In order to understand how 
this protection works, there is a need to describe the environment in which the bearing is utilised. 
The bearing is an element of a machine that constrains relative motion and reduces friction between 
moving parts to only the desired motion. It is an important element of a machine and if broken, 
                                                
183 Youtube.com, “Ombyggnad av en Bosch ABS-enhet - ACtronics”, retrieved 24/04/2014 from: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mCanmgjx-M0.  
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forces the whole machine to stop. If the sensor and the bearing is an element of a an important 
machine performing industrial operations or reducing friction in a wind power station, a shutdown 
will have significant economical impacts. This leads to the conclusion that if it is possible to embed 
the sensor within the bearing, the trader will need to shut down the operations for the time to 
remove the bearing, remove the sensor and analyse it in order to understand it. The manufacturer 
then has to return it into the machine in order to start up the production again. These are major 
decisions that will most likely be very expensive since it is not possible to remove the sensor without 
shutting down operations. In order for this strategy to provide the best protection possible, SKFs 
own technicians should install the bearing within the machine. This is also the scenario in some 
cases but in the majority of cases the trader who purchases the bearing installs it herself. Another 
deficiency with this strategy is that manufacturers often have scheduled shut downs in order to 
perform maintenance. During one of these scheduled shut downs there is a window for the 
manufacturer to analyse the bearing. However, to embed the sensor is still identified as a better 
solution than only needing to mount it on the machine itself since embedding has a more preventive 
effect. When mounted, the trader does not need to shut down operations in order to analyse the 
sensor, i.e. the costs for removing the sensor are low. 
In the situation where the sensor is embedded within the bearing SKF should always try to 
be the one installing it. By doing so this protective measure will ensure that the circle of people is 
kept at a minimum, thereby enabling the protection offered from block 1. It is identified that in 
many situations the customer wants to install the bearings themselves. This lowers the strength to 
some degree but embedding the sensor per se limits the circle of people and increases the control. 
This practical measure also obstruct the customer from transacting, making it a practical measure 
that lowers the risk from the sensor being transferred to a 
third party as well. This measure also obstructs the sensor 
from being disclosed, exploited and acquired, thereby 
enabling the protection given by block 1. 
14.1.3 Secondary Shell 
Another way to protect the sensors from being dismantled 
is to create a secondary shell covering the sensor and its 
original plastic shell. By creating a secondary shell that 
consists of harder material than plastic, e.g. steel, it will be 
Figure 9 - Secondary Shell 
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harder for the infringer to acquire the information within. Today many of the sensors that are used 
by SKF are mounted on machines by a single mounting stud. With a secondary shell, the shell itself 
will need to be mounted by several mounting studs in order to make sure that the customer cannot 
remove it easily. If it is possible to mount the sensor by using special tools only available at SKF it is 
identified as the best solution when mounting the sensor. It will make it harder for the infringer to 
open the second shell, see Figure 9.  
 This solution is identified as very feasible since it is fairly easy to construct and use. With this 
solution there is no need to interact with the components and thereby possibly hinder them from 
performing optimally. However, it is not identified which thickness the secondary shell should have. 
Generally a thicker shell implies that it is harder to access what is inside of it. The problem might be 
that it is too thick and unintentionally intervenes with the sensor or with the sensor’s ability to 
transmit data. This is not further investigated since it is not covered by the scope of this thesis. As 
with the moulding solution, this solution is not bulletproof but only makes it harder for the infringer 
to access the information. 
 First of all utilising a second shell does not only protect the sensor from being dismantled, it 
also obstructs the customer from easily transferring it to a third party. A secondary shell also 
facilitates a more limited and controlled circle of people and thereby enabling protection from block 
1. It is furthermore a measure that lowers the risk that the sensor is stolen or exposed to espionage.  
14.1.4 Self Destruct 
Given that the sensor can either be mounted on the machine containing the bearing or, if the 
bearing is large enough, contain the sensor within the bearing, a design which destroys the sensor, if 
opened in a wrong way, can be one preventive measure. In an interview with Pernilla Hallberg, 
customer administrator at ACtronics, it was confirmed that when an object, that has these protective 
measures, is the most complicated one to dismantle. According to her, and the R&D staff at 
ACtronics she has spoken to, when the circuitry within a product is glued together with the cover 
itself it is hard to dismantle the circuitry and keep it intact. In most cases the circuitry is destroyed 
and useless. However, it is identified that even if the circuitry is destroyed information can still be 
derived from it, albeit more difficult. A similar protection can be used for the sensor. By using 
custom made glue in order to glue the circuitry to the cover a good protection can be created.  
Using these types of protective measures can be argued as a measure that makes it hard for a 
person skilled in the art to access the sensor. This was identified as an important aspect when the 
trade secret was identified as ‘put on the market’. This protective measures obstructs a person skilled 
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in the art to easily access the information within the sensor and thereby enabling the protection 
given from at least the FHL. 
14.2 NDT 
Non-destructive testing is a wide group of analysis techniques used in industry to evaluate 
components or systems without causing damage.184 There are many different methods that can be 
used in order to analyse components or systems without causing damage, e.g. use of electromagnetic 
radiation (X-rays), ultrasonic testing, radiographic testing, acoustic emission etc. In order for this 
thesis to not be too technically complicated this thesis will only analyse how to protect the sensor 
from electromagnetic radiation and ultrasonic testing. 
 Using electromagnetic radiation, in order to analyse components, is a commonly used 
method and almost any material can act as an electromagnetic shield. However, a shield made of 
high-density material is better than low-density material.185  Therefore, one effective way to block the 
radiation that does not require extensive amounts of material is to use a ‘lead shield’. Lead has a very 
high density and is therefore often used in order to protect from electromagnetic radiation. This 
method is used in many sectors and the ordinary person has seen this method at the dentist. It is the 
collar around the neck when taking x-ray photos of the teeth. Therefore, a cover of lead is one way 
to protect the sensor. Lead has however many negative properties. It is expensive, heavy, and has a 
negative impact on the environment.186 Another solution is to cover the sensor with steel. Steel has 
not as high density as lead and requires therefore greater thickness in order to be as effective. It is 
possible to use x-ray through steel as thick as 2.5 inches (6.35 cm) and 3.5 (8.89 cm) if using gamma 
ray.187 Covering the sensor with a 6.35 to 8.89 cm cover of steel is identified as impractical. The 
sensor would be ponderous, unattractive, and expensive. Therefore, protection from 
electromagnetic radiation is a risk that might not be able to overcome without unreasonable costs. 
However, it is still identified that a steel cover will pose as a challenge for many traders, but if 
someone really wants to perform NTD with electromagnetic radiation, they might acquire the 
information within the sensor. 
                                                
184 “What is NDT?”, Retrieved 22/04/2014 from http://www.ndt-ed.org/AboutNDT/aboutndt.htm. 
185 “Materials used in radiation shielding”, Retrieved 11/04/24 from http://www.thomasnet.com/articles/custom-
manufacturing-fabricating/radiation-shielding-materials. 
186 “Lead - PB”, Retrieved 11/04/2014 from 
http://www.lenntech.com/periodic/elements/pb.htm#Environmental%20effects%20of%20lead.   
187 “Can you x-ray through steel”, Retrieved 22/04/2014 
http://wiki.answers.com/Q/Can_you_x_ray_through_steel?#slide=2.  
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Ultrasonic testing (henceforth referred to as UT) is a commonly used NDT method. UT 
uses high frequency sound energy to conduct examinations and make measurements.  The risk is 
that a trader uses UT to derive information from the sensor since, if used correctly, it is highly 
accurate in determining reflector position and estimating size and shape.188 However, there are 
limitations with ultrasonic testing. It is for example hard to use UT when the materials are rough, 
irregular in shape, very small, exceptionally thin, or not homogenous.189 Furthermore it is hard to 
inspect materials that are coarse grained due to low sound transmission and high signal noise. Cast 
iron is for example such material. A protective measure could therefore be to include cast iron in the 
shell of the sensor. This will pose as a protective measure from UT but, as mentioned above, it 
might still be able to use other NDT methods to acquire some information. The possible 
protections from NDT have the issue that not only do they not offer impenetrable protection, they 
are also very ponderous. 
Protection given by any of the measures enables a more limited and controlled circle of 
people as well as showing that the objective prerequisites are fulfilled, thereby enabling the 
protection given in block 1.  
14.2.1 Camouflage 
Another protective measure that could be used is to camouflage the components. By not marking 
the different components with essential data, such as what it is or what voltage they use, the 
infringing party will need to analyse each product herself in order to understand what they are. It is 
identified that the infringer will suspect that some components are standard, i.e. a certain circuitry, 
motherboard, or any other component, but the infringer cannot be sure of it. If however it is 
possible to make all the components “look” the same – in the sense that they all for example have 
the shape of squares and the same dimensions – it is identified as a further camouflage that makes it 
even more difficult for the infringing party.  
 Another way to utilise camouflage is to use components that acts like dummies. The 
dummies do not provide or do anything within the sensor other than confusing the infringer of 
what is the correct construction and use of components. This ought to be a fairly cheap protective 
measure that can be utilised to a relative great extent. 
                                                
188 ”Basic principles of ultrasonic testing”, Retrieved 23/04/2014 http://www.ndt-
ed.org/EducationResources/CommunityCollege/Ultrasonics/Introduction/description.htm.  
189 ibid. 
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 The first step of this solution – disguising the components by not marking them – and the 
use of dummies are identified as a feasible solution that most likely is relatively cheap. However, if 
the infringer really wants to know what components are used this solution will only hinder her for 
some time. 
 Utilising camouflage as a protective measure does not either strengthen or weaken the claim 
made in block 1 or 2. It might be argued that it fulfils the objective criterion as set out in the FHL 
but that means that it will need to be communicated towards the customer that the components 
have been camouflaged. If so it helps enabling the protection given by the FHL. 
14.3 Transfer 
Protecting the sensor from being transferred can be done in several ways. The most conventional 
ways are to, at least when the sensor is mounted on the machine and not built in within the bearing 
itself, weld, glue, or to throb the sensor onto the machine. By doing this it is harder for the trader to 
dismount the sensor from the machine. However, the trader can transfer the whole machine itself or 
break open the protecting cask. The protection given by these conventional measures is therefore 
relatively low. Other more sophisticated solutions can be used. Installing a GPS transmitter within 
the sensor is one way to keep track of where the sensor is. The GPS can for example be codified to 
release a signal when it is transferred outside of the factory it was supposed to be used in. The 
protection offered by this solution is very high since it can easily show whether or not there is an 
attempt to transfer the sensor. However, there are limitations with this solution as well. Using GPS 
might be expensive, it requires surveillance from time to time, and it might interfere with the 
measures conducted by the sensor. 
Utilising these measures strengthens at least the protection given in block 1. These practical 
measures – as mentioned in section 14.1.3 – enable a more limited and more controlled circle of 
people, i.e. maintains the secret character of the sensor. 
14.4 Stealing 
Given that the sensor is located within the factory of the trader, there is a risk is that someone from 
inside, i.e. an employee, steals the sensor. In order to protect from this scenario the sensor should 
be, as mentioned before, protected by a secondary shell. A secondary shell is identified as sufficient 
protection since a single employee will find it challenging to open it up and steal it without being 
caught in the act. However, the solution is not bullet proof. If many employees collaborate they 
might be able to steal the sensor. The risk is although identified as low.  
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 In order to not reiterate see section 14.1.3 and 14.3. 
14.5 Bankruptcy 
When a trader enters into bankruptcy it is presumed that everything within the control of the trader 
is owned by the trader, e.g. machines, facilities, IPRs and so on. In a situation where the trader has 
licensed the sensor the presumption is that she owns the sensor. In order to break this presumption 
the licensor, SKF, needs to show that it is the owner of the sensor. This can be done in several ways. 
The easiest way is ensure that the sensor has a serial number engraved and that this serial number is 
written down in the license agreement. With such a solution SKF can show fairly easy that they are 
the righteous owner of the sensor. 
Notifying the serial number affects neither the claim made in block 1 or block 2. However, it 
is identified that it facilitates the transaction of trade secrets as it lowers this risk. 
14.6 Conclusion 
After analysing the referred practical solutions the conclusion is drawn that they are only obstacles 
that can be breached if one really wishes to do so. It is therefore not possible to set up impenetrable 
protective measures that ensure that no one will ever acquire the information within the sensor. The 
existence of companies such as “ACtronics” shows that it possible to overcome sophisticated 
protections. It is furthermore identified that there is a possibility to use several solutions in 
combination in order to improve the protection. For example, the sensor can have its circuitry glued 
together with the moulded cask and have a GPS transponder inside with a secondary shell consisting 
of cast iron to protect it. The logic is that the more practical solutions used, the better protection is 
offered. However, using many practical solutions might not be possible from a business perspective 
since the costs can be unreasonable. It is therefore important that an overall assessment is done for 
each case in order to invest in the solution that offers the best protection. Another conclusion that 
can be drawn is that the practical protection will most likely stop most traders to try to acquire the 
knowledge within the sensor. Many companies will refrain from this simply because they do not 
need the information or lack the resources to dismantle the sensor. It is the competitors that are 
identified as the threat. The worst-case scenario is that they develop the same sensor by reverse 
engineering and compete with SKFs using SKFs own technology. Another scenario is that the 
competitors develop the same knowledge from their own R&D investments. This is a possible 
scenario since the trade secret protection offers not exclusive right to the knowledge. 
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 It is further concluded that the practical measures are closely linked to the protection given 
by block 1. The analysis shows that it is often time a necessity to utilise some protective measures in 
order to enable the protection given by the FHL or the Directive. Therefore, when utilising trade 
secrets dynamically there is a need to utilise practical measures. 
 Following Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theories, the act of protecting the knowledge by 
practical measures, can be identified as a property claim in the business arena since it is a claim that 
the knowledge is considered as a trade secret. By protecting the knowledge within the sensor, SKF 
displays towards the business arena that this knowledge is their property, their trade secret. This is 
closely connected to the first claim, that of claiming the knowledge as a secret according to the legal 
definition since the protective measures are more or less a requirement to fulfil the legal definition. 
The use of such protection is added to the belief that the asset, the knowledge within the sensor, can 
be trusted as potentially secure object in commercial transactions, i.e. allowing the knowledge to be 
capitalised through dynamic use of trade secrets. 
The practical measures are not bound by any national boundaries, the business arena ought 
to be the same in each country. This implies that the practical protections are possible to utilise in all 
countries. 
15 Block 3 - Practical Measures for Openly Available Knowledge  
As has been seen, the protection granted by FHL and the Directive is not sufficient to grant a 
satisfactory level of protection when transferring the manual to a customer. It is however established 
that contractual provisions and other laws to some extent offset this issue. The question is how, and 
if, it would be possible to protect the manual using practical measures in such a manner that you 
would not need to rely solely on only laws and contracts. It will also be analysed how these practical 
measures affect the claim and protection of FHL and the Directive.  Initially solutions that are more 
general to their character are reviewed and are then followed by specific solutions to the risks 
identified under section 7.2.1. 
15.1 Time-Limited Access 
When licensing the manual the customer will only have access to the manual for the duration of the 
licensing agreement. If the access to the manual during this time was limited to for instance only 
working hours, risks in relation that an employee may misappropriate the manual might be lowered. 
It builds on the assumption that the employee has work tasks to do during the working hours and 
would not have time to photograph the manual or similar. If the employee has possibility to take a 
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break and have access to the manual without any supervision or similar the limitation in time would 
not work as effectively or at all. If utilising a digital manual limiting the access time may be done by 
setting the properties of for instance the document or the data room where the manual is stored. 
For an analogue manual it would be required that someone is responsible for locking the manual 
into a safe or similar at a certain hour.   
 By limiting the access time of the manual the activity criterion of FHL and most likely the 
Directive will be fulfilled. If the customer somehow manages to access the manual after working 
hours, this might be seen as an acquisition, depending on the circumstances. Since SKF have shown 
that they do not want this to happen by limiting the access time, the acquisition would then be 
considered unwarranted.  
15.2 Too Much Information 
One way to minimise the amount of information within the manual would be, if possible, to attach 
external elements to it. If for instance a value needs to be calculated from a measured value, instead 
of showing the equation that should be used for calculating the second value, the initial value could 
be typed into an apparatus that would deliver the second value. This way vital information can be 
kept secret. If using an apparatus the information within can be subject to several risks itself, which 
are addressed under the section about embedded knowledge in this thesis. Instead of an apparatus 
an interactive manual or a field on a webpage or similar could be used and thereby avoid issues 
relating to the physical nature of the apparatus. Nonetheless, the customer could possibly reverse 
engineer the equation even though it might take long time. 
 Limiting the information in the manual using any of the measures above implies that the 
activity criterion according to FHL and most likely the Directive is fulfilled. Also, if the customer 
would access the information hidden either in the apparatus or the webpage this would without 
doubt be considered an acquisition according to FHL and the Directive. The customer does not 
have consent for doing this and should not be in good faith considering the acquisition either, since 
the information is hidden. This implies that the acquisition would be seen as unwarranted according 
to FHL and the Directive. 
It should be noted that limiting the knowledge within the manual might affect the trade 
secret claim in block 1 and thereby the protection granted if limited too much. This would be the 
case if the information prerequisite of the FHL and the Directive would not be fulfilled. Most times 
this should not be an issue, due to the low requirements for knowledge and information to be 
claimed as trade secrets according to both the FHL and the Directive. If this is the case the 
116 
knowledge within the device or similar would still be considered as trade secrets and protected by 
FHL and the Directive.  
Another way to limit the amount of information would be to enter most of the information 
in the manual, so that the customer can do most of the mounting of the bearing herself, but leave 
out essential moments that need to be performed by technicians of SKF. This way the most 
important information in the manual might be protected, however, the customer might not be very 
fond of this arrangement as she will have to rely on technicians from SKF and from a business 
perspective it might therefore not be feasible. This measure implies that the activity criterion in FHL 
and most likely the Directive is fulfilled since it effectively keeps the information secret. However, it 
does not affect the protection or claim granted by said legal acts.   
15.3 Keeping the Manual 
As is accounted for above under section 7.2.1.2 there are several different ways that the manual 
could be copied in order to keep the manual. However, all of these ways to copy the manual could 
potentially be solved by one simple, low tech, solution. Regardless of how the manual is transferred 
to the customer, either digital or analogue, having an SKF employee that supervise the use of the 
manual will make it impossible or at least very difficult to misappropriate the trade secret. However, 
such a solution is not very convenient and the customer may not be fond of having an SKF 
employee there all the time. Supervising the use of the manual implies that the activity criterion 
according to FHL and maybe the Directive is fulfilled. It does not affect the claim or the protection 
granted from said legal acts, apart from that SKF might be in a better position concerning evidence 
if the supervisor sees when for instance a disclosure takes place. 
 One way to prevent the customer from simply refusing to return the manual to SKF would 
be to utilise a data room which implies that the data is stored on a remote server, instead of on a 
local computer, and can only be accessed by certain devices, it is also possible to decide during 
which hours of the day, which users etc. that should have access. Accessing the data room should 
require password that only have a couple attempts after which the access would be blocked to 
ensure that only authorised personnel gets access to the manual. Such a data room could either be 
used on a computer or, more convenient perhaps, as an app on for example a tablet. To limit risks 
associated with temporary files that might be possible to access after the data room has been shut 
down SKF should supply the customer with a device through which it will only be possible to access 
the data room and do nothing else. By doing this SKF also ensures that the customer has never 
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legally acquired the manual according to FHL or the Directive. If the customer therefore manages to 
make a copy or similar of the manual, it will for certain imply an acquisition that is unwarranted. 
To maximise the protection from the data room it should only be possible to view one part 
of the manual at one given time. When the step that is described in a certain part of the manual has 
been completed the technician may proceed to the next step in the manual. It should not be possible 
to go back in the manual to ensure effectiveness of this provision. If the customer needs to go back 
to a previous step, she would need to contact SKF to either be allowed to do that or, which is better 
from a control perspective, have SKF send one of their technicians to complete the previous step.  
Utilising a data room is an effective way of fulfilling the activity criterion according to FHL 
and most likely the Directive. If the customer somehow manages to reach the manual inside the data 
room either after termination of the agreement or by going back to a previous section in the manual 
it would without doubt constitute an acquisition according to FHL and the Directive regardless if 
the manual is simply accessed or if a copy has been made. It is also established that SKF would not 
have consented to the acquisition, since the agreement is terminated. The acquisition would require 
hacking the data room why the customer cannot be considered to be in good faith either. Therefore 
it would be seen as an unwarranted acquisition according to FHL and the Directive.   
15.3.1 Photographing 
One way to prevent this from happening for a digital manual is to have as a demand for accessing 
the manual that the web camera of the computer or tablet is turned on. The camera would then be 
linked to the program that is used to access the manual that would see if the person operating the 
device takes up a phone or camera and holds in front of the screen and in such a case make the 
screen black. It is unclear if such a solution exist, it would however definitely be possible from a 
technical perspective to have such a solution when looking at what cameras can do when being 
applied in e.g. automobiles to detect when you are tired, when a pedestrian is in front of the car etc. 
As a camera has a limited visual scope, it would probably be possible to stand to the side so the 
camera cannot see you and take a photograph. This could however be prevented by applying a visual 
filter to the screen of the device that makes it possible to see what is on the screen only when you 
are directly in front of it. Such filters already exist and are mainly used on computer screens.190 
The ideal solution to this problem would be if it would be possible to have a special 
background on the manual so that when taking a picture nothing could be seen. This solution exists 
                                                
190 Kensington, “Privacy Screen for Laptops Widescreen Flat Panel Monitors”, retrieved 05/05/2014 from: 
http://www.kensington.com/us/us/v/4471/1687/privacy-screen-for-laptops-widescreen-flat-panel-monitors. 
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when it comes to copying using a colour photocopier trying to copy an analogue manual, however 
knowingly no such solution is unfortunately available for photographs of either digital or analogue 
manuals.191 That solution is a safety paper with sections on it that becomes black and unreadable 
when copied using a colour photocopier. There is however a possibility to have a computer screen 
that is only white unless you utilise special glasses. The solution is based on that one of the 
polarising filters in the computer screen is removed and is then put into the lenses of the glasses.192 
It is possible to remove this filter from any computer screen rather easily implying that it should be 
possible also to buy a screen with the filter separated from the beginning. A filter solution would not 
prevent photographs from being taken, as it is possible to hold the glasses in front of the lens of the 
camera. However, if the glasses are stored in a safe unless for work hours it will at least make it more 
difficult for anyone to take a photograph, especially if the technicians would not have time to do it 
during their work hours. It is also possible to utilise a solution with watermarking the pages of the 
manual, either digital or analogue, to prevent photographs from being taken, however it would only 
tell that the manual belongs to SKF and not prevent the photograph from being taken.  
Neither of the solutions above are very practical, and there is no identified solution for 
analogue manuals why this is a risk that is very difficult to be completely protected from. 
All measures presented above imply that the activity criterion will be fulfilled according to 
FHL and most likely the Directive. If the manual is copied by taking a photograph, FHL and the 
Directive will consider it an acquisition. Using any of the solutions above will make it clear for the 
customer that SKF has not consented to the photographs, the customer will be in bad faith. 
Therefore it will be easier to prove that an acquisition is unwarranted according to FHL and the 
Directive.   
15.3.2 Screenshot 
The most convenient solution to this problem for a digital manual is by software preventing 
screenshots from being taken. This is for instance possible when it comes to a special version of 
PDFs called CopySafe PDF.193 It is also possible to utilise a solution with watermarking as for 
photographs. It is most likely also possible to make an app for a tablet so it would be impossible to 
                                                
191 “CopySafe Copy-Preventable paper”. 
192 “Privacy monitor hacked from an old LCD Monitor”, retrieved 22/04/2014 from: 
http://www.instructables.com/id/Privacy-monitor-made-from-an-old-LCD-Monitor/. 
193 “CopySafe PDF”, retrieved 31/03/2014 from: http://www.artistscope.net/copy-protect-pdf.htm.  
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take a screenshot in that app or that the print screen would not show what was actually on the 
screen.   
A solution that would undoubtedly solve this problem would be if the device does not have 
any connection to the outer world in terms of internet, Bluetooth, USB or similar because if it does 
not then it would not be possible to transfer the screenshots taken to a third party anyway. 
Utilising protective measures, as the ones mentioned, imply that the activity criterion of FHL 
and most likely the Directive will be fulfilled. It will also put the customer in bad faith when 
acquiring the manual by making a copy. This will make the acquisition unwarranted and ensure that 
the protection offered by FHL and the Directive is effective.   
15.3.3 Printing 
The most convenient solution for this problem for a digital manual is to have the manual stored in a 
virtual data room that does not allow for the manual to be printed or downloaded to later be 
printed. The same effect could also be achieved by having the manual as an app on a tablet. Another 
solution, if stored locally on a device, is to prevent the device from connecting to the printer either 
wirelessly or by wire.  
If the manual inside the data room is printed, it will constitute an acquisition according to 
both FHL and the Directive. This acquisition is unwarranted since SKF has not consented to it. The 
customer cannot reasonably have been in good faith when acquiring the manual since the data room 
does not allow for the manual to be printed, a protection that would need to be circumvented. As 
have been mentioned above, utilising a data room implies that the activity criterion of FHL and 
most likely the Directive will be fulfilled.  
15.3.4 Recording 
This is a risk that from a technical perspective is impossible to prevent, as long as people has access 
to the manual, either digital or analogue, they will have the possibility to read the manual and also 
doing so out loud. The only way to protect the manual without having a guard, as has been 
discussed above, is to limit the amount of information in it, which might not be possible. In relation 
to this there should also be as many figures as possible instead of text describing the procedure, like 
an IKEA manual, as it is more difficult to read out what the picture says than just read the exact 
words of a text.  
 Utilising figures instead of text in the manual will most likely not affect the protection 
granted by FHL and the Directive, as the measure is rather vague. It will also most likely not fulfil 
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the activity criterion of either FHL or the Directive. Limiting the information or having a guard may 
nonetheless affect the legal protection, as have been accounted for above.  
15.3.5 Copying 
One way to prevent the manual from being copied is to only grant access to the manual to the 
people who need it in their work and only during those hours when they work. This would make it 
more difficult to copy the manual, as the people that would have access to it would have to perform 
other tasks during the time the manual is accessible. In order to prevent an analogue manual from 
being copied using a photocopier, safety paper, as have been discussed above, should be utilised.  
The most convenient solution however, as discussed above, is to limit the information in the 
manual in some way to ensure that even if the manual is copied vital information will still be missing 
out. The solution discussed above under “Recording” with drawings as a preventive measure will 
not be as effective in this case as they could more or less easily be copied as well as long as the 
person can draw or when using a photocopier for an analogue manual.  
As have been noted above, limiting the people who have access to the manual when working 
will ensure that the circle of people remains closed. This in turn leads to that the trade secret will not 
lose its secret character according to FHL and the Directive. Apart from this it does not affect the 
claim or protection granted by FHL or the Directive. The legal consequences for limiting the 
information of the manual have been accounted for above.  
15.4 Transfer 
There are two different ways that the manual may be transferred from a customer to a third party, 
which are individually addressed below. Before transferring a manual there is most times a need to 
make some sort of copy. The different ways that have been identified that this might be done are 
photographing, screenshot, printing, recording, and copying, which have all been mentioned above 
in relation to “Keeping the Manual“ why reference is made to that section. Under that section was 
also mentioned that the majority of those risks could be significantly lowered, or erased completely, 
if an SKF employee would supervise the usage of the manual, the same principle applies for the risks 
in relation to transferring the manual as well.  
15.4.1 Sending 
One way to prevent the risk that the a digital manual file may be transferred from the customer to a 
third party is to have the manual on a device without communicative abilities, i.e. without any 
internet connection, Bluetooth or similar, implying that it would literally be impossible to send the 
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PDF file, or similar, containing the manual. The device could also be designed not to have any 
physical ports either, such as USB, to ensure that the file containing the manual is simply copied to 
an USB-memory or similar. Having neither physical ports nor communicative abilities is however 
not very practical and will pose difficulties when transferring the manual to the device. It would also 
be possible to limit the connective abilities of an electronic device via software, implying that the 
device might be used as usual, except that it would be impossible to send any files.  
If digital manual is stored as a PDF file it is possible to have a time limit on the file, implying 
that after a certain period, for instance a month, the file will not be able to access. This will not 
prevent the most immediate problem that the file may be sent, it may however limit the damage 
from the manual being transferred.  
Another solution would be to use a data room, as mentioned above, for accessing the 
manual which also would make it impossible to transfer the file to third parties either by internet, 
Bluetooth, USB memory or similar.  
For an analogue manual sending is not a very big risk since the customer would then lose the 
manual, as long as the customer only got one manual. If this is the case there is a need to make a 
copy first, which is discussed above, or send it with a faxing machine. To prevent the manual from 
being faxed safety paper, as mentioned above, should be utilised that will make the copy of the 
manual that is faxed unreadable, which will work as long as it is a colour copy, if it is not this 
solution might not work.194 Either way the manual should be locked in a safe outside working hours 
to lower this risk.  
Utilising any of the mentioned measures will imply that the activity criterion is fulfilled 
according to FHL and most likely the Directive. If the manual is sent to a third party it will 
constitute a disclosure according to FHL and the Directive. Utilising any of the practical measures 
will ensure that the disclosure is considered as unwarranted. This is because the customer will have 
to circumvent the practical measures designed to prevent the manual from being sent, which implies 
that it cannot be considered that SKF have given an implicit consent to the transfer. 
15.4.2 Stealing 
It is difficult for SKF to protect the manual, either digital or analogue, from theft once it has been 
transferred to the customer. There are nonetheless some ways to limit this risk where the first would 
be to limit the amount of information within the manual so that even if it is stolen it does not pose a 
                                                
194 “CopySafe Copy-Preventable paper”, retrieved 29/04/2014 from: http://www.isp-
vft.com/Pages/Copysafe%2B.html. 
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big risk. Another way is to utilise data room or web access solution for a digital manual so that there 
locally is no manual that can be stolen. If having the manual stored locally on an electronic device 
there could be a requirement for the device to not be connected to the Internet that it cannot be 
hacked and the information stolen that way. A thief could of course steal the device, or an analogue 
manual, in such a case. The device should therefore be locked in a safe when not used, the same for 
an analogue manual, in order to limit the risk of theft to a minimum. 
 Preventing the manual from being stolen also has the positive effect that the activity 
criterion becomes fulfilled according to FHL and most likely the Directive. Apart from that the 
protective measures does not affect the claim or protection granted by FHL or the Directive. 
15.5 Learning the Information 
To prevent the technicians of the customer to learn the information in the manual is impossible. If 
one of the customer’s technicians has access to the manual and performs the installations of the 
bearings she will sooner or later learn the information within the manual. It would however be 
possible to limit the risk that the individual technician learns the whole process. One way would be 
to switch technicians often so that they do not have time to learn what is in the manual, however, 
then the information would be distributed to a wide circle of people and it would be very costly to 
constantly switch personnel. Another way would be to have separate technicians for separate parts 
of the installation so that no one can learn the whole process, the backside would then be that each 
person would be very good at performing her part which later could be combined with the other 
peoples’ knowledge to get the whole picture.  
A better solution is to limit the information within the manual, as mentioned above, so that 
if the technicians of the customer learns what is in the manual it will still be limited so that they 
cannot install the bearings from their memory.  
Switching technicians often or having separate technicians for separate parts of the 
installation will not affect either the claim or the protection granted by FHL and the Directive. The 
legal implications of limiting the information within the manual have been accounted for above. 
15.6 Bankruptcy 
In the case of bankruptcy of the customer SKF would like to retrieve the manual from the customer 
if the bankruptcy estate does not enter into the agreement. To be able to do that the manual must be 
possible to separate in the bankruptcy, implying that it has to be specifically marked or otherwise so 
that it would be possible to retrieve it. If a digital manual is accessed through a data room or another 
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web solution this would not be an issue though, since the customer only possess the manual 
temporarily every time it is accessed, and therefore has no permanent copy in the sense that it is not 
in the possession of the customer when not accessed and therefore the manual is returned already 
when the customer closes the manual on the computer or similar.     
 Marking the manual might, depending on how it is done might ensure that the customer is in 
bad faith when acquiring the manual. Apart from that it does not affect the claim or protection of 
FHL or the Directive. The legal implications of utilising a data room have been accounted for 
above. 
15.7 Conclusion 
As a general conclusion it can be said that the more and better practical protections added before 
dynamically utilising knowledge, in this case the manual, both digital and analogue, the easier and 
more controlled it becomes. It is however noticeable that apart from limiting the information, 
depending on how that may be done, the practical protections are possible to circumvent if one 
would really want to. The practical protections are mere obstacles in the way of getting access to the 
information. If a combination of solutions are used it will nonetheless obstruct getting hold of the 
information. The most important protective measures to apply is that the manual should be accessed 
through a time limited data room that is only possible to reach using a device supplied from SKF. 
On top of this the information within the manual, that is openly available for the customer, should 
be limited to a minimum by making the manual interactive as well as ensuring that the customer 
cannot go back to a previous section in the manual.  
However, it should be noticed that the more protective solutions that are used, the more 
difficult it will be to utilise said solutions from a business perspective, the customer might not 
comply as it many times will make the use of the manual more difficult as well as increase the price 
of the manual. The appropriate level of protection must be determined in each individual case to 
ensure that the optimal benefit is gained from the costs incurred by protecting the information, as 
information is of different character, with different value and used in different situations. It should 
however be emphasised that it is many times easier to protect the manual when it is digital, as is seen 
above, why optimally a digital, and not analogue, copy of the manual should be transferred to the 
customer.    
 It has been noted in the majority of cases that applying practical measures implies that the 
activity criterion according to FHL and the Directive gets fulfilled. The practical provisions also 
have the positive implication that it becomes far more difficult for the customer to acquire the 
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manual in good faith. It is also easier to establish that for instance a disclosure is unwarranted since 
there will be no doubt about that SKF has not consented to the disclosure. The practical measures 
might also put the proprietor of the trade secret in a better position when trying to prove an 
infringement. Practical measures may also be tied to contractual provisions, making the contracts 
provisions more effective and easier to sanction if it is easier to prove an infringement.    
It has also been noted that limiting the knowledge within the manual, as has been stated as 
one of the most effective practical protective measures, might affect the trade secret claim in block 1 
and thereby the protection granted if limited too much. It is however established that most times 
this should not be an issue. Nonetheless the knowledge within the device or similar would still be 
considered as a trade secret. 
In relation to the specific risks it should be noted that if licensing the manual, the license 
should explicitly forbid the customer to for instance take a photograph of the manual. By combining 
the protection from contractual provisions and practical measures a higher combined level of 
protection is reached. The practical measures many times also facilitates proving an infringement 
according to FHL and the Directive, or of a contractual provision. 
Petrusson and Heiden state that it is possible to claim trade secrets in the business arena, 
which implies that you have information that you keep secret. Since the business arena may be 
global, because national borders do not necessarily bind it, it implies that all the practical protective 
solutions noted above in this section are possible to utilise regardless of country, as long as it is 
possible from a business perspective. Adding practical protections to information, such as in the 
case of the manual, is therefore a claiming process in the business arena implying a stronger property 
claim, as the control position over the information will be stronger. The question is if it would be 
possible to capitalise on the manual, with the information within, in terms of transacting the manual 
when utilising the practical protections stated above? To capitalise on the manual, it must be seen as 
a potentially secure object in a commercial transaction, will the practical protections enable this? As 
a general conclusion it can be said that if enough practical protective measures are applied, it will be 
a strong property claim and difficult enough to misappropriate the knowledge within the manual to 
capitalise on the manual by dynamically utilising the same while maintaining its value. In other cases 
the outcome might be different since what protections might be possible, both practically and from 
a business perspective, to apply will differ from case to case. Therefore, in many cases the practical 
protective measures that may be applied may not provide enough protection and control, why 
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additional protection in terms of contracts and law must be added to reach an appropriate level of 
protection.  
16 Overall Assessment 
The three different blocks have above been analysed separately in order to identify what sort of 
protection they offer and whether or not that protection is sufficient in order to capitalize on trade 
secrets, based on the works of Petrusson and Heiden. In order to do so there is a need for a 
summary, which is presented below. This final conclusion will address whether or not the three 
blocks combined will offer a sufficient protection and thereby make the foundation of a platform to 
dynamically use trade secrets. This section will furthermore address the findings that have been 
found in this thesis and their generalizability.  
16.1 Embedded Knowledge 
16.1.1 Summary 
16.1.1.1 Block 1 
In the first block the author analysed whether or not the sensor and the information kept within 
could be claimed as a trade secret according to the FHL and the Directive. The analysis showed that 
it is possible to do so but that the protection most likely is not sufficient for dynamical use. In order 
to facilitate dynamical use of the sensor the main problems with this claim is to maintain the relative 
secrecy, i.e. to maintain the control of the circle of people who knows about the trade secret, and to 
utilise protective measures. The protective measures will simplify the process of showing that the 
customer was in bad faith, as well as potentially make it to hard for a person skilled in the art to 
access the sensor easily. It is further concluded that selling the sensor will most likely ruin the 
secrecy character since the circle of people is not controlled or limited.  
Theoretically, the first block contains a strong property claim derived from Swedish and 
European law. The claim is done in the business arena due to secrets lack of an administrative arena, 
and upheld finally in the judicial arena if needed. When the Directive is adopted, the claim will be 
stronger and more homogenous throughout the European Union. However, practically, the control 
position is identified as weak since it seems that the FHL and the Directive have focused on the 
scenario where the trader is keeping the trade secret internally, making this first block rather 
“toothless” when trying to use the trade secret dynamically. It should however be noted that both 
the FHL and the Directive offers remedies, however, these are, as shown in the analysis, hard to 
define and often times might not recoup the investments made.  
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16.1.1.2 Block 2 
‘Block 2’ also meant a property claim, but derived from contractual claims as opposed from law. The 
analysis shows that the freedom of contract allows for constructing agreements that allow dynamical 
use of the sensor. An important aspect was that trade secrets could be acquired in good faith, why it 
is important to draft NDAs that put the customer in bad faith.  
There are two main problems with ‘block 2’. The first is that it can be, from a business 
perspective, hard agree upon contractual obligations stating how the sensor should be handled. The 
second problem derives from the nature of contractual obligations. Even if the contract can be 
formed so that the trade secret can be used dynamically, it has only a ‘preventive effect’. A 
competitor who does not mind paying damages or penalties can neglect the contract and dismantle 
the sensor in order to access the knowledge within. The third block was analysed to address this 
problem. Block 2 also showed that there is a need to use contractual provisions in order to enable 
the protection given by block 1. 
16.1.1.3 Block 3 
The third block acts as a physical barrier, which prevents the trader from, to some extent, infringe 
on the trade secret. Several measures were analysed to prevent the customer to see and access the 
information, where moulding the sensor with plastic materials was identified as a commonly used 
measure. However, these practical measures can be used to a great extent and are limited by the cost 
in proportion to the sought protection. It is therefore possible to protect the sensor from most 
infringement attempts, but as mentioned, if a company really wants to access the knowledge, they 
most likely can. This is the main problem with ‘block 3’, that it offers no ‘bulletproof’ protection, 
but can be overridden if a trader really wants to and has the resources to do so. However, the 
analysis shows that it is important to utilise protective measures in order to enable the protection 
given by block 1. 
16.1.2 Conclusion 
The question is if these three blocks combined offer the necessary protection and property claims in 
order to capitalise the knowledge? First and foremost it is fairly easy to establish that the protection 
that is given by a combination of the blocks is better than relying, for example, on only the 
protection given by the FHL or the Directive. Adding the practical measures as a third protective 
step will most likely make it hard to access the knowledge for most companies since they lack the 
resources to utilise such operations. Therefore the use of the three blocks in combination will lower 
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the risk for infringement and thereby increasing the chance of SKF keeping the knowledge behind 
the sensor exclusive when dynamically utilising the secret within the sensor. 
 Following Petrusson’s and Heiden’s theories that in order to be capitalised, the asset needs 
to be viewed as a potentially secure object in commercial transaction. It is hard to establish where 
the threshold is for the asset to be viewed as secure enough. One way to investigate this is to 
compare the foundation of this platform to the system of patents. Assets, such as patents, are 
identified as secure objects since they undergo worldwide “investigation”, have to pass thresholds, 
and gives the proprietor an exclusive right to the technology. Patents also have the benefit of not 
losing its exclusiveness even if the competitors know everything about the technology. It is 
moreover safe to draw the conclusion that the risk of the patent losing its exclusivity is lower than 
the risk of a trade secret losing its exclusivity, even if the foundation of this platform is utilised. A 
competitor may breach the law and the Directive, the contract, and the practical protection with 
damages and penalties as a consequence, prison in some cases, or simply gains the same knowledge 
by own R&D. As soon as they gain the knowledge kept within the sensor there is no way to ‘take 
this knowledge back’. It is not possible to undo what someone has learned and therefore the 
exclusiveness of the knowledge is vanquished. The competitors can therefore build and sell copies 
of the SKFs sensor, without SKF being able to stop them. If the sensor were protected by a patent 
SKF these actions would be identified as infringements. Therefore it is rather safe to state that the 
market will most likely not identify the foundations of this platform as secure as the patent, making it 
an inferior system for transacting technology. However, there are some benefits. Although a cost 
analysis has not been made, utilising the foundation of the platform could pose as a cheaper 
alternative to patents. Furthermore, if utilised and not loosing the exclusivity, the foundation of this 
platform can offer time unlimited protection for the knowledge, as opposed to patents which 
generally give only twenty years of exclusivity.   
16.1.3 The Business Perspective 
It should first and foremost be stated that the sensor should not be sold. The risk of losing the 
exclusiveness is much higher if the sensor is sold since the buyer can for example legally reverse 
engineer the product, alternatively sell it to a third party. Therefore a business model utilising a 
licensing structure is recommended. With a licensing model it is easier to have a controlled and 
identifiable circle, thereby fulfilling the requirements in both the FHL and the Directive. 
Furthermore the licensing agreement should at least address the risks that are identified as imminent 
and connect breach of them to heavy penalties in order to create a preventive effect. Another 
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finding is that the licensee should in the early stages of the negotiations sign a NDA in order to 
show that the licensee was in bad faith when acquiring the sensor. The use of the protective 
measures analysed in the third block offers several different options. It is however identified that 
moulding the sensor with a combination of plastic and cast iron while also gluing the circuitry to this 
mould, is a rather effective protection from the sensor being dismantled or any other use of NDT-
method, which are also identified as the most imminent risks. Combining these two practical 
measures with a secondary shell is identified as the best protection given that they are rather cheap 
compared to the protection they offer. If however there are resources, a GPS should be attached to 
the sensor and it should be encrypted so that only a certain computer can receive the information. 
These systems will reduce the risk of the licensee transferring the sensor to a third party, however, as 
mentioned, from a business perspective this might not be a sustainable solution. 
 An interesting finding, from a business perspective, is that the threshold for what should be 
deemed as a trade secret is low. Even if the sensor would consist of a very simple solution it is likely 
possible to claim it as a trade secret according to the legal definition of FHL and maybe the 
Directive. This means that a business model focusing on utilising trade secret can be used for almost 
any product. Given that there is a demand for such product, one can imagine the scenario where the 
foundations of the platform is used for a product that is cheap to produce. With the protection from 
the three blocks the knowledge of the components within can be made more or less exclusive, 
making it possible to raise the margins for the product since no one knows what is actually in them. 
Following the interview with Pernilla Hallberg, customer administrator at ACtronics, this business 
model is already used within the automotive industry. Cheap components are protected by practical 
measures and contractual claims while they are sold very expensively since no one knows that the 
products consist of cheap components. This business model could be a strategy in order to increase 
the margins on certain products within other industries as well, for example in the industry that SKF 
operates in.  
16.2 Openly Available Knowledge 
In order to make the final conclusion where the three blocks are connected to each other the 
findings under each block will be briefly summarised to serve as a basis for the conclusion.  
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16.2.1 Summary 
16.2.1.1 Block 1 
Claiming trade secrets is done in the business arena, due to a lack of administrative arena, and 
upheld in the judicial arena if necessary. It is in the first block established that the manual and the 
knowledge within is considered as trade secrets according to both FHL and the Directive, why the 
manual may be claimed as property. However, when dynamically utilising trade secrets, as in the case 
with the manual, the control position and level of protection granted by the FHL and the Directive 
is not sufficient, since they are designed for static use. The activity prerequisite also becomes more 
extensive for dynamic uses, especially for the Directive. Utilising confidentiality provisions or 
marking the manual, as ‘Confidential’ or ‘Trade secret of SKF’ will increase the level of protection, 
however the control and protection is nonetheless not sufficient for dynamic utilisation. When 
selling the manual the control is lost completely, even though it might still be a trade secret, why 
licensing is a preferable solution. However, both licensing and selling to a wide circle will imply that 
the manual loses its status as a trade secret. Both FHL and the Directive utilise prevention in terms 
of damages, which are difficult to establish the size of, to ensure obedience and retain control over 
the trade secret.  
 One of the main problems under the first block is to ensure that the customer is in bad faith 
about the manual being a trade secret, to be possible to be held responsible, which is done by 
utilising NDAs or marking the manual as ‘Confidential’ or ‘Trade secret of SKF’. This will also fulfil 
the activity criterion of FHL and most likely the Directive. Another main problem is to ensure that 
the circle of people remains “identified and closed” when transferring the manual to the customer, 
which is done both by selecting few customers and ensuring that as few people as possible have 
access to the manual once transferred. 
16.2.1.2 Block 2 
In the second block is analysed the possibility to claim the knowledge within the manual as property 
using contracts, which is a weaker property claim compared to the one in the first block. Using 
contractual provisions fulfils the activity criterion of FHL and most likely the Directive and enables 
the protection granted by said legal acts. Regardless of the provisions in a contract the sanctions 
available are mainly penalties, which has a preventive function. In both first two blocks it is 
established that if a customer, that the manual has been transferred to, want to, she can do whatever 
she wants with the manual as long as she is prepared to pay the price in terms of damages and 
penalties, if detected at all. 
130 
 The main problems under block 2 is the nature of a contracts and contractual obligations, 
and that it, from a business perspective, may be difficult to reach a common ground in the 
negotiations about the contractual provisions. The nature of a contract is that regardless of its design 
it will not actually hinder any of the parties to perform any actions, apart from the prevention it 
constitutes when considering the sanctions. This is the reason why the sanctions should be as severe 
as possible, which then again relates to the first problem of agreeing upon them. 
16.2.1.3 Block 3 
The third and final block is analysed as an attempt to address the issues with the two first blocks. 
Different practical protective measures can be utilised as means to prevent the manual from getting 
into the wrong hands. These measures imply that the activity criterion gets fulfilled, and enables the 
protection granted by FHL and the Directive, as well as the protection from contractual provisions. 
By limiting the information within the manual, if possible, transferring the manual could be done 
with very little risk. However, transferring knowledge ‘openly’, as with a manual, will always be done 
with some degree of risk. Limiting the amount of information within the manual might however 
have consequences for the claim and protection granted by block 1, however unlikely. It is also 
established that the control position is better for a digital manual than an analogue, since it is easier 
to protect a digital manual from the different identified risks.   
The main problems for block three is how to limit the information within the manual and 
how to ensure a high enough level of protection. Both problems are highly depending on the 
individual case since the characteristics of the information will determine how much the information 
may be limited as well as which additional protections may be applied. There is also the issue of 
possibility from a business perspective, both in terms of costs and that both parties need to agree to 
the measures. 
16.2.2 Conclusion 
In order to dynamically transact trade secrets with a minimum of risks, as in the case of the manual, 
the question is not so much if each individual block in the thesis provide a strong enough property 
claim and control position to facilitate the transfer but rather if it is possible to build the foundations 
for a platform with enough protection and control for transferring trade secrets by combining the 
three of blocks.  
The three blocks provide different aspects of the unity that is required for transferring trade 
secrets while still maintaining control over the knowledge and limiting risks. The first block provides 
the initial property claim and unwarranted actions that are sanctioned by damages. The second block 
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increases the effectiveness of the first block via confidentiality provisions while increasing the 
property claim overall via the contract. The second block also makes explicit what the parties may 
and may not do, what the sanctions are if these provisions are broken and general preventive 
measures such as a big up-front payment. The third block adds a practical level of protection 
implying an even stronger property claim as well as more or less effective methods of preventing 
misappropriation of the manual. Like the second block the third block increases the effectiveness of 
the first block.  
Combining the three blocks will most likely imply a strong property claim combined with 
effective preventive measures and sanctions if any unwarranted actions are taken. On top of this 
practical solutions will make it more difficult to perform any such unwarranted actions either by will 
or by chance. It should nonetheless be noted that even if the control and protection will be high 
there are always risks associated with dynamic use of trade secrets as it is practically impossible to 
protect the trade secret from all sorts of risk as well as the fact that trade secrets does not give any 
exclusivity over the knowledge they comprise.  
Petrusson and Heiden state that in order for an asset claimed as property to be capitalised 
upon there is a need for it to be seen as a potentially secure object in a commercial transaction. Will 
the trade secret be secure enough when utilising the foundation of the platform to sustain the value 
of the trade secret while at the same time using it dynamically? The answer is most likely yes, 
however the answer is dependent partly on the level of protection that can be attained by the 
practical protections and the prevention block 1 and 2, and partly on the strength of the proprietor 
of the trade secret in the business arena. If it is impossible to use any practical protections, or just a 
few, weak, ones, and the prevention granted by block 1 and 2 is low, the trade secret will in most 
cases not be secure enough to sustain the value of the trade secret while using it dynamically. This 
might however be offset by the strength in the business arena which can be leveraged into higher 
protection from legal, contractual and practical measures to arrive at a sufficient level of protection. 
The bottom line is therefore that even if there is no exclusivity over the knowledge, the protection 
and control granted by the three blocks combined should in many cases be enough for dynamically 
utilising trade secrets while maintaining the value of the knowledge, as long as the risk is not too big 
from a business perspective.  
It should be emphasised that dynamically utilising trade secrets may be done regardless of 
level of protection, however, in such a case the associated risks will be significantly higher and it will 
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be more difficult to sustain the value of the knowledge, why it is not advisable to dynamically utilise 
trade secret without the protection from the basis of the platform. 
Providing the manual through a data room that may only be accessed through a device 
supplied by SKF, as well as limiting the information by making the manual interactive and ensuring 
it is impossible to go back to a previous section in the manual are the key protective measures and 
will many times provide a sufficient level of protection for dynamically utilise trade secrets in a 
commercial transaction.  
The case that have been used to visualise the possibilities and limitations is that of a manual 
as it is typically a text of some sort, maybe with illustrations to visualise, where the valuable 
information is openly available for anyone who has access to the manual. In order for the findings to 
be of any interest and have any impact they should be possible to generalise, to be possible to apply 
to other cases as well. As a manual is more or less a written document, and as it would seem 
reasonable that transferring knowledge protected as trade secrets would be done this way, for 
instance when transferring know-how as in the case or some other type of information, the findings 
in relation to this case are applicable to other similar cases when knowledge is transferred. The 
exception might be the practical solutions for limiting the information within the manual, as many 
times when transferring knowledge the goal is to present all of it.  
As the way of transferring and controlling knowledge that is analysed in this thesis is, 
compared to patents for instance, relatively cheap, it is a cost efficient alternative that can be useful 
especially for start-ups or SMEs that might not have the resources to protect knowledge by, for 
instance, patent protection.     
16.2.3 The Business Perspective 
Since transferring the manual has its risks SKF should strive for utilising their own technicians for 
installing the bearings, as this will allow for SKF to remain in total control over the knowledge. 
However, many times this is not possible since the customer wants to install the bearings 
themselves. If the customer cannot agree to let SKF’s technicians install the bearings there is a need 
to consider the value of the deal as such and compare it to the estimated value of the knowledge 
within the manual. If the deal is worth a lot compared to the knowledge within the manual, there are 
few business reasons that would speak for not entering into the business deal, even though there are 
risks associated with it, and vice versa. 
If the manual is to be transferred to a customer it should neither be given nor be sold to the 
customer, as SKF will lose control over the knowledge. A better solution from a business 
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perspective is to license the manual instead, this model ensures better control over the knowledge at 
the same time, as the customer will get access to the knowledge needed to install the bearings. This 
model will also allow for SKF to license the same knowledge several times, with possibility of higher 
earnings compared to selling the manual. 
It should be noted that even if there are several protective measures that may be applied it 
might not be possible to apply all of these measures, either contractual or practical. If the value of 
the knowledge is low, fewer protective measures should be applied, however, this is mainly in 
relation to practical solutions as the marginal cost for adding another provision in an agreement is 
low. There is also the issue that the parties need to agree on all the protective measures, the 
customer might think that the protective measures are too far-reaching in which case the parties 
need to negotiate a common ground.  
Another aspect of increasing the protection is that it might increase the possibilities to 
receive higher payment for the manual if the information is limited enough so that the customer 
does not know what is hidden. It is possible to leverage the ignorance of the customer to increase 
the price, since the customer is not aware of the value of the knowledge. This is more difficult to do 
for openly available knowledge as compared to embedded knowledge.  
17 Concluding Remarks 
To dynamically use trade secrets as many protective measures from the foundations of the platform 
as possible should be utilised in order to maintain the value. If this is done, dynamically using trade 
secrets may be done with a sufficient level of protection to ensure that the value of the trade secret 
is maintained. If this is not done the value might be sustained anyway, but the risks associated with 
the transfer are higher. With these two cases the authors have shown that the foundation of the 
platform is applicable in a variety of cases where the owner or proprietor wants to dynamically use 
her trade secrets. However, the two cases also show vast differences depending on how the 
knowledge is packaged. When the knowledge is openly available, as in the manual case, the customer 
gets access to the knowledge whereas in the embedded case the customer has no initial access. The 
openly available case also visualises the inherent problems with knowledge, that it is non-excludable 
etc., which in this case for instance implies that it can be copied and spread to unlimited amount of 
people, whereas the embedded case cannot be ‘copied’ in the same way since it requires a product 
representation, which requires resources. Regardless of the differences of the cases many times the 
same conclusions are arrived to, e.g. both should be licensed rather than sold, both should be 
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transferred to a controlled number of customers, both need practical protective measures to ensure 
sufficient level of control etc.   
Even if the thesis takes the perspective on knowledge owned by a ‘big’ company the authors 
believe that the findings are, and can be used generally. One can imagine start-ups or SMEs utilising 
the foundations of this platform as an alternative to patents in order to transact knowledge. The 
most obvious reasons for this is that patents are relatively costly while the foundations of the 
platform offer protection to lower costs. However, the question is if start-ups or SMEs are given 
sufficient protection from this foundation since – as the analysis shows throughout the thesis – 
power in the business arena, which start-ups and SMEs usually lack, might be necessary in order to 
get sufficient protection.  
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Appendix 1 - Article 3 EU Directive  
Article 3 
Unlawful acquisition, use and disclosure of trade secrets 
 
1. Member States shall ensure that trade secret holders are entitled to apply for the measures, 
procedures and remedies provided for in this Directive in order to prevent, or obtain redress 
for, the unlawful acquisition, use or disclosure of a trade secret.  
2. The acquisition of a trade secret without the consent of the trade secret holder shall be 
considered unlawful whenever carried out intentionally or with gross negligence by:  
      
(a)  unauthorised access to or copy of any documents, objects, materials, substances or 
electronic files, lawfully under the control of the trade secret holder, containing the 
trade secret or from which the trade secret can be deduced;  
(b)   theft;  
(c)   bribery; 
(d)   deception;  
(e)   breach or inducement to breach a confidentiality agreement or any other duty to 
maintain secrecy;  
(f)   any other conduct which, under the circumstances, is considered contrary to honest 
commercial practices.  
3. The use or disclosure of a trade secret shall be considered unlawful whenever carried out, 
without the consent of the trade secret holder, intentionally or with gross negligence, by a 
person who is found to meet any of the following conditions:   
(a)  has acquired the trade secret unlawfully;     
(b)  is in breach of a confidentiality agreement or any other duty to maintain secrecy of the 
trade secret; 
(c)  is in breach of a contractual or any other duty to limit the use of the trade secret. 
4. The use or disclosure of a trade secret shall also be considered unlawful whenever a person, 
at the time of use or disclosure, knew or should, under the circumstances, have known that 
the trade secret was obtained from another person who was using or disclosing the trade 
secret unlawfully within the meaning of the paragraph 3.  
5. The conscious and deliberate production, offering or placing on the market of infringing 
goods, or import, export or storage of infringing goods for those purposes, shall be 
considered an unlawful use of a trade secret.    
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